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Abstract 
 
 
This dissertation develops a theory that accounts for the rhetorical practices that 
constitute living entities as sacred, expendable, or somewhere in between. I forward a concept of 
zoerhetorics, defined as legible, consequential, public, and partisan discourses or practices that 
raise or lower the status of entities along lines intelligible to biopolitical regimes of living. These 
biopolitical trenches of difference include gender, race, and ability. Joining biopolitics and 
posthumanist rhetorical theory, zoerhetorical theory attempts to understand how lives come to 
matter along the status-laden thresholds of humanity and citizenship. The theory of zoerhetorics 
forwarded here draws on the biopolitical/necropolitical production of unequal populations in 
order to explain the processes by which some living entities obtain higher or lower statuses than 
other living entities.  
In order to ramify zoerhetorical theory, I analyze the trajectories of zoerhetorics across 
three field-assemblages in the contemporary United States. The first case study explores the 
ways in which rhetorics at the National Memorial for the Unborn in Chattanooga, Tennessee 
inflate the status of fetal entities. By employing the zoerhetorical tropes (or zoetropes) of 
naming, apostrophe (en-voicing), and prosopopeia (en-facing), the Memorial for the Unborn 
   iv 
inflates the status of the fetal entity, with resulting consequences of livability distributed across 
various groups of entities. The second case study explores the zoerhetorics of CIA drone strike 
targets in Pakistan, as represented in the New York Times. Across dichotomies of innocence 
(militant/civilian) and social belonging (U.S. citizen/Other), American-identified drone rhetorics 
produce racialized bodies for targeting in Pakistan. The third case study explores zoerhetorics of 
populations encouraged toward “life” as they exercise in upscale athletic clubs in Boulder, 
Colorado. Through zoe/rhetorics of training and whiteness, vitality-performing biocitizens 
maintain and justify accumulated embodied privilege through practices of vitality. At each of 
these sites, zoerhetorics operate in prescriptive, iterative ways for entities with a contested 
relationship to humanity: the fetus, the drone target, and the vital biocitizen. The final chapter 
concludes with a series of topoi (topical resources), horoi (boundary markers), and qualities of 
zoerhetorics, as well as recommended future directions for building zoerhetorical theory. 
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Introduction: 
 
What are Zoerhetorics? 
 
 
“All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.” 
 
— George Orwell1 
 
  
How do some lives come to matter? Why do some lives fail to matter? That some lives 
are valued more than others is a phenomenon observed across a range of popular and scholarly 
writings. Here is just a small sample. For starters, an old saw of journalism states that “a hundred 
Pakistanis going off a mountain in a bus make less of a story than three Englishmen drowning in 
the Thames.”2 This line has been attributed to American author Mort Rosenblum, and here he 
observes that, in major American-identified newspapers, some deaths get reported with more 
frequency and attention than other deaths. George Monbiot of The Guardian wrote in response to 
the Newtown killings, “In the U.S., mass child killings are tragedies. In Pakistan, mere bug 
splats.”3 Monbiot was comparing the American public outpouring of grief in response to the 
killing spree in a school in Connecticut with the minimal American response to the deaths of 
Pakistani children by CIA-issued drone strikes. In a similar journalistic spirit, Glenn Greenwald 
                              
1 George Orwell, Animal Farm (Orlando, FL: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing, 1945/2009). 
 
2 Jack Shafer, “The Rise and Fall of the “Bus Plunge” Story: What Killed this New York Times Staple?” 
November 13, 2006, Slate, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/press_box/2006/11/the_rise_and_fall_of_the_bus_plunge_story.ht
ml. 
 
3 George Monbiot, “In the U.S., Mass Child Killings are Tragedies. In Pakistan, Mere Bug Splats,” The 
Guardian, December 17, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/dec/17/us-killings-tragedies-
pakistan-bug-splats. 
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recently observed, “It’s as though there are two types of crimes: killing, and then the killing of 
Americans.”4 Here Greenwald was addressing the conservative outrage over the deaths of 
Americans in Benghazi, Libya. Darling of the critical left that he is, Greenwald, like his former 
Guardian colleague Monbiot, was quick to indict the United States for enforcing what he called 
a “hierarchy of life.” Indeed, as I will show later, across human societies there exists something 
like a hierarchy of life, despite the myriad pronouncements we may make against it. The popular 
Pope Francis recently made such a pronouncement. In an address to Catholic medical 
professionals at the Vatican, Francis beseeched those present to 
 
 
…bear witness to and disseminate this ‘culture of life’… remind all, through actions and 
words, in all its phases and at any age, life is always sacred and always of quality. And 
not as a matter of faith, but of reason and science! There is no human life more sacred 
than another, just as there exists no human life qualitatively more meaningful than 
another.5 
 
Although this declaration by Francis is underwritten by a Catholic theology and political agenda, 
his contention that all lives are equal is one that is generally repeated throughout much of the so-
called civilized world. 
Journalists and popes are not the only people noticing that some lives seem to be 
attributed more value than other lives. A number of scholars across a range of academic 
disciplines have also discerned (and critiqued) these differences in life status. Perhaps most 
famously, Paul Farmer, a respected Harvard anthropologist, coined a quotable quote. He wrote, 
                              
4 Glenn Greenwald, “The Tragic Consulate Killings in Libya and America’s Hierarchy of Life,” The 
Guardian, September 12, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/sep/12/tragic-consulate-killings-
libya. 
 
5 “Francis: No Human Life is More Valuable Than Another,” September 20, 2013, Vatican Information 
Service, http://visnews-en.blogspot.com/2013/09/francis-no-human-life-is-more-valuable.html. 
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“The idea that some lives matter less is the root of all that is wrong with the world.” In its virally 
infinite web redistributions, this quote is often accompanied by a close-up image of a teary 
young boy, sometimes Asian, sometimes black. In this moment, Farmer not only acknowledges 
the unequal distribution of value for human lives, but also centers this inequality as the “root” of 
all global problems. In 2011, historian David Livingstone Smith published a book that argued 
that all human societies dehumanize other humans, debasing them in a way that resembles the 
treatment of non-human animals.6 In a similar observation, philosopher Judith Butler wrote that 
some lives seem to possess more “grievability” than others.7 In my own field of rhetorical theory, 
in his award-winning book Prisoners of Conscience, Gerard Hauser observed of the Abu Ghraib 
torture memos that “contrary to human rights accords, under conditions of war, some lives are 
more precious than others, and therefore are more deserving of protection than others.”8  
This is just a small sampling of the many examples of these moments that I have gathered 
over the recent years. These collected observations let me know that I am not alone in 
acknowledging that some lives seem to have more value than others in the contemporary world, 
but rather that this phenomena has been documented over and over again. Even the most cursory 
sweep of both U.S. and international conditions of living (or dying) would demonstrate what 
both common sense and critical theory also dictate to be true—a hierarchical series of cultural 
valuations drive distributions of livability. Despite much official and vernacular attention paid to 
equal human rights, and a technical legal equality dictated by International Humanitarian Law, 
                              
6 David Livingstone Smith, Less than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 2011). 
 
7 Judith Butler, Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? (London: Verso, 2009). 
 
8 Gerard Hauser, Prisoners of Conscience: Moral Vernaculars of Political Agency (Columbia: University 
of South Carolina Press, 2012), 357. 
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human lives are not equal.9 At the same time that rhetorics of global human rights proliferate, 
many humans, as George Orwell quipped of his titular farm animals, “are more equal than 
others.”10  
 How do these differences in status, value, and livability come to happen? Arguably, we 
do not have a good understanding of the rhetorical patterns by which some lives achieve more 
value than other lives. In this dissertation, I give a name to the rhetorics that inflate or deflate the 
value of lives: zoerhetorics. By “rhetorics,” I mean the meaningful, consequential, partisan, and 
legible discourses and practices that circulate in various publics. 11 This dissertation develops a 
theory that accounts for how zoerhetorics, or discourses or practices that modulate the status of 
living entities, operate in contemporary regimes of living.  
Why are zoerhetorics important? Zoerhetorics are literally a matter of life and death. 
Depending on how we rhetorically frame groups of persons, their lives may be more or less 
livable. Consider the inflationary value of a document/event like the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which arguably granted sweeping legal protections to persons across the globe. 
Alternatively, consider the deadly deflationary effects of repeatedly referring to a group of 
persons as subhumans (like the Nazis did of the Jews—they were literally called Untermeschen, 
or “under men”) or animals (like Rwandan government radio broadcasts that characterized the 
                              
9 For a critique of the international human rights movement, see David Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue: 
Reassessing International Humanitarianism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). The complex history 
of notions of human equality is more than I have space for here, but suffice it to say that the shift from a “natural” 
hierarchy to the world (a concept that subtends, for example, the Great Chain of Being) to a universal human rights 
did not automatically level sociopolitical hierarchies of privileges and resources. Not only are humans not equal 
now, but they have never been equal.  
 
10 Orwell, Animal Farm. 
 
11 For this definition of rhetoric, I am inspired by: Carole Blair, Greg Dickinson, and Brian Ott, 
“Introduction: Rhetoric/Memory/Place,” in Places of Public Memory: The Rhetoric of Museums and Memorials, 
eds. Greg Dickinson, Carole Blair, and Brian Ott (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2010). 
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Tutsis as cockroaches).12 Both of these latter examples attempted to justify mass slaughters, but 
plenty of dehumanization rhetorics result in less spectacular suffering.  
Thus far I have been using the word dehumanization, but the zoerhetorical effects I seek 
to understand are much broader than just lowering the status of humans. In fact, zoerhetorical 
processes both make and unmake humans. One of the major problems with theories of 
dehumanization thus far—a problem that this project intends to correct—is that they assume that 
what it means to be “human” is stable, transhistorical, and essential. David Livingstone Smith, 
for example, assumes throughout his recent book on dehumanization that all humans are just, 
well, obviously human. It is important to remember—as Smith himself has pointed out— 
that who gets to “count” as human is a culturally specific and contested thing. In fact, many of 
the “people” that count as “people” now were not considered real people throughout history. Yet 
by focusing only on how humans are rhetorically unmade, Smith never stops to think about how 
they are rhetorically made.13 With the concept of zoerhetorics, I attend to both processes of 
humanization and dehumanization. Furthermore, I argue that these processes must be understood 
in tandem. 
Because of the sociohistorical ambiguity around who gets to count as human, I 
understand humanity both as a performative practice (yes—you are “performing” humanity right 
now) and as a discursive resource of human exceptionalism. In other words, following 
posthumanist theorists, humanity is an artificial boundary that we have constructed to create an 
“us” and a “them.” We could define animals as exactly those who have been excluded from 
                              
12 I get this latter example from Smith, Less Than Human. 
 
13 Ibid. 
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humanity, and humans as the animal for whom being called human is important.14 Rather than an 
ontogenetic species-marker, humanity is defined by its cultural fissures, divisions, exclusions, 
gray areas, and states of exception.  
For that reason, we need to talk about zoerhetorics across a range of living entities. By a 
range of living entities, I mean anything that is “alive” or can be “lively”—humans, primates, 
insects, plants, bacteria, and even things (I will talk about the vibrancy of things more later). I am 
especially interested in zoerhetorics around liminal entities whose status is contested. For 
example, what about potential humans, like stem cells and fetuses? What about animals? The 
animal kingdom perhaps experiences the widest range of zoerhetorical attributions (something I 
will define later as “zoerhetorical swing”). Animals can be either recognized as legal persons, as 
dolphins are in India, feted and cared for as cherished companion animals, or force-fed the feces 
of their brethren as they are raised for slaughter in intensive meat farming operations. 
In what follows, I aim to forward a theory of zoerhetorics in order to explain the process 
by which some living entities obtain and maintain higher or lower statuses than other living 
entities. Zoerhetorics are discourses, objects, events, or practices that raise or lower the status of 
a life or lives along biopolitically intelligible regimes of living. Biopolitics is the branch of 
critical theory that makes sense of the way that “life itself” is regulated. Integral to the operation 
of zoerhetorics are the status-laden thresholds of animality, humanity, and citizenship, which are 
striated by biopolitically entrenched lines of difference: species, gender, race, etc. In fact, the zoe 
prefix of zoerhetorics derives from an important book in biopolitical theory: Giorgio Agamben’s 
Homo Sacer. According to Agamben’s contested etymology, zoe (ζωὴ) is an Ancient Greek 
                              
14 These definitions are inspired by: Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, trans. Kevin Attell 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003); Jacques Derrida, The Animal that Therefore I Am (Bronx, NY: 
Fordham University Press, 2008). 
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word for “life” that describes the spectrum of all living entities, including humans, animals, and 
plants.15  It is the source for our modern-day words like “zoo” and “protozoa.”  I take the prefix 
of zoe not for its claims to etymological accuracy, nor to reproduce Agamben’s categorical 
ontology of bare life,  but for its capacities to index biopolitical theory and plumb the depths of 
living entities beyond the human.16  
This dissertation explores these rhetorical practices that constitute living entities as 
sacred, expendable, or somewhere in between. I will focus on contemporary zoerhetorics in the 
United States. A life can be raised to properly and fully human, or lowered and dehumanized to 
subhuman or unworthy status. Over the course of studying and writing about zoerhetorics, I have 
fabricated a number of terms. I provide this mini-glossary as a resource for readability: 
Zoerhetorics: Meaning-laden, consequential, legible, public, and partisan discourses, 
objects, or practices that inflate, deflate, or maintain the status of an entity or group of entities, 
especially along the biopolitical fault lines of species, race, gender, sexuality, ability, etc. 
Zoerhetorical theory: A series of suppositions that posit general patterns to which 
zoerhetorical modulations of status conform. 
Zoerhetorical modulation: A demarcated inflationary or deflationary rhetorical event; the 
consequential result of a series of successful zoerhetorics.  
                              
15 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). 
 
16 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 187. 
 
 8 
Zoerhetorical hierarchy: A sociopolitically ranked arrangement of entities who, 
proportional to their contested position on the hierarchy, experience partisan distributions of 
livability (adapted from linguist Mel Chen’s concept of “animacy hierarchy”).17 
Zoerhetorical swing: The range of status attributions for a group of entities across a given 
public. Animals and fetal entities, for example, have a wide zoerhetorical swing; the vitality-
performing white biocitizen has a narrow zoerhetorical swing. 
Zoetrope: Zoerhetorical trope; a figure of speech that inflates, deflates, or maintains the 
status of an entity or group of entities. I will later identify how naming, metonymy, apostrophe, 
and prosopopeia operate as zoetropes. 
 
How to Read this Dissertation: Organizational Rationale 
 
In the first chapter, I situate zoerhetorical theory within an interdisciplinary body of 
conceptual and methodological literature. I argue that the European rhetorical tradition’s history 
of complicity with hierarchy is longer than its history of providing tools for leveling these 
hierarchies. At the same time, rhetoric’s intersection with the fields of posthumanism and 
biopolitics provide exciting openings for understanding sociopolitical hierarchies in new ways. 
The goal for this chapter is to provide a theoretical and methodological framework for the 
ensuing three case studies.  
In the next chapters, I analyze zoerhetorical patterns across three sites. The first case 
study explores the ways in which rhetorics at the National Memorial for the Unborn in 
Tennessee inflate the status of fetal entities. The second case study explores the zoerhetorics of 
                              
17 Mel Y. Chen, Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2012), Kindle Edition. 
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populations targeted for drone strike death in Pakistan, as represented in the New York Times and 
its ancillary rhetorics. The third case study explores zoerhetorics of populations nourished 
toward life and vitality as they exercise in athletic clubs in Boulder, Colorado. I chose these 
diverse case studies because I wanted to demonstrate and analyze a wide array of zoerhetorical 
modulations. At the memorial for the unborn, I was interested in the fetus as a contested, liminal 
entity. How do zoerhetorics operate around an entity whose status is so essentially contested? 
Similarly, how do zoerhetorics operate around a group of entities who are labeled as enemy 
targets under conditions of war? This is why I chose to analyze the way the New York Times 
framed CIA drone strikes and their resulting “collateral damage.”  
  Whether it was an actual “place” like the NMU, or material/text/place like the New York 
Times, I conceived of all of these case studies as field-assemblages, or heterogenous collections 
of materialities and signs with emergent properties. My guiding research question at each field-
assemblage was, “How are entities being inflated or deflated here? What are the patterns? What 
are the consequences?” In order to answer these questions, I employed rhetorical field method 
work (such as participant observation), informed with feminist qualitative reflexivity. 
 When I was originally choosing the case studies, I wanted one case study that was 
explicitly trying to raise the status of contested living entities (the NMU), one case study with 
explicit deflation of entities (New York Times drone targets), and another case study where 
already high-status entities worked to maintain their privilege (the upscale gym). The funny thing 
that I found, however, was that I could identify both inflationary and deflationary zoerhetorical 
effects at all of these sites. One of the insights of this dissertation is that status inflations and 
deflations typically go hand-in-hand. Each of the case studies in this dissertation zoerhetorically 
critiques an issue of contemporary exigence, contributing both to the rhetorical theory 
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scholarship particular to the case as well as the broader ramifications of zoerhetorical theory. I 
will elaborate more on each field-assemblage below.   
 Rhetorics at the National Memorial for the Unborn, and pro-life fetal rhetorics more 
broadly, attempt to raise the status of the fetus—one of the most contested entities in the world. 
This site allows me an opportunity to dissect zoerhetorics that aspire to jump across the threshold 
of humanity. The public fetus is subject to a sweeping range of status assignations—from “a 
clump of cells” to full human citizen—a zoerhetorical contestability that can be at least partially 
attributed to its silence as an entity. Silent entities for whom we speak, such as fetuses, stem 
cells, and brain dead persons, provide an opportunity for rhetors to “zoetrope” these entities into 
personhood. In other words, they rhetorically become humans. In this study, I use rhetorical field 
methods and an assemblage theory frame to identify “zoetropes” as rhetorical devices that raise 
or lower the status of a life at the NMU. I identify three zoetropes in effect at the NMU: naming, 
en/voicing (apostrophe), and en/facing (prosopopeia). As the status of fetal entities inflates at the 
NMU, in turn, the status of fecund women whose reproductive practices to do not match those 
prescribed at the NMU necessarily deflates. 
 Following this focus on the unborn, I turn toward a distant Other that the United States 
has targeted for death: the often anonymous Pakistani military-aged male rendered as a 
“signature strike” target via surveillant drone technology in the War on Terror. Understanding 
the New York Times and official governmental drone rhetorics as material-discursive 
assemblages, I identify the rhetorics of innocence (across the faulty, eroded militant/civilian 
dichotomy) and the rhetorics of belonging (across the citizen/non-citizen dichotomy) in 
operation around drone targets. Parts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of North 
Waziristan exemplify what we might call deathworlds, and the rhetoric of the Times and the U.S. 
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government collude in the racialized marking of populations for death. This case study tracks the 
ways in which zoerhetorics have consequential effects for the livability of lives.  
 If death words help create deathworlds, as we see in the case of the War on Terror, life 
words help create lifeworlds. The third case study employs participant observation to explore the 
everyday vitality-performing habits of privileged bodies at pricy athletic clubs in Boulder, 
Colorado. In this chapter, I introduce the vitality-aspirant biocitizen and critique the ways in 
which bodies targeted for vitality accrue and store privilege. Through rhetorical practices of 
training and whiteness, vital biocitizens justify this accumulation of privilege and therefore their 
high-status positions on the zoerhetorical hierarchy.  
 In the conclusion, I make a series of observational comparisons across these cases in 
order to locate possible propositions of zoerhetorical theory. Each case study offers a 
zoerhetorical reading of an entity with special or unique status vis-à-vis humanity, belonging, 
and citizenship: the fetus, the terrorist, and the vitality-performing biocitizen. Taken together, the 
three case studies provide a broad-ranging overview of zoerhetorics in the contemporary United 
States. It is my hope that the insight gleaned from each of these chapters justifies the introduction 
of the concept of zoerhetorics and validates these first stabs of understanding how these 
zoerhetorics work. The final chapter concludes with a series of topoi (topical resources), horoi 
(boundary markers), and other qualities of zoerhetorics, as well as recommended future 
directions for building zoerhetorical theory. 
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Chapter One 
 
Zoerhetorics: Theory and Methods 
 
 
 How would you predict the outcome of this classroom activity? The instructor supplies a 
group of university students with a series of ten index cards. The cards say things like gold, tree, 
man, God, dirt, child, fish, ape, and woman. There are no other directions but this one sentence: 
put the cards in their proper order. What happens? Reliably, the students arrange the cards in an 
order that resembles the Great Chain of Being, or the ranked “natural” order of the world we 
have inherited from the Middle Ages.1 I relay my experience of this pedagogical activity for two 
reasons. First—and this should come as no surprise—students, like anyone else, have absorbed 
and can recreate a so-called “natural” hierarchy to the social world. Second—herein lies the 
teachable moment—this activity makes students intensely uncomfortable. They immediately 
want to challenge the natural hierarchy that they themselves have recreated, especially along 
lines of gender, race, or age. They say things like, “We can’t rank humans because all humans 
are equal,” and arrange the cards depicting different human identity-markers laterally. At its best, 
this activity opens into class discussions that grapple with hard questions. How do we come to 
“know” that there is a hierarchy to the world? How come we accept some elements of the 
hierarchy more than others? How do we resist the hierarchy? The shortest, if vague and 
noncommittal, answer to these questions is “rhetoric.” This dissertation is an attempt to provide a 
somewhat longer answer. 
                              
1 I am indebted to Professor Jenell Johnson at the University of Wisconsin, Madison for this pedagogical 
activity. 
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 I like to tell this story because it demonstrates the persistence of hierarchical thinking in 
the social world. In everyday vernacular and official contexts, ordinary U.S. Americans absorb, 
recreate, and challenge zoerhetorical hierarchies. Even as we collectively try to bulldoze social 
hierarchies with movements like socialism, universal human rights, feminism, and anti-racism, 
hierarchies endure. Even at a time when it is no longer possible to say seriously, in a public 
context in the United States, that men are superior to women, or white people are superior to 
black people, hierarchical social arrangements persist. 
Why do hierarchies matter? Because they have serious consequences for how livable 
someone’s life can be. Bodies are nourished or malnourished, appreciated or attenuated, 
succored or scored, distinguished or extinguished, martyred or murdered, soothed or doomed, 
cured or curtailed, and triaged or truncated, based on their position in a given sociopolitical 
hierarchy. In this dissertation, I am interested in the rhetorical dimensions of these hierarchies. 
How does the current hierarchical arrangement come be accepted as il/legitimate, un/necessary, 
or im/proper? What are the rhetorical dimensions of regimes of living and dying? By what 
rhetorical means are lives encouraged toward life or targeted for death?  
In order to answer these questions, I draw from two fields, or more accurately, one 
discipline and one branch of critical theory: rhetorical studies and biopolitics. Though 
conversations have started between these two bodies of thought, I contend that they still have a 
lot to say to each other. Rhetorical studies helps us make sense of the various circulating public 
rhetorics that legitimate the kind of unequal distributions of livability I have been talking about. 
Biopolitical theory gives us a framework for understanding how contemporary regimes of living 
produce these inequalities. 
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This chapter situates zoerhetorical theory in the existing rhetorical studies and 
biopolitical literature. First, I review rhetorical theory’s gambols into understanding hierarchy, 
which center on the work of Kenneth Burke. This will lead to a critique of the ways in which the 
rhetorical tradition has colluded in hierarchy-making. Next, I argue that any thorough exploration 
of contemporary hierarchies must take into account biopolitics and necropolitics, as populations 
are recommended for life, deterioration, or death along deep biopolitical trenches. Although 
some biopolitical theory germinates in rhetorical studies venues, which I briefly review, the 
articulations between these fields have been impoverished. Finally, I collate the ethical and 
conceptual commitments that inspire my methodological approach, which relies on rhetorical 
field methods as a practice and assemblage theory as a conceptual frame, infused with a prudent 
dose of feminist reflexivity.  
 
The Rhetorical Tradition…of Hierarchy 
 
Whether considered sacred or killable, the status of all lives is modulated by hierarchy-
driven rhetorical practices. Which tools, concepts, or topoi from the rhetorical tradition can be 
pressed into the service of discussing these modulations? This is a tricky question, because our 
forefigures both provide tools for understanding hierarchy while also justifying a natural 
hierarchic order to the world. But the latter precedes the former, as I will show. For most of its 
long history, the European rhetorical tradition labors to justify a natural order to the world. The 
development of the rhetorical tradition was, as Terry Eagleton claimed, “utterly inseparable from 
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the social relations of exploitation.”2 In this section I will provide a historical gloss of the ways 
that rhetoric has grown around hierarchy like a tree growing around a wire.  
Before I embark, let me clarify what I mean by hierarchy. One of the first documented 
uses of the term occurred in the sixth century by Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita. He used it to 
properly divvy up the angels, developing the word from the Greek hierarcha, “rule by priests” or 
“sacred rule.”3 Historically there have been celestial, ecclesiastical, imperial, and any number of 
other kinds of hierarchies, but when I use the term I am referring to a consequential 
sociopolitical hierarchy that ranks living entities: a zoerhetorical hierarchy. A “zoerhetorical 
hierarchy” is a ranked arrangement of entities who, proportional to their contested position on 
the hierarchy, experience partisan distributions of livability. In this dissertation, I am interested 
in the contemporary zoerhetorical hierarchies in the United States. 
In one sense, theories of hierarchy start where rhetoric starts, at least according to the 
standard narrative—in Ancient Athens. From Plato we inherited the seeds of what would grow 
into the Great Chain of Being in the Middle Ages—a sense of a natural order of the world, with 
Go(o)d at the apex. In Plato’s narrative, the cookery craft of rhetoric consistently failed to realize 
the true nature of this hierarchy, compared to her Platonic twin, dialectic. For Plato, all possible 
kinds of things existed in the world—the world was complete, or demonstrated plenitude. (Here 
we can distinguish between hierarchies of value and social hierarchies, related but analytically 
distinct). To the full plenitude of Plato’s hierarchy, Aristotle added continuity and gradation. For 
instance, Aristotle’s pathbreaking zoology contributed a natural gradient order to the world with 
                              
2 Terry Eagleton, Walter Benjamin, or, Towards a Revolutionary Criticism (London: Verso, 1981), 101-2. 
 
3 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “hierarchy.” 
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his linear taxonomic classification of animals, that, of course, placed humans above the rest.4 
Ever since, as Arthur Lovejoy has shown, narrative systems of natural orders often feature these 
three qualities of plenitude, continuity, and gradation.5 
Selectively the Western rhetorical tradition lassoes in or ignores scholars of the Middle 
Ages in its grand narrative of rhetorical history. With Saint Augustine, Albertus Magnus, and his 
famous student, Thomas Aquinas, we get the most sophisticated version of the Great Chain of 
Being, which is worth recounting here for its tenacious persistence in Western thought. At the 
apex of the Great Chain resides God, representing the highest degree of perfection. After God 
and angels (archangels, seraphim, then cherubim) come humans, apes, other animals, plants, and 
minerals. Humans occupied a unique position in the scala naturae (Latin for “nature’s ladder”), 
because they shared qualities with divine creatures above them, such as an eternal spirit, but 
were also condemned to lives of enfleshed desire like those of the animals below them.  
The Great Chain described the complete universe. Augustine’s aphoristic response to 
why God created all things good and bad, was “Non essent omnia, si essent aequalia,” or, “If all 
things were equal, all things would not be.”6 In other words, in order for God’s world to be 
perfect, all possible diversity of kinds must be in the world—this is the notion of plenitude that 
Augustine inherited from Plato. An entity’s essential status in the natural order of the world 
determined its position on the ladder. In his writing on the duty of the Christian orator, 
Augustine’s commitment to eloquence and truth also bespeaks a nascent natural order to the 
world. Like all kinds of species-types, humans were expected to strain for perfection, and it was 
                              
4 Arthur Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (Piscataway, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 2009). 
 
5 Ibid. 
 
6 Bhikhu C. Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (Boston: Harvard 
University Press, 2002), 23. 
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the primary duty of Christian orators to teach the way of this perfection, and not to let words 
themselves obscure truth.7 In the Rhetoric of Religion, Burke picked up on the verbal hierarchies 
at work in Augustine’s Confessions. As a preacher of the “The Word,” Augustine mined the 
linguistic power reserved in God terms (and the term God).8 
Great Chain of Being narratives from the Middle Ages prefigure the contestation and 
boundary work of human-making that I will discuss later. For example, as David Livingstone 
Smith explained, medieval scholars 
 
…divided humanity into a series of subtypes ranked from “highest” to “lowest.” 
Unsurprisingly, considering their origin, most of these schemes modestly placed 
Caucasians at the pinnacle of humanity and relegated Native Americans and Sub-Saharan 
Africans to the bottom, only a hair’s breadth away from apes.9 
 
 
The phrase “hair’s breadth” is important here, because it demonstrates another key feature of the 
Chain: continuity. According to Albertus Magnus, borrowing from Aristotle, everything on the 
ladder was substantively linked, in uninterrupted enchainment, to the entities between which it 
was sandwiched. In the example Livingstone cites above, Sub-Saharan Africans, then, were 
considered to possess overlapping qualities with both the apes above them and the humans below 
them. The crucial point here, besides the despicable imperialist superiority justified by the Chain, 
is the imbricative fluidity between entities. This fluidity or fungibility, as I will argue in the third 
chapter, provides a discursive resource by which it becomes possible to metonymically shift 
entities up and down the hierarchy. 
                              
7 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). Here I reference Book Four, 
“On Christian Orators.” 
 
8 Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1970). 
 
9 David Livingstone Smith, Less than Human (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2011) Kindle Loc. 40. 
 18 
Although the Great Chain of Being sounds absurdly antiquated now, its core ideas persist 
as both rhetorical resources and as elements that operate on people through contemporary 
cultural valuations. The Great Chain of Being aspired to legitimacy based on a “natural” order to 
the world, and necessarily privileged the elite few as a result. In medieval versions of the Great 
Chain, the highest ranking human was the divinely ordained king, followed by land-owning lords 
and peasants. Not surprisingly, men as heads of household were placed above women and 
children. We could say that the Great Chain of Being was an incredibly convincing way to 
justify unequal distributions of livability in the Middle Ages and beyond. It offered a coherent, 
cohesive, overarching narrative that validated and perpetuated inequalities. While it seems like 
only white supremacists directly reference the Great Chain of Being today, the features of social 
hierarchy of the Chain carry to the contemporary world, albeit in different forms.10 
The idea of an ordained hierarchy to the world continued in the Western world through 
the early modern period, Renaissance, and into the nineteenth century. The European 
colonization of the Americas, Asia, and Africa in the fifteenth through nineteenth centuries 
depended on an ascribed “natural” order to the social world. The resulting subjugation of native 
people has been extensively documented in postcolonial scholarship. The history of rhetoric 
itself more than once served as platform to justify these hierarchical relations. According to 
Walter Mignolo, “[t]he authority of alphabetic writing and its “natural” links with history and 
rhetoric furnished sufficient proof for the Spaniards to look at other cultures as inferior.”11 
Furthermore, the subjugation of Amerindians, African Americans, and women through the 
                              
10 Here is an example of a white supremacist referring directly to the Great Chain of Being on the 
Occidental Quarterly website: http://www.toqonline.com/blog/heidegger-race-destiny/. 
 
11 Walter Mignolo, The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 112. 
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nineteenth century was often underwritten by Christian hierarchies. Susan Romano provided an 
example of Christian rhetoric in the service of hierarchy work in the New World in her 
discussion of bilingual sacrament handbooks for the Catholic conversion of Amerindians.12 Don 
Paul Abbot further extends this inquiry in his analysis of José de Acosta’s work. Acosta, a 
Spanish missionary, argued that conversion rhetorics aimed at native peoples must be 
fundamentally different from those aimed at Europeans because of the diminished capacity of 
native peoples.13 In his Rhetorica Christiana, Diego Valadés included for his native audience 
engravings elaborating multiple hierarchies, including ecclesiastical and imperialistic ones.14 The 
persistence and durability of the Great Chain of Being is evident through the early modern 
period.  
It was not until Kenneth Burke, however, that the rhetorical tradition was provided with a 
systematic theory for how language both attends and tends towards hierarchy. Prior to Burke, 
rhetoricians were concerned with rhetoric as a productive art—an art often used to maintain 
social hierarchies. Not only did Burke define man [sic] as the symbol-(mis)users “goaded by a 
spirit of hierarchy,” but his system of socioanagogic criticism depended on a series of 
hierarchies. A great example of Burke’s eccentric idiolect, the word “socioanagogic” forged 
together “social” and “anagogy.” Burke borrowed “anagogy” from theology, where it referred to 
a hermeneutic search for ultimate mystical relevance, often in Biblical texts. From the term’s 
first appearance in Permanence and Change through the socioanagogic reading of Shakespeare’s 
                              
12 Susan Romano, “Rhetoric in Latin America,” in The Handbook of Communication History, eds. Peter 
Simonson, Janice Peck, and Robert T. Craig (New York: Routledge, 2013), 397-411. 
 
13 Don Paul Abbott, Rhetoric in the New World: Rhetorical Theory and Practice in Colonial Spanish 
America (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1996). 
 
14 Ibid., picture inset. 
 
 20 
“Venus and Adonis” in Rhetoric of Motives, socioanagogic criticism provided ways of reading 
the world through secular appropriations of divinity. A theological employment of anagogy 
would involve reading, say, the Old Testament for ways in which eternity was represented. 
Burke’s secular, social anagogy pursued the characteristics and consequences for language’s 
range of social, political, and religious hierarchies. Of “Venus and Adonis,” he said, “[O]ur 
major concern is to discuss the poem in terms of hierarchy.” The principles of continuity, 
identification, God terms, and social order are evident in Burke’s socioanagogic analysis, 
wherein he reads the goddess Venus, the mortal Adonis, and the murderous boar as 
representatives of three different levels of social class. Later in the same passage, he outlined his 
vision for socioanagogic criticism: 
 
Even the world of natural objects, as they figure in poetry, must have secret 
“identification” with the judgments of status. […] The veil of Maya is woven of the 
strands of hierarchy, and the poet’s topics glow through that mist. By “socioanagogic” 
interpretation we mean the search for such implicit identifications.15 
 
 
Burke’s legacy of socioanagogic criticism, or his ultimate advice to read for the “enigmatic 
signature of the hierarchic motive,” has not received as much attention as Burkean ideas like 
identification or dramatism. At the same time, many of Burke’s most crucial concepts, like 
scapegoating and God terms, necessarily rely on hierarchical structuration to make sense. 16 God 
terms, for example, achieve their rhetorical force from God’s position at the top of the hierarchy. 
                              
15 Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 219. 
 
16 Ellen Quandahl pulled a quotation from Rhetoric of Religion that aphoristically connects scapegoating 
with hierarchy: “If order, then a need to repress the tendencies to disorder. If repression, then responsibility for 
imposing, accepting, or resisting the repression. If responsibility, then guilt. If guilt, then the need for redemption, 
which involves sacrifice, which in turn allows for substitution.” Burke, 314. Cited in Quandahl, “‘It’s Essentially as 
Though This were Killing Us’: Kenneth Burke on Mortification and Pedagogy,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 27, no. 
1 (1997): 5-22. 
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Rhetorical agency permeates from the apex of the hierarchy, where resides God, the “title of all 
titles.”17 Just by mere metonymic association with the pinnacle of the hierarchy, an entity’s status 
can inflate. Burke is at his most hierarchy-sensitive in the epideictic closing passage of Rhetoric 
of Motives, where he notably names Aristotle as a builder of metaphysical hierarchies: 
 
The mystery of the hierarchic is forever with us, let us, as students of rhetoric, scrutinize 
its range of entrancements, both with dismay and in delight. And finally let us observe, 
all about us, forever goading us, though it be in fragments, the motive that attains its 
ultimate identification in the thought, not of the universal holocaust, but of the universal 
order—as with the rhetorical and dialectic symmetry of the Aristotelian metaphysics, 
whereby all classes of beings are hierarchically arranged in a chain or ladder or pyramid 
of mounting worth, each kind striving towards the perfection of its kind, and so towards 
the kind next above it, while the strivings of the entire series head in God as the beloved 
cynosure and sinecure, the end of all desire.18 
 
 
In the Rhetoric of Religion, when Burke introduces his five-part definition of (hu)man, he further 
explains the importance of hierarchy to human creatures. By definition, according to Burke, 
humans are symbol mis/using animals, inventors of the negative, separated from their natural 
conditions by instruments of their own making, goaded by the spirit of hierarchy, and rotten with 
perfection. In a footnote, he apologized for the rhetorical flourish inherent in “goaded by a spirit 
of hierarchy” and suggested the more neutral phrase of “moved by a sense of order.”19 His 
comment on hierarchy references social stratification and the ownership of property. Later in the 
book he returned again to Augustine, referencing the Saint’s equation of God’s love with 
ascendance. “By thy gift we are inflamed and borne upward,” Burke quotes Augustine—and in 
                              
17 This is but one example from Burke’s multi-page list in Rhetoric of Motives of all of the secular things 
for which God metonymically replaces, 299.  
 
18 Burke, Rhetoric of Motives, 333. 
 
19 Burke, Rhetoric of Religion, 42. 
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attaining our “proper” level on the hierarchy, we rest.20 Secularly speaking, the inflationary 
capacities of God’s love persist. 
Burke’s socioanagogic criticism and his concept of god terms gave us some tools for 
understanding hierarchies and how a “natural order” is maintained as a rhetorical resource. 
Unfortunately, the rhetorical tradition’s history of colluding with hierarchies is longer than its 
development of the tools and practices to understand and critique these hierarchies…by 
thousands of years. Furthermore, the dominant Western rhetorical tradition is still in many ways 
accomplice to social hierarchy. For example, when we instruct our upper-middle class public 
speaking students on the best ways of accruing ethos, we forward a hierarchy that unreflexively 
privileges class-striated norms of speaking and ad/dressing.  
While groundbreaking, Burke’s socioanagogic methods alone aren’t quite enough to 
understand how populations are governed, how individuals are mystically positioned for certain 
regimes of living or nonliving, or how humanity pushes off animality as the condition for its 
being. One of the primary ways in which the rhetorical tradition is an accessory to hierarchy is its 
insistence on the exceptionalism of the human. To comprehend these things, we need theories of 
the posthuman, as well as the biopolitical and necropolitical to continue to build a pathway to 
understanding contemporary hierarchies. The steep social and value hierarchies embedded in the 
secular and sacred humanisms that underwrite the rhetorical tradition require posthuman 
analysis. 
 
 
 
                              
20 Ibid., 160. 
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Posthuman Rhetorical Theory: Rhetoric Does Not a Human Make? 
 
 Rhetoric has been situated firmly in the humanities since the trivium of medieval 
education, a location maintained through the Renaissance and the present time.21 Cicero used 
humanitas to describe the learning required to cultivate a hu/man for a life of public service. 
Rhetoric’s consistent designation as a discipline in the humanities underscores both the subject 
and object of traditional rhetoric: humans. Identifying the “embedded encomia” to the 
metaphysics of Western thought inherent in the rhetorical tradition, Nathan Stormer described 
the individual as speaking agent as the cornerstone of the traditional rhetorical theory.22  
 It would be thoughtless to critique humanism topically while using rhetorical theories 
implicitly or explicitly grounded in the very same humanism. The number of rhetoric scholars 
working with non-humanist, ahumanist, anti-anthropocentric or posthumanist theories has 
increased in the past ten years. Still, despite the development of theories of rhetoric that decenter 
or deny the rational liberal subject, the literature has not yet congealed into a coherent 
conversation. To wit, “posthuman* rhetorical theory” as a phrase yielded zero results in Google 
Scholar as of mid-April 2014, although there are some disparate hits for “posthuman rhetoric.” 
                              
 21 Although, we can always go back earlier, for example, to Isocrates. In his “Antidosis,” humans “escaped 
the life of wild beasts” because of the powers of speech and persuasion. Isocrates and George Norlin (Trans), 
“Antidosis.” In Thomas Benson and Michael H. Prosser (Eds) Readings in Classical Rhetoric (New York: Lawrence 
Erlbaum, 1995), 47. 
 
22 Nathan Stormer, “Articulation: A Working Paper on Rhetoric and Taxis,” Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 90, no. 3 (2004): 257-284. 
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 Within the field itself, the classic definitions of hu/man include rhetoric (Burke’s symbol-
using and mis-using animal, for example) and the classic definitions of rhetoric include human.23 
Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric revised to enunciate a former silence would read, “the best 
available means of persuading (other humans).” There is even a term that roots rhetoric right in 
the binomial nomenclature of the human species: homo rhetoricus. In 1976, Richard Lanham 
contrasted the rhetorical man [sic] with homo seriousus, and posited homo rhetoricus as the role-
playing figure responding to his contingent world with Sophistic agility, a fantasy of human 
agency that formed the basis of European Renaissance.24 Osterreich was moved enough by homo 
rhetoricus to use it as the title of a book chapter, where he offers this definition of human: 
“Humans are rhetorical beings who use persuasive speech not only to influence others but also to 
shape themselves.”25 The unspoken presumption in the standard rhetorical formula of the 
speaking agent seizing kairos in order to produce change is that the agent is human and change is 
produced for other humans. “Rhetoric” and “human” often bind together tautologically: rhetoric 
is what makes the human and humanity’s defining feature is use of rhetoric. Rhetoric was the art 
for governing the exclusive faculties of speech and reason—capacities at various times withheld 
from women, slaves, and new world savages. Traditional rhetorical theory is not just myopically 
                              
23 Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1966). 
 
24 Richard Lanham, The Motives of Eloquence: Literary Rhetoric in the Renaissance (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1976). Stanley Fish picked up these two subspecies from Lanham and used them to rehash 
the agon between philosophy (seriousus) and rhetoric, which he cast as the animating quarrel of Western 
thought: Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989). Dwight Conquergood mapped the similar plights of homo rhetoricus 
and homo performans in their opposition to ontological fixedness: “Ethnography, Rhetoric, and Performance,” 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 78, no 1 (1992): 80-97. 
 
25 Peter Osterreich, “Homo Rhetoricus,” in Culture and Rhetoric, Vol. 1, eds. Ivo Strecker & Stephen Tyler 
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2009), 49. 
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focused on but also ontologically bound to the entities that call themselves human, or the entities 
for whom being human is important.  
 In Ancient Greece, stone markers called horoi delimited the geographic boundaries of the 
Athenian agora.26 A horos marked the place where a territory began and ended, often in the first 
person. “I am the horos of the agora,” declared a slab stele recovered by archeologists in Athens. 
Topoi are defined by the horoi that mark their edges. Although the horoi of Ancient Greece were 
very literally border rhetorics, they can be employed metaphorically as well. Like horoi, the 
boundary between the human and nonhuman is re/inscribed in acts of re/territorialization. 
Humanity has a “stake” in what counts as human—again, literally. Posthumanist theorists are 
best described as scholars who, instead of stopping at the horoi of humanity, keep going. 
Rhetoricians have turned to posthumanist theorists for just these boundary-pushing capacities.27 
 One scholar wrote that the posthuman is “one of the most important concepts in 
contemporary literary theory, science studies, political philosophy, the sociology of the body, 
cultural and film studies, and even art theory.”28 Critical introductions to posthumanism, like 
Hayle’s 1999 How We Became Posthuman, followed ten years later by Wolfe’s excellent 
synthesis What is Posthumanism? reflect the broad influence of posthumanist theory in the 
humanities and social sciences.29 While humanism maintains, with Protagoras, that man [sic] is 
the measure of all things, and that humans should be the guiding object of inquiry, 
                              
26 Josiah Ober, “Greek Horoi: Artifactual Texts and the Contingency of Meaning,” In Methods in the 
Mediterranean: Historical and Archeological Views on Texts and Archeology, ed. Davis Small (Boston: Brill, 
1995). 
 
27 Thank you to Jenell Johnson for pointing me towards horoi. 
 
28 Nicholas Gane, “Posthuman,” Theory, Culture & Society 23, no. 2-3 (2006): 431-434, 431. 
 
29 Katherine N. Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and 
Informatics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Cary Wolfe, What is Posthumanism? (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2010). 
 26 
posthumanism attempts to move beyond both the ontological primacy of the human.30 Human 
exceptionalism is the idea that humans are categorically distinct from all other animals.  
 Perturbations of human exceptionalism are at least as old as Darwin’s 1859 Origin of 
Species, although posthumanism didn’t cohere into the eponymous movement until the last 
twenty years. In 1873, Freidrich Nietzsche’s essay “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” 
famously called out the anthropomorphisms that humans mistake for truth, which served as a 
precursor to both Sigmund Freud and Michel Foucault. As Diane Davis catalogued, Freud listed 
the Darwinian and other threats in to the human ego in a 1917 essay that prefigured posthumanist 
thought.31 According to Freud, modern science delivered three blows to human pride, displacing 
our egos cosmologically (through the work of Copernicus), psychologically (through the 
importance of the unconscious via Freud), and evolutionarily (through Darwin’s idea that 
humans descended from apes). Martin Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism” precipitated 
posthumanism in 1947 because it critiqued Sartre’s defense of Descartes’s Cogito in place of the 
thrownness of being-in-the-world.32 Foucault’s body of work, especially his argument on the last 
pages of The Order of Things, predicted that this thing called man (or anthropos, in his words) 
                              
30 For some scholars like Joshua Gunn (“Review Essay: Mourning Humanism, or, the Idiom of Haunting,” 
Quarterly Journal of Speech  92, no. 1 (2006): 77-102), posthumanism underwrites postmodernism: “This common 
commitment to displacing the masculinist, self-same rational agent as the center of the known universe is the hidden 
premise of the postmodernist enthymeme and in most instances the accusatory rhetoric of the postmodern (that is, 
the uses to which the postmodern foil is put) is a reaction to the post-humanism that underwrites various, differing 
understandings of postmodernity…that which has passed as postmodernism is actually posthumanism.” (78). Other 
scholars prefer the term nonhuman to the posthuman, as witnessed by the 2012 conference called, “The Nonhuman 
Turn,” hosted by the Society for Literature, Science, and the Arts. 
 
31 Diane Davis, “Creaturely Rhetorics,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 44, no. 1 (2011): 88-94. 
 
32 Robert H. Cousineau, Humanism and Ethics: An Introduction to Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism 
(Louvain: Editions Nauwelaerts, 1972). 
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was nearing its end.33 Even though it has only been named during my lifetime, posthumanism 
casts a long shadow. Posthumanist movements began outside the rhetorical tradition, although 
Diane Keeling revises a history of rhetoric that finds posthuman impulses since antiquity.34 In 
perhaps the most-quoted line in posthumanist theory, Katherine Hayles overstated, “We have 
always been posthuman.”35 
 Posthumanist rhetoric dovetails with the project of pushing beyond what Greg Dickinson 
called the “cult of the symbol.”36 One of the distinguishing features of rhetorical theory after the 
Wingspread conference, Carole Blair asserted, is the ubiquity of the symbol and symbol systems. 
She wrote, “While one can still catch a post-Wingspread rhetorician defining rhetoric without the 
term symbol somewhere, it is more than a bit unusual.”37 If humans and rhetoric are indeed 
tautologically bound, it is symbol use that provides the glue for this binding. Humans crown 
themselves with symbolic achievement; humans are distinct from (and, implicitly, better than) 
animals because they use symbols. Further, self-awareness and complex cultural worlds also 
separate humans from animals. Parenthetically, all of these claims of human exceptionalism have 
been consistently rebuffed in the last twenty years as scientists found evidence of self-awareness, 
                              
33 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1971). I am pointed in this direction by Wolfe’s What is Posthumanism? 
 
34 Diane Keeling, “Posthumanist Rhetoric: Theory and Rhetoric for the More-than-Human” (PhD Diss., 
University of Colorado-Boulder, 2012). 
 
35 Hayles, Posthuman, 291. 
 
36 Greg Dickinson, “Joe’s Rhetoric: Finding Authenticity at Starbucks,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 32, no. 
4 (2002): 5-27. 
 
37 Carole Blair, “Rhetorical Bodies,” in Rhetorical Bodies: Toward a Material Rhetoric, eds. J. Selzer and 
S. Crowley (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999). 
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culture, symbols, and tool use in animals.38 Posthuman rhetorical theorists find that logos 
(variously construed as speech, language, and rationality) is no longer an adequate answer to the 
question, “What makes a human?” 
  This persistence of symbolic exceptionalism is the reason it shocked the field when 
George Kennedy posited a rhetoric beyond symbols in the famed 1992 essay “A Hoot in the 
Dark,” which was revised and republished six years later in his book Comparative Rhetoric.39 
Kennedy redefined rhetoric as prior to language, as a generalized form of energy present not only 
between humans but also among animals, and situated his study within evolutionary biology. In 
his account, an “assembly caw” amid a murder of crows was an example of rhetoric operating in 
the animal world. 
 As the previous section showed, the rhetorical tradition, especially in its human 
exceptionalism and status-saturated attributions of agency, collaborates in hierarchy building. 
Humanism is another hierarchic feature of the European rhetorical tradition. A nuanced 
zoerhetorical theory would critique many of the impulses of humanism, especially the kind of 
humanism that leads the United States and other nations to call contemporary acts of war 
“humanitarian interventions.” To understand these contemporary morphologies of humanism, 
and to continue to assemble the toolbox needed to build a theory of zoerhetorics, we need 
posthumanist rhetoric to open into biopolitical and necropolitical theories.  
 
 
 
                              
38 Tom Tyler and Manuela Rossini. Animal Encounters (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2009), 
http://public.eblib.com/EBLPublic/PublicView.do?ptiID=467771. Also of interest here work published in a new 
interdisciplinary journal Humanimalia. 
 
39 George Kennedy, “A Hoot in the Dark,” Philosophy & Rhetoric 25, no. 1 (1992): 1-21. 
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Biopolitical and Necropolitical Regimes of Living 
 
Often the differences that matter—the differences that make a difference for livability—
occur across the biopolitical trenches of citizenship, race, gender, sexuality, nationality, or 
physiological normativity. Race (sometimes construed as caste or ethnicity), is the line of 
difference along which biopolitical imperialist regimes were originally built. Reaching more 
deeply into the zoo of living entities as posthumanist theorists would encourage us to do, we 
might add species to our list of differences that matter. Across humans and nonhumans alike, 
consequential distributions of livability follow the grooves of these fault lines. But where do 
these fault lines come from? 
We can roughly group human-identified living entities into three categories. Some bodies 
experience nourished vitality, some deteriorate slowly in conditions of deprivation, and others 
are targeted distinctly for death. For example, lives deemed worthy of life are encouraged to 
participate in a culture of vitality, engaging in practices of exercise, nutrition, and a “healthy 
lifestyle.” The most ascendant of these lives will have the biographical availability, excess 
capital, and agentic willpower these lifestyles require. Prisoners on death row might exemplify 
the second category. They have been judged unworthy of “free” life due to alleged criminal 
activity. Lauren Berlant would add the obese poor in the United States to this category as well, 
arguing that they are targeted for a kind of “slow death.”40 The third category, the subhuman, is 
less readily identifiable in the contemporary U.S., although certainly exists. Nowadays the 
withholding of humanity from a person or group of persons is rarely explicit. The obvious 
historical example is the dehumanization of the Jews in Nazi Germany. Calling them dogs, 
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vermin, parasites, and an infestation “unmade” them as human and worked to justify their 
annihilation. As I will argue later, a similar “unmaking” is currently in effect in rhetorics 
regarding military-aged males in drone strike zones in the War on Terror. Living entities come to 
matter (or fail to matter) through a series of rhetorical processes. I use these three categories as 
shorthand to discuss these processes, but I also acknowledge the poverty of such a simple 
schema. To demonstrate how complex these zoerhetorical movements can be, consider that one 
entity or group of entities could be nourished for life along one vector and targeted for death 
along another. 
Biopolitics, as a branch of critical social theory, studies the multiple strategies by which 
life is regulated and optimized, and is considered the primary apparatus of governmentality that 
emerged at the end of the eighteenth century. (Governmentality refers to the way that 
governments create citizens that are best suited to fulfill their policies). All discourses regarding 
the management of life, including but not limited to quality of life, distribution of risk, life 
insurance, health (care), mortality, disease, life chances and environment are rendered intelligible 
through a logic of biopolitics and controlled through biopolitical dispositifs (Foucault’s word for 
apparatuses). Biopolitical theory provides an explanatory lens for a dizzying range of topics: 
animal care; nurse and physician practices; physiological, mental health and medical issues more 
generally; disability studies; lifestyle studies; and environmental or ecological issues.41 What the 
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concept enjoys in theoretical traction, however, it lacks in specificity. Matthew Coleman and 
Kenneth Grove are disdainful about the extent to which “biopolitics” is an unreflexive umbrella 
term for any kind of post-sovereign conception of power. Following Paolo Virno, they agree that 
“life breaks through the center of the public scene;” that is, that life emerges as a major 
regulating concept of the contemporary social world, but they reject the way the term gets 
deployed as a vague catchall.42 In the spirit, then, of deploying the concept of biopolitics 
responsibly, I offer a brief overview of the major tenets of biopolitical theory. After laying 
groundwork, I’ll focus on necropolitics, and then move into scholarship that explores the 
rhetorical dimensions of biopolitics and necropolitics. 
Biopolitical theory crystallized in France via Michel Foucault in the 1970s, and remains a 
vibrant and European branch of critical social theory. Many major biopolitical theorists are 
Italian—Giorgio Agamben, Antonio Negri, Roberto Esposito, and Rosi Braidotti.43 Thomas 
Lemke is German and Achille Mbembe is from what is now Cameroon and took his PhD from 
the Sorbonne in France.44 The U.K.-based cultural studies journal Theory, Culture & Society 
publishes more biopolitical essays than any U.S.-based cognate journal. Prominent American 
thinkers like Judith Butler and Michael Hardt address biopolitics, and although there is 
transatlantic collaboration (Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire trilogy, for example), the 
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thrust and focus of academic dialogue on biopolitics remains European as U.S.-based scholars 
work with less receptive audiences and slow English translations. 
All biopolitical scholars today contend with Foucault, even though biopower proliferates 
in ways it would have been impossible for him to imagine when he introduced the concept in the 
first volume of The History of Sexuality in 1976 (English translation 1978).45 Foucault’s major 
insight was that “life itself” increasingly informed political decisions. This volume and the two 
that followed forwarded three axes of biopower. The first axis was the historical rupture from 
sovereign power (characterized by the phrase “taking life and letting live”) to biopower 
(characterized by the phrase “making live and letting die”). This axis elaborated a significant 
shift in political orientations to death with the advent of biopolitics. Prior to biopolitical regimes, 
it was the king’s prerogative to revoke life. During the eighteenth century, the sovereign’s role 
shifted to become the protector, prolonger, and maximizer of life. The second axis situated 
biopower as the basis of modern racism. For Foucault, the discursive formation of race (and its 
accompanying mythology as consisting of phenotypic biological categories) was a biopolitical 
production. The consequences of biopolitical race-making are among the most lethal of 
biopolitical power effects.  
The third axis maintained that biopower is a distinctive art of governmentality that 
emerged historically with liberal forms of social regulation and individual self-governance. This 
final axis created the famous distinction between the two interlocking poles of biopower: the 
disciplinary control of the individual body (“anatomo-politics,” enumerated best in The Care of 
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the Self, Volume 3)46 and the regulatory control of the population en masse. Because of 
sexuality’s position between these two poles—as both personal/disciplinary and open to 
measures of surveillance like population control—it served as the perfect first biopolitical case 
study. In order to develop his idea of self-discipline, Foucault borrowed from Jeremy Bentham’s 
sketch of a prison. From the guard’s position in the middle of this prison, she could see 
everything—it was a panopticon. This architectual arrangement encouraged the prisoners to 
internalize the gaze of the guard and regulate their own behavior. Foucault used this as a 
metaphor for contemporary disciplinary society. We now all live in the panopticon, and as a 
result, we have internalized the panoptic gaze. Good biopolitical subjects no longer require a 
sovereign or prison guard to keep them in line—instead, we do it ourselves. I will develop some 
of the implications of this internalized disciplinary gaze in the fourth chapter, where I discuss the 
embodied daily habits of people working out at the gym. Biopolitics continued to surface in the 
series of lectures Foucault delivered at the Collège de France through the late seventies and early 
eighties. Society Must be Defended, delivered in 1975-76, especially because of its racialized 
reading of modern war as an attempt to make a population biologically stronger, was an 
important addition to the Foucauldian biopolitical canon.47 The Birth of Biopolitics, delivered in 
1978-79, elaborated inextricable links between biopolitics and forms of liberalism.48 
In 2007 Thomas Lemke published perhaps the most ambitious synthesis of biopolitical 
theory to date, which was translated from German to English in 2011 and re-titled Biopolitics: 
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An Advanced Introduction.49 He usefully categorized two biopolitical follies: the overemphasis 
on the first half of the word (biopolitics) and the overemphasis on the second half (biopolitics). 
Biopolitics forwarded a concept of a political body that is considered a natural living organism 
(here Lemke cited Rudolph Kjellén, a Swedish philosopher who likely coined the term 
“biopolitics” in 1916, in an essay that Foucault deconstructed), whereas the biopolitics 
explanation maintained that politics regulates biology (here he cited the work of E.O. Wilson and 
similar others who attempted to ground unequal distribution of resources in a biological 
“natural” hierarchy).50 The dangers overemphasizing bio resulted in naturalistic explanation of 
life as the stable organic basis beneath politics; the dangers of overemphasizing politics resulted 
in an understanding of politics as a stable and pure form of biology. “However,” Lemke 
explained, “both conceptions fail to explain the instability and fragility at the border between life 
and politics.”51 Following Foucault, Lemke mediated these two poles with a relationally and 
historically contingent notion of biopolitics. Lemke affirmed the value of biopolitics in its 
“ability to make visible the always contingent, always precarious difference between politics and 
life, culture and nature, between the realm of the intangible and unquestioned.”52 In Lemke’s 
narrative, Foucault was the first biopolitical theorist to break with naturalist or politicist 
interpretations of biopolitics. For Foucault, “life” emerged as the center of politics as a historical 
process and symptom of modernity.  
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 Both in Lemke’s narrative and in the numbers game of citation frequency, the most 
influential interpreter of biopolitics was Giorgio Agamben (especially the Homo Sacer trilogy). 
Agamben’s famous intervention was the state of exception. In Agamben’s version of biopolitics, 
he omitted Foucault’s disciplinary power and incitements towards life. Rather, Agamben 
introduced us to homo sacer, the figure around which the modern state becomes possible. Homo 
sacer, an obscure figure from Roman law, was the “sacred man” who may be killed (his murder 
was not punishable) but not sacrificed (his life was not worthy of sacrifice). As bare life, homo 
sacer could be excluded from the political realm. This exclusion grounds the state of exception, 
Agamben’s basis for Western politics. This groundwork allowed Agamben to famously declare 
at the end of Homo Sacer that the concentration camp is the biopolitical paradigm of modernity. 
As mentioned earlier, the zoe prefix of zoerhetorics derives from the Ancient Greek word 
that describes the spectrum of all living entities.53 While I use zoe from an encounter with 
Agamben’s work, I do not use zoe to mean exclusively bare life. In Agamben’s version of 
biopolitics, he positioned zoe against the other Attic Greek word for life, bios (βιος), which 
referred to the way of life proper to a group. Bios, life that meets a certain set of conditions and 
qualifications, is restricted to but not guaranteed for humans. Among other scholars, Laurent 
Debreuil dismissed Agamben’s zoe/bios etymological distinction as fictional.54 At the end of 
Homo Sacer, Agamben backed away from the strict zoe/bios definitions he established in the 
beginning of the book. In the conclusion, he stressed, “we no longer know anything about the 
classical distinction between zoe and bios.”55 Again, I must emphasize the my uptake of zoe is 
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not to reproduce Agamben’s categories of conditioned versus bare life, but instead to gesture 
towards biopolitical theory with a term that describes entities across the species divide. 
 
 
Necropolitics: The Dark Side of Biopolitics 
 
 Privileged citizens in the contemporary Western world are likely to experience the 
biopolitical optimization of their lives, and most of the scholarly work on biopolitics reflects this. 
The preponderance of essay-length biopolitical studies focus on health, nutrition, and exercise as 
modes of encouraging the creation of citizens that are suited to a particular government’s 
policies. But biopolitical regimes host seedy underbellies. Scholars Foucault, Agamben, 
Esposito, Achille Mbembe, Monica Casper, Lisa Moore and Jasbir Puar attend to the dark side of 
biopolitics. What Foucault and Stuart Murray called thanatopolitics and Achille Mbembe called 
necropolitics describe the way in which regimes of power target populations for both life and 
death.56 The inflate/deflate double modulation of zoerhetorics relies on this double movement of 
bio/necropolitics. 
 When he described homo sacer and positioned the concentration camp as the paradigm of 
modernity, Agamben articulated something like a necropolitics (although he doesn’t use the 
word—he uses the Foucauldian thanatopolitics). He wrote that the fundamental activity of 
sovereign power is the production of bare life. According to Agamben, it is bare life, 
surprisingly, that is in the most intimate relation with the sovereign during the state of exception. 
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Just as the sovereign is included in the community as able-to-kill, homo sacer is included in the 
community as kill-able. The sovereign is the person to whom anyone may be homo sacer, and 
homo sacer is the person to whom anyone may be sovereign. Agamben wrote that if there is no 
obvious figure of homo sacer today, it’s because we’ve all become homines sacri. For 
Agambem, the concentration camp was one of the most dangerous instantiations of 
thanatopolitics we have ever seen, because of its inclusion of bare life into the mechanisms and 
calculations of power.  
 Like his fellow countryman Agamben, the Italian philosopher Roberto Esposito 
contributed to bio/necropolitics, using the concept of immunity to discuss the ways in which 
modern biopolitics always carry the threat of deathly reversal. Seeking a middle ground between 
what he described as the negative tonality of Agamben’s biopolitics and the celebratory tone of 
Hardt and Negri’s biopolitics, and, for the first time, positioning Nietzsche as the precursor to 
modern biopolitics, Esposito asserted that immunity is the point of contact between the 
“affirming” and “lethal” modes of biopolitics. He contrasted immunity with community: “If 
communitas is the relation that binds members to an obligation of reciprocal donation, then 
immunitas is the condition of dispensation from that relation.”57 In other words, Esposito’s 
immunitary paradigm describes a condition of relation where immunitas protects the one who 
bears it from risky contact with the one who lacks it, thereby restoring his own jeopardized 
borders. For Esposito, sovereignty and other institutional forms of modernity exist to protect the 
logic of the immunitary paradigm. 
 The most powerful contribution to necropolitics is Achille Mbembe’s essay that bears the 
title. Mbembe wondered why scholars endlessly discuss the optimization of and incitement 
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towards life when, complicit and always present with biopolitical regimes, are populations 
targeted for death, living in “deathworlds.” Whereas Foucault and Esposito thought that some 
sort of rupture had to occur before biopolitics became lethal, Mbembe maintained that the 
preservative and lethal functions of biopower were continuous with each other. He asked, “Is the 
notion of biopower sufficient to account for the contemporary ways in which the political, under 
the guise of war, or of resistance, or the fight against terror, makes the murder of the enemy its 
primary and absolute objective?”58  
 For Mbembe, modern examples of deathworlds, where subjects are targeted for death 
rather than nourished toward life, are South Africa under Apartheid and the Israeli occupation of 
Palestine. Here Mbembe suggested that biopolitics b(l)inds us to the violence of warfare—a 
violence inextricable from the notion of the sovereign state. Recasting Foucauldian biopower as 
the “domain of life over which power has taken control,” Mbembe asked after the conditions by 
which the practice of the right to kill, the right to allow to live, and the right to expose to death 
are exercised. Foucault considered Nazi Germany to be the only complete conflation of politics 
and war. Mbembe, however, would have us think that the conflation of war and politics is a 
defining mark of late modern biopolitical/necropolitical regimes.   
 The bio/necro tension is further elaborated by Monica Casper and Lisa Moore (in their 
book Missing Bodies) and Jasbir Puar (in her book Terrorist Assemblages).59 “Haunted” by the 
living dead in necroworlds, Casper and Moore seek to codify a politics of corporeal visibility. In 
a research question similar to my own, they ask, “What can account for the fact that certain 
bodies are hyper-exposed, brightly visible, and magnified, while others are hidden, missing, and 
                              
58 Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” 12. 
 
59 Monica Casper and Lisa Moore, Missing Bodies: The Politics of Visibility (New York: NYU Press, 
2009), Kindle Version. 
 
 39 
vanished?”60 Puar, one of Mbembe’s most visionary readers, used the bio/necro tension to 
forward a theory of homonationalism, which describes the normative demands of the “good” 
(implicitly white and appropriately consumption-driven) gay or lesbian subject. In making sense 
of the complex bio/necro relationship, Puar elaborated, “The latter makes its presence known at 
the limits and through the excess of the former; the former masks the multiplicity of its 
relationships to death and killing in order to enable the proliferation of the latter.”61  
 Biopolitical theory, on its own, then, is not enough. Rather than being merely the 
unfortunate casualties of nation states clashing, bodies targeted for death are the necessary 
casualties of the political war machine. Some bodies are unevenly absorbed into biopolitical 
regulation while bodies targeted for death remain ignored, excluded from biopolitical and 
general political collectivity. Many studies interrogating the maximization and regulation of life 
entirely ignore the dying body or the body targeted for death; Nikolas Rose’s affirmative 
biopolitical work can be considered an example of this.62 While attending to biopower’s 
machinations of encouraging vitality is a worthy activity, neglecting the politics of death 
threatens to re-forget and re-ignore necropolitical bodies. Necropolitical theory, then, is an 
attempt to look at the globalized constellation of bodies across various distributions of livability, 
with the understanding that populations targeted for life are both discursively and materially 
sustained by populations targeted for death. Zoerhetorical theory investigates rhetorics that both 
raise and lower the status of life based on an understanding of this structural imbrication between 
the biopolitical and the necropolitical.  
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Biopolitics and Rhetoric 
 
In contemporary regimes of living, one of the primary modes of assigning zoerhetorical 
status is what Didier Fassin called biolegitimacy. Biolegitimacy is the extent to which a society 
is considered to value “life itself.” A recent development in biopolitical theory, Fassin’s concept 
of biolegitimacy explores exactly this logic of capital-L Life. Instead of Foucauldian biopower, 
Fassin contended that contemporary regimes of living are best characterized by the imposition of 
biolegitimacy, or the recognition of the sacredness of life itself. The shift from biopower (power 
over life) to biolegitimacy (power of life) explains the extent to which capital-L Life has become 
“a crucial issue in the moral economies of contemporary societies.”63 In other words, societies 
gain a rhetorical currency from espousing a commitment to life itself. When George W. Bush 
declared America as having a “culture of life,” he exemplified the exigencies of biolegitimacy. 
Similarly, when the U.S. wages war on terror “in the name of life itself,” we valorize a 
performance of biolegitimacy.  
Although Fassin never expressed it in these words, his concept of biolegitimacy is 
enacted as or animated through rhetorical performance. Nation-states (or organizations or 
entities) can perform, or fail to perform, biolegitimacy. A successful performance of 
biolegitimacy hinges on a range of rhetorical considerations, of which the rhetor’s classic 
audience, purpose, and context are only the beginning. Perhaps most importantly, a given 
organization’s successful performance of biolegitimacy is not proportional to that organization’s 
lethality. For example, the Obama administration has done an excellent job of discussing 
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weaponized drones biolegitimately—they saves the lives of servicepersons, they save the lives of 
civilians abroad, they save the lives of Americans threatened by the terrorists they target. At the 
same time, as I will develop in the third chapter of this dissertation, drones are lethal weapons. 
As a rhetorical performance, biolegitimacy lets us see that whoever controls the narrative of “life 
itself” can often monopolize attributions of virtue. The concept of biolegitimacy rendered as 
rhetorical performance is but one moment where rhetorical studies can articulate fruitfully with 
biopolitical inquiry. 
 Although Foucault attended to discourse, and Agamben’s and Esposito’s work relied on 
etymology, semantics, and philology, the biopolitical heavyweights paid little attention to the 
rhetorical tradition. As a result, their ways of dealing with the discursive meaning-making of the 
production of inequality along lines of population is deficient. Biopolitical logics are rhetorical 
accomplishments that permeate publics in legible and consequential ways. One of the primary 
rhetorical dimensions ignored by biopolitical theorists is this: How do biopolitical logics come to 
be convincing? That is, how do we come to practice our own vitality or tacitly agree to another’s 
exclusion? We need a way to interrogate the operation of biopolitical incitements towards life 
and necropolitical banishments towards deathworlds as they occur rhetorically. This is the 
contribution I intend for zoerhetorical theory to make to biopolitical theory. 
While a lot of biopolitical work focuses on meanings as they circulate in public culture, 
there is little that directly addresses rhetorical theory or rhetoric scholarship. A handful of special 
issues on biopolitics or related issues have been published in rhetoric, media, or communication 
journals, and rhetorical theorists such as Nathan Stormer, Megan Foley, and Stuart Murray 
discuss the intersection of rhetoric and biopolitics. I find my own zoerhetorical project also 
buttressed by a thinker (formerly) professionally positioned in a Rhetoric department yet not 
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traditionally associated with rhetorical studies: Judith Butler. Rhetorical scholars have tended use 
biopolitics as a theoretical lens with which to critique some public text.64  
 In 2011, MediaTropes, an open-access online journal, published a special issue on 
bioconvergence, or the “capillary trajectories” of converging living bodies, media, and 
technology with Foucauldian biopower.65 In this forum Lisa Diedrich published an analysis of 
Terri Schiavo and Hurricane Katrina as instances of “mediated medicine” in the biopolitical 
sphere. In the same forum Cary Federman and Dave Holmes explained the biopolitical and 
rhetorical status of the Guantánamo prisoner, locating points of convergence in the media, 
sovereignty, and the War on Terror.66 Google Earth, brain imaging software, and global financial 
industries are also topics under interrogation in the special issue on bioconvergence.  
 Jerry Hauser’s work is notable for its mobilization of biopolitics within rhetorical theory 
to understand the particular plight and opportunity of the prison of conscience. Hauser used the 
example of political prisoners of conscience enacting parrhesia, or fearless frank speech, to 
challenge the fated pessimism of Agamben’s state of exception.67 This book located moments 
where bodies targeted for slow life or death (such as the prisoners at Robben Island in South 
Africa) were able to generate a rhetorical agency that persuasively intervened in the 
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contemporary regime—thereby, in some instances, modulating the effects of the biopolitical 
regime. Although I am hesitant to grant these political prisoners the same heroic status that 
Hauser does, Hauser’s work chronicles a series of moments where rhetors, often successfully and 
counter to the assessment of Agamben, buck regimes of dying. This celebration of rhetorical 
power of the resistant agent on the individual level serves as an important limit case to this 
dissertation, which seeks after the rhetorical forces that legitimate persons targeted for death or 
nourished toward life. 
 Stormer’s main contribution is an essay where he attempted to inform biopolitical 
analyses with a mediating logic of articulation theory using prenatal space as a case study.68 This 
essay, one of the few explicit attempts to reconcile biopolitical theory with rhetorical theory, 
warned against reading biopolitics as merely representational and text-based. Biopower, as 
distributed through what Conley and Dickinson called “regimes of living,” articulates both an 
order of life (Stormer gives the example here of a healthy pregnancy) and an order of discourse 
about life (for example, discourses of nutrition that humans and nonhumans can intelligibly 
address).  
In Megan Foley’s biopolitical essay on Terry Schiavo, she identified a contemporary 
inversion in the classic movement of democratic franchisement.69 Historically, speaking subjects 
campaigned for their own rights, such as the suffrage for women or civil rights for persons of 
color. However we are now faced with a strange inverse. Even in the face of continued 
disenfranchisement for many speaking subjects, we have movements that campaign for the rights 
of non-speaking entities, for example, environmental rights, animal rights, and the rights of 
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incapacitated persons. Foley calls this phenomenon prosopopeic citizenship. Prosopopeia is the 
tropological attribution of voice. For Foley, prosopopeic speaking-for mediates the aporetic gap 
in the democratic order between sovereign logics and biopolitical logics. The speaking subject is 
expected to comport themselves with sovereignty over their own bodies. When this breaks down 
in non-speaking entities, it requires prosopopeic mediation, which Foley documented by looking 
at popular mass-mediated responses to Schiavo’s plight. 
 Murray’s body of work centers on Agambenian biopolitics, rhetoric, and media. In 
addition to translating Agamben’s “No to Biopolitical Tattooing” into English, Murray tackled 
the dark side of biopolitics.70 Using the suicide bomber as a case study, he suggested that the 
suicide bomber is frightening, and even unintelligible, to us exactly because she operates outside 
of the dominant biopolitical logic. For Murray, the thanatopolitics of the suicide bomber is both 
response and resistance.71 Murray also offered a rejoinder to biopolitics of life and death as co-
belonging, one that appreciates in death a “pre-political community ethic.”72  
 Judith Butler’s recent work took a biopolitical and rhetorical turn. In the last ten years, 
Butler expanded the scope of her research from sexual marginality to the margins of Western 
liberal norms of inclusion. In Precarious Lives, Butler inquired after frames or narratives that 
permit or fail to permit the representability of the human.73 Throughout this book and 2009’s 
Frames of War, she is concerned with depictions of Palestinians or Al-Qaeda-associated “enemy 
                              
70 Agamben, “Biopolitical Tatooing.” 
 
71 Stuart J. Murray, “Thanatopolitics: On the Use of Death for Mobilizing Political Life,” Polygraph 18 
(2006): 191-215. 
 
72 Stuart J. Murray, “Thanatopolitics: Reading in Agamben a Rejoinder to Biopolitical 
Life,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 5, no. 2 (2008): 203-207. 
 
73 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London: Verso Books, 2006). 
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combatants” in the War on Terror that fail to represent their humanness.74 Butler’s distinctly 
rhetorical move forefronts the constitutive power of frames, narratives, and visual imagery such 
as photographs in the consequential public representations of Islamic Others. These questions are 
important not only to answer the question of whether we can respond effectively to suffering at a 
distance, “but also to formulate a set of precepts that might work to safeguard lives in their 
fragility and precariousness.”75 In particular, Butler wants to understand how the frames that 
allocate the recognizability of certain figures of the human are themselves linked with broader 
norms that determine questions of humanization or dehumanization. Like this dissertation 
project, the normative goal of Frames of War is to interrogate the radical inequality that 
characterizes “the difference between grievable and ungrievable lives.”76 Butler’s suggestion is 
to attune us to our primary condition as vulnerable bodies, and to critique the way in which we 
are not invited to understand the Other under the sign of the Human. 
 In sum, communication, media, and rhetoric scholars employing biopolitical lenses have 
gained ground in the last ten years. From Hauser we get a pushback on Agambenian cynicism 
with prisoner of conscience as rhetorical agent. From Stormer we get an analysis of biopolitical 
space that attempts to go beyond the textual. From Foley we get a critical rhetorical analysis of 
popular mass-mediated messages informed with a biopolitical framework. From Murray, we get 
a corpus of rhetorical work sensitive to both bio- and necropolitics. Finally, from Butler we get 
an etho-political orientation suffused with biopolitical theory that questions the “grievability” of 
lives as they cluster within or outside of the sign of the Human.  
                              
74 Judith Butler, Frames of War (London: Verso, 2009). 
 
75 Judith Butler, “Torture and the Ethics of Photography,” Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space 25, no. 6 (2007): 951-966, 951. 
 
76 Butler, Frames of War, xxii.  
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 Despite these gains, few rhetoric scholars have explicitly asked how biopolitical regimes 
come to be created and sustained rhetorically. Even fewer have approached the dark 
necropolitical side (Murray and Butler excepted), and no rhetoric scholar has yet worked the 
bio/necro tension while pushing rhetoric past the “merely” discursive. Biopolitical regimes come 
to be persuasive in both classically rhetorical ways—via the mediation of symbols in various 
configurations in a series of mostly public texts—and in ways unmediated by symbols as well. 
 While I have been skewering, perhaps unfairly, the rhetorical tradition for maintaining a 
human exceptionalism, I want to briefly point out that biopolitics, too, falls into this 
paradigmatic modernist logic of privileging the human. As Nicole Shukin argued in Animal 
Capital, when scholars like Agamben or Esposito focus on the flows of bios over those of zoe, 
they are committing a kind of speciesism. Scholarship by Shukin, Carey Wolfe, and Mel Chen 
not only focuses on animality explicitly, but also recognize “the animal” as exactly that whom 
the human pushes against for exclusion. Wolfe even argued that speciesism provides a rhetorical 
resource for dehumanizing humans. He wrote, 
 
as long as the automatic exclusion from animals remains instant simply because of their 
species, such a dehumanization by means of the discursive mechanism of “animalization” 
will be readily available for deployment against whatever body happens to fall outside 
the ethnocentric “we.”77 
 
Biopolitical logics permeate regime of living in expansive, wide-ranging flows. It will be in 
particular settings and the broader assemblages of which they are a part that we will see 
rhetorical work that raises and lowers the status of entities’ lives. These zoerhetorics, in turn, 
                              
77 Cary Wolfe, Before the Law: Humans and Other Animals in a Biopolitical Frame (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2012), Kindle Edition, loc. 21. 
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maintain necropolitical regimes with their characteristic disciplining, targeting, and privileging 
of populations. What methods of inquiry are needed to locate, examine, and critique these 
zoerhetorics? 
 
Methodological Inquiries for a Zoerhetorical Theory 
  
  
 In this section, I will aggregate the hodgepodge of tools, sensibilities, hunches, and 
ethical commitments that form my methodological approach to this dissertation. I will articulate 
the benefits of rhetorical field methods with a feminist qualitative reflexivity informed by 
Deleuzian assemblage theory as conceptual frame. Assemblage theory provides one of the many 
possible pathways by which traditional rhetorical analysis can open into posthumanism. 
Fittingly, posthumanism is a necessary commitment for zoerhetorical analysis, which 
understands species assignation as an important zoerhetorical marker, threshold, and resource.  
 To use the language of web 2.0, rhetorical field methods (RFMs) are trending right now. 
What makes a field method like participant observation “rhetorical”? Are RFMs simply the 
appropriation of time-tested anthropological methods for distinctly rhetorical questions, or are 
we doing something entirely new? How do I build credibility as a scholar of rhetoric while using 
RFMs? In their essay that coined the term, Middleton, Senda-Cook, and Endres undertook to 
synthesize the dispersed and varied efforts by rhetoricians to take to the field.78 They situated 
RFM amid ongoing disciplinary activities at the nexus of critical rhetoric, ethnography, and 
                              
78 Michael Middleton, Samantha Senda-Cook, and Danielle Endres, “Articulating Rhetorical Field 
Methods: Challenges and Tensions,” Western Journal of Communication 75, no. 4 (2011): 386-406.  
 
 48 
performance studies. Defining RFM as the method of “everyday rhetorical experience,” they 
privileged the “processual form of rhetorical action that are accessible only through participatory 
methods.”79 
 In this essay, the authors offered the first coherent codification of RFM and forwarded 
three reasonable commitments to its developing practice: 1) Rhetoric is best understood as a 
social practice, 2) Rhetorical texts and lived experience are dialectically related, and 3) 
Participatory epistemology supplements critical knowledge. This essay is important because it 
starts official focused disciplinary conversation on what have come to be known as RFMs. 
Because of this, it also serves as a legitimizing force for RFMs—now rhetorical field workers 
have something to cite in the methods sections of their essays. However, I think there are some 
major problems with this piece. Primarily, the authors do not hold rhetorical fieldworkers 
responsible for the reflexivity that feminist qualitative research training entails. I will try to 
amend this omission in my own use of RFMs. 
 Site of protest, consumption, public memorials, museums, and tourist destinations are 
amid the panoply of “fields” interrogated by rhetoric scholars. But it’s important to acknowledge 
that a number of rhetoricians studied rhetoric “in the field” long before the codification of RFMs. 
Carol Blair, Ralph Cintron, Greg Dickinson, Phaedra Pezzullo, and Bryan Taylor are among the 
many rhetoric scholars for whom the broader rhetorical experience of “being there” mattered in 
some way before “Articulating Rhetorical Field Methods” was published in 2011. They each 
deal with the exigencies of qualitative reflexivity and methodological accountability in different 
ways. On one side of the spectrum, Greg Dickinson disavowed the need for ethnographic 
participant-observation, even as it is clear from his thick descriptions that he spent considerable 
                              
79 Ibid., 387. 
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time in the places about which he wrote, such as Starbucks and the Old Pasadena mall.80 On the 
other side of the spectrum, Ralph Cintron’s multi-year immersive participant observation in an 
industrial town near Chicago (which he calls Angels’ Town, after which his book is named) is 
exemplary in its commitment to ethnographic reflexivity. At the same time, he still brings a 
critical rhetoric sensibility to the homes, streets, grocery stores, back alleys, and front porches of 
Angels’ Town. For example, he calls the claim to understand a culture or community a “trope” or 
ploy of ethnography.81 
From the range of rhetorical scholarship that has taken to a “field,” it is clear that 
traditional text-based critical rhetoric wasn’t enough. But this leaves scholars trained as 
rhetorical critics in confusing territory. How do I perform an ethical interview? What “counts” as 
enough time in the field? What counts as data? How much of my own narrative voice should 
make the final cut?  Are rhetorical field methods qualitative research with a rhetoric lens, or an 
altogether different animal? Furthermore, rhetorical field workers are charged with making 
claims about a much larger (sometimes incoherently large) set of data, (“the experience”) when 
compared with critical rhetoric. Because of this, they are also charged with a different 
relationship to accountability. If I wanted to write a rhetorical analysis of Obama’s most recent 
national address, the video and text would be there at whitehouse.gov, tying me tightly to a range 
of evidence-based claims I might make about Obama’s speech. Researchers would all agree on 
                              
80 Dickinson says he is not “methods driven,” and in one set of footnotes explained that ethnographic 
research would in fact be an obstacle to his rhetorically-informed research. Dickinson, “Memories for Sale: 
Nostalgia and the Construction of Identity in Old Pasadena,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 83, no. 1 (1997): 1-27, 23.  
 
81 Ralph Cintron, Angels’ Town (Boston: Beacon Press, 1997). 
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the bounds and dimensions that compose the “speech,” and that the speech is essentially a piece 
of data or text that is (considered) always the same, every time we review it.82 
But the rhetorical field worker’s data is more than a gathering of texts: the particular 
experience they have in a place, the particular interactions with other folks there, as well as their 
particular embodied practices, habits, and privileges all contribute to a text that cannot be 
replicated. Therefore, the rhetorical fieldworker needs to do more work upfront explaining his or 
her relationship to the field. This different relationship to accountability, combined with the 
explosion of available data, gives the rhetorical fieldworker more room for the reflexivity that 
qualitative researchers have been practicing for years. Responsible qualitative researchers have 
addressed questions about the “politics of the gaze” and have turned to reflexivity as a means to 
acknowledge that how knowledge is gathered as deeply related to the claims made.83 
If we are to think of traditional rhetorical criticism as beginning with a coherent, discrete 
set of data (“the text”), RFM’s explode this notion of data/text. Everything part of the experience 
of “being there” becomes potential data: any symbol use; sensory data from any of the five 
senses (or six if you count intuition, which has its own range of rhetorical considerations); 
behaviors, affects, and talk of the researcher and all present persons; all material aspects of the 
site: architecture, décor, the way bodies move through it; its purpose; the way people act within 
and towards the space; the way the site operates as discursive node (centrifugally? 
                              
82 Of course, McGee’s fragments of texts that the critic must create herself troubles this idea. Michael 
Calvin McGee, “Text, Context, and the Fragmentation of Contemporary Culture,” Western Journal of 
Communication 54, no. 3 (1990): 274-289.  
 
83 Wanda Pillow, “Confession, Catharsis, or Cure? Rethinking the Uses of Reflexivity as Methodological 
Power in Qualitative Research,” International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education 16, no. 2 (2003): 175-
196. At the same time, reflexivity can fail. As Pillow noted, conversations around reflexivity often turn to a 
heightened focus on the researcher’s subjectivity, which at its worse can slip into self-centered narcissism. Daphne 
Patai is critical about the extent to which reflexive practices (such as the rote listing of the researcher’s demographic 
characteristics that imply a particular subject position) actually make qualitative research better. Patai, “(Response) 
When method becomes power,” in Power and Method, ed. A. Gitlen (New York: Routledge, 1994), 61–73. 
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centripetally?); the transitory versus permanent nature of the site; its ghosts and hauntings; its 
relationship to the city or broader space; any consumption (ideas, food, retail products) that 
occurs there. According to Greg Clark, who is in turn working from John Dewey and Burke, an 
experience “always does rhetorical work.”84 The “rhetorical experience,” then, is a vibrant, 
throbbing, dynamic complex of parts. How to make sense of it? 
 One possible way of making sense of this complex of parts is through Deleuzian 
assemblage theory. I appreciate the ethical commitments of assemblage theory, whose anti-
phallic, rhizomatic ontological structure is more fascicular than fascist. Mel Chen, in her volume 
Animacies, groups Deleuze and Guattari’s assemblages with Donna Haraway’s dismantling of 
“naturecultures,” Latour’s “hybrids,” and Karen Barad’s “agential realism,” as fairly recent 
movements that push back against the problematic social constructionist move that the world is 
entirely “segregated to the realm of the subjective.” These developments help us rethink how 
matter might contribute to the “ongoing discussions about the conceptual, cultural, and political 
economies of life and death.”85 After a brief overview, I will argue that assemblage theory 
affords me, in this dissertation, modes of sense-making for rhetorical experiences in an explosive 
assembled field while also accounting for objects. 
 Assemblage derives from the French word agencement (which translates roughly to 
“arrangement”), and refers to the connectivities between vibrant, heterogenous components in 
emergent, articulative congregation with one another across material and discursive realms. In 
fact, assemblages are the precondition for the mingling of these material and discursive 
                              
84 Gregory Clark, “Rhetorical Experience and the National Jazz Museum in Harlem,” In Greg Dickinson, 
Carole Blair, and Brian L. Ott, eds. Places of Public Memory: The Rhetoric of Museums and Memorials 
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2010). 
 
85 Mel Y. Chen, Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2012), Kindle Edition, loc. 184. 
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modalities: “Assemblages are necessary for states of force and regimes of signs to intertwine 
their relations”86 As Deleuze and Guattari described them, assemblages have a number of 
dimensions. Assemblages territorialize whenever their boundaries are sharpened or when there is 
an internal increase in homogeneity; assemblages deterritorialize (lines of flight) whenever their 
boundaries are blurred and when there is an internal increase in heterogeneity. We can think of 
territorialization and deterritorialization generally as making and unmaking processes that 
assemblages are constantly undergoing.87 At the same time, assemblages are emergent insofar as 
an the assembled components together can “do” something—they can make something happen—
that is different from the capacity of its individual components. 
 Especially as Jane Bennett articulates it, assemblage theory as a frame allows for an 
opening into objects. Posthumanist theory demands we revise both the subject and object of the 
oft-quoted Protagorean claim that man is the measure of all things. Posthuman rhetoric is just 
beginning to explore this thing-ness—although Richard McKeon feinted towards the thing in the 
early seventies in his famous essay on architectonic rhetoric.88 In 2008 Richard Marback used the 
vandalization of the Monument to Joe Louis as a call for rhetorical studies to give objects their 
due. “Objects are more than the featureless repositories of consequential responses,” he wrote.89 
Things, in culture-forming articulation with discourses and people, become important for 
Stormer’s reformulation of rhetoric that attempts to dislodge myopic focus on the individual. 
                              
86 Deleuze & Guattari, 1000 Plateaus, 71. 
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  Rosanne Kennedy, Jonathon Zapasnik, Hannah McCann and Miranda Bruce, “All Those Little 
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Rather than individuals articulating a society through words, Stormer employs the secondary 
meaning of articulate—distinctly jointed—to describe the way in which things, practices, and 
people form culture.90 
Although some rhetorical theorists, as we have seen, have hailed the thing, it remains a 
promising but largely untapped area for rhetorical theory. Materiality, thing, object, and actant 
overlap as components of “assemblages” or “imbroglios” as rhetorical theorists attempt to make 
sense of the world pushing back. Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory (ANT), which 
originated in sociology of science studies, inspired a number of rhetorical scholars to 
provisionally attribute agency to actants like things.91 Sarah Hallenbeck used ANT in an essay on 
feminist rhetorical agency that dispersed agential power to bicycles.92 In this essay, agency was 
dispersed within networks of humans and nonhumans like objects and discourses. Similarly, in 
his Rhetoric Society Quarterly article on counter-regions in Kansas, David Tell called on ANT in 
order to develop a method of articulation accountable to things.93 In this dissertation, for 
example, assemblage theory becomes indispensable in its capacity to account for the fetus as an 
object in the chapter on fetal memorialization. It allows me to attribute a vibrant agency to the 
fetal object while simultaneously avoiding the humanist imperative of attributing Life and 
Humanity to it as well. 
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Jane Bennett’s book Vibrant Matter explored the vital power of material formations, or 
what Kenneth Burke would call recalcitrance. Her second chapter, in particular, developed an 
agency of assemblages. Every entity simultaneously consists of assemblages, is an assemblage 
itself, and is a component of a number of larger assemblages. For Bennett, the point is to 
distribute agency—a healthy rejoinder to rhetoricians for whom rhetorical agency is synonymous 
with human agency. Within rhetoric scholarship, Bennett’s project dovetails with Thomas 
Rickert’s conceptualization of the chora (via the theorists Julia Kristeva, Jacques Derrida, and 
Greg Ulmer) as a mode of invention that doles out agency to nonhumans.94 Jasbir Puar’s book on 
Terrorist Assemblages was instructive here, as an assemblage frame allowed her to shift a focus 
from what terrorist bodies signify to what they do.95 
Zornitsa Keremidchieva articulated one way for articulating assemblage theory with 
rhetorical theory. The emergent properties of assemblages make possible different trajectories of 
thought. Although her assemblages are much larger in scale than my field sites, Zornitsa 
Keremidchieva’s work highlighted a qualitative shift in “race-gender-alienage-war” assemblage 
that formed (“assembled”) a body politic oriented away from social justice. In this piece, 
Keremidchieva is concerned with tracking various “flows” of discrimination or jurisdictional 
authority.96 When I borrow her insights for my own methodological inquiry, I am interested in 
the trajectories of amplification or deflation of status—the zoerhetorical flows—for particular 
groups. 
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 Of course, assemblages are not panaceas. The general posthumanist framework they 
require can make it difficult to, for example, make humanist social justice claims about the 
world. Similarly, attributing agency to things is conceptually difficult to sustain, and modernist 
humanism smuggles itself in, and has certainly left more than traces on this dissertation. As a 
conceptual frame for rhetorical field methods, posthumanism and assemblage theory is best 
considered a guiding heuristic, touchstone, or topos, rather than strict law.  
 Zoerhetorics inflate and deflate the status of various entities across a range of settings. In 
this dissertation, I focus on three particular field-assemblages, which is not to suggest that 
zoerhetorics only occur at these places. At each of these sites, rhetorics reterritorialize and 
deterritorialize the zoerhetorical hierarchies. My hermeneutic task is to read these diverse field-
assemblages for the trajectories that make the amplification or diminution of life status possible. 
The first field-assemblage is the National Memorial for the Unborn, where I will pay attention to 
the trajectories of inflation of life status for the fetal entity across the site and its accompanying 
texts. The second field-assemblage is the New York Times and its ancillary rhetorics of drone 
warfare, where I attend to the lines of deflation for drone targets in the War on Terror. At the 
third field-assemblage, which consists of Boulder, Colorado’s fancy athletic clubs and the vital 
biocitizens who enact self-care there, I attend to flows of vitalization and status-raising. 
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Chapter Two 
The Zoerhetorics of Fetal Memorialization: 
Rhetorically Making Babies at the National Memorial for the Unborn 
 
My precious babies in Heaven—I will be your voice! 
  — Hannah Rose Allen, on a letter at the National Memorial for the Unborn 
 
	    
At the center of one of the most intractably deadlocked public debates—abortion—the 
fetus floats silently. As the target of political, legal, medical, vernacular, and religious 
communicative practices that encourage its flourishing as well as its termination, the fetus may 
be the most publicly contested entity of the twenty-first century. The fate of the fetus has 
occupied controversial political space in the United States since at least the 1800s,1 but the 
debate’s more recent instantiation as a chronically recurring issue of the “culture wars” since the 
                              
1 According to Linda Gordon in her comprehensive history of birth control in the U.S. The Moral Property 
of Women: A History of Birth Control Politics in America (Champaign, IL:  University of Illinois Press, 2002). But 
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around fetal becoming.  See C. Cameron and Robert Williamson, “In the World of Dolly, When Does a Human 
Embryo Acquire Respect?” Journal of Medical Ethics 31, no. 4 (2005): 215-220, 215. 
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1980s drew lines in the sand that divide political factions today on the issue of abortion.2 The 
struggle over the substantiality of the fetus continues. In just the last two years, over one 
thousand provisions have been introduced at the state level to ban abortion, grant embryos or 
fetuses legal personhood, defund Planned Parenthood, or restrict the efforts of abortion 
providers.3 At the same time, millions of American women pursue abortions. Twenty-one 
percent of all pregnancies in the U.S. end in abortion, and over one million legal abortions occur 
in the U.S. every year, even though abortion rates have dropped over the last two years.4 More 
recently, fetal rights have been absorbed into a broader right-to-life movement that includes 
within its purview not only embryonic and fetal entities but also stem cells and brain-dead 
persons.5 
Amid this fray, in the past twenty years, pro-life communities have developed and 
embraced fetal memorialization, or the commemoration of aborted or miscarried “unborn 
babies,” as a component of their movement. Epicentral to these fetal memorial practices is the 
National Memorial for the Unborn (NMU) in Chattanooga, Tennessee. The NMU is not only the 
largest and oldest facility in the United States dedicated to unborn memorialization, but is also 
the only one to declare a relationship to the nation in its title. Since 1994, the NMU has been 
open twenty-four hours per day, seven days per week, to provide a space where the nation’s 
unborn can be remembered and grieved. Meanwhile, an adjoining office in the crisis pregnancy 
                              
2  We can look to Pat Buchanan’s famous “culture war” speech at the Republican National Convention in 
1992 as an important event in this division. 
 
3 “State Attacks on Women’s Health,” Planned Parenthood website, last modified 2014, 
http://www.plannedparenthoodaction.org/issues/state-attacks-womens-health/types-attacks/. 
Most of these provisions are defeated. 
 
4 “Induced Abortion in the United States,” Guttmacher Institute, last modified February 2014, 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.html. 
 
5 For example, the large National Right to Life organization includes “health care rationing” and 
“euthanasia” among its issues. 
 58 
center next door provides an online presence and logistical support for at least fifteen smaller 
memorials to the unborn scattered across the country.6 Installed on the NMU’s imposing fifty-
foot granite Wall of Names are hundreds of inscribed brass nameplates, each dedicated to an 
“unborn baby.”  
The NMU ventures consequential stakes in the status of the fetus. As a rhetorical artifact, 
biological entity, and part of a cultural assemblage, the fetus’ vacillating, contested status 
demands inquiry. This fractious clamor over the fetus stands to tell us something important about 
how rhetorics make life and humanhood. In this chapter, I seek to understand the rhetorical 
practices that modulate the cultural status of various entities as they occur within the National 
Memorial for the Unborn assemblage—that is, I seek to understand the NMU zoerhetorically. 
Biopolitical regimes demand the production and destruction of populations. At the NMU, the 
“unborn” are biopolitically produced and rhetorically accumulate or solidify humanhood in 
iterable, prescriptive, tropological ways that I will detail below.  
The chapter will proceed as follows: After dispensing with a brief note on terms, I will 
elaborate the theoretical framework with which I approach the NMU, centered around 
complementary threads of feminist and biopolitical/necropolitical scholarly inquiries into the 
fetal entity. This will be followed by a description of benefits of conceiving of both the fetal 
entity and my fieldsite as assemblages, calling on the posthumanist movement towards “things” 
in contemporary rhetorical theory. After a chronospatial tour of the NMU, I offer three ways in 
which fetal entities are humanized at the NMU. I call these three movements of naming, 
en/voicing, and en/facing “zoetropes” that inflate the status of the fetal entity at the NMU. 
                              
6  The NMU lists 15 affiliates on its website, but there are hundreds of memorials to the unborn across the 
country.	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Zoetropes, or rhetorical devices that inflate or deflate an entity’s status along biopolitical lines, 
carry important implications for zoerhetorical theory. 
 
A Note on Terminology 
 
In order to dispense with the scare quotes I have enclosed around the “unborn” thus far, I 
want to acknowledge the high stakes of using any of the available public names for the particular 
entities commemorated at this site. The myriad terms for the fetal entity each arrive with their 
own zoerhetorical status investments; in fact, there is no publicly circulated term for the fetal 
entity void of status investments. Consider the status-inflating and -deflating forces at work in 
the following ranked list of public names for alive or dead fetal entities: zygote, embryoblast, 
embryo, fetus, aborted baby, unborn baby, baby, child.7 The plurality of available names for the 
embryonic/fetal entity is made possible by the conceptual elision, or what John Lynch called the 
“metonymic reduction,” of all embryonic/fetal entities.8 This conceptual collapse provides the 
foundation for a wild vacillation of status assignations for the fetal entity. This vacillation is 
evident in the range between, on one end, the term “zygote” (a single diploid cell, often 
considered the beginning of life in pro-life rhetorics) and, on the other end, referring to the 
embryonic/fetal entity with a first name or even nickname. 
                              
7 Zygotes become structures called blastocysts about five days after fertilization, the inner cell mass of 
which is referred to as an embryoblast. In humans, the formation is technically called an embryo from the first cell 
division until eight weeks after fertilization (or roughly ten weeks after last menstrual period). After this period, 
embryologists refer to the structure as a fetus. Thomas W. Sadler, Langman’s Medical Embryology (Baltimore: 
Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2011). 
 
8 John Lynch, What are Stem Cells? Definitions at the Intersection of Science and Politics (Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 2011), 54.  
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Public assignations of the fetus span humanhood. 9 As I will develop below, humanhood 
is perhaps the most consequential, yet also the most furiously debated, zoerhetorical threshold. 
Fetal entities, especially, are rhetorically contested around the threshold of humanhood. While 
attributions of humanhood come to fuller fruition when a fetal entity is given a name like Annie 
or Christopher, as is the encouraged practice at the NMU, attributions of human-ness are also 
evident in terms like “aborted baby” and “unborn baby.” In order to be a baby, of course, one 
must be human. Depending on a public’s or individual’s orientation to life’s beginnings, “unborn 
babies” or “aborted babies” are either sacred children, oxymorons, or somewhere in between. 
Throughout this chapter, I will follow the standard ethnographic practice of using the terms emic 
to my site when making references within the NMU assemblage—all while fearing the political 
consequences of the word unborn. However, for approaching fetal memorialization writ broadly, 
I find more analytical and political traction in a term that feminist reproductive theorists have 
been using since the eighties: the public fetus. 
 
Necropolitics of the Fetal (Memorial) Assemblage 
 
 The public fetus refers to the ways the fetus has become an intelligible, identifiable icon 
and index of cultural values around innocence, medical risk, femininity, maternity, and 
childhood. In tandem with the concept of biolegitimacy, the public fetus provides a useful 
configuration around which to build the theoretical framework of this chapter. Next, I will make 
a pitch for an assemblage-driven approach to the NMU as a rhetorical field site tuned towards the 
                              
9 I use the term “humanhood” rather than “personhood” for its species specificity. Personhood is now 
elastic enough to span species. In 2013 the Indian government granted dolphins legal personhood. The Institute for 
Ethics and Emerging Technologies nominates great apes, cetaceans, parrots, and elephants for personhood and call 
for an extension of human rights to these species: http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/RNHP. 
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vibrancy of “things.” In doing so, I identify the inherent fungibility of the fetus as a 
zoerhetorically contested entity, and explain why the fetus offers a crucial case study to advance 
zoerhetorical theory. 
The concept of the public fetus reminds us that fetal photographs, ultrasound images, and 
even the mutilated fetuses pasted on anti-abortion billboards have not always saturated the 
national stage in the immediately identifiable ways they do now. As Donna Haraway observed, 
“It is almost impossible to get through the day near the end of the Second Christian Millennium 
in the United States without being in communication with the public fetus.”10 While some 
scholars suggest that the increase in visualization technologies such as ultrasound and 
intrauterine photography contributed to the creation of the fetus as a public figure,11 others argue 
that the saliency of the fetus as an entity more important than and separate from the mother has 
been a trend long before ultrasound or other technologies.12  
As a national figure constructed through a variety of representational forms, the public 
fetus is indelibly linked with women and power. Lynn Morgan and Meredith Michaels observed 
that Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court decision upholding the legality of abortion in the United 
States since 1973, was based on the constitutional right to privacy, which makes a notion of the 
public fetus a rather ironic post-Roe development.13 Feminist reproductive theorists have 
                              
10 Donna Haraway, Modest−Witness@Second−Millennium. FemaleMan Meets OncoMouse: Feminism and 
Technoscience (New York: Psychology Press, 1997), 201-2. 
 
11 Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, “Fetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in the Politics of 
Reproduction,” Feminist Studies 13, no. 2 (1987): 263-292; Carol A. Stabile, “Shooting the Mother: Fetal 
Photography and the Politics of Disappearance,” Camera Obscura 10, no. 1 (1992): 178-205. 
 
12 Nathan Stormer, Articulating Life’s Memory: U.S. Medical Rhetoric about Abortion in the Nineteenth 
Century (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002). 
 
13 Lynn Marie Morgan and Meredith W. Michaels, “Introduction,” in Fetal Subjects, Feminist Positions, 
eds. Lynn Marie Morgan and Meredith W. Michaels (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999). 
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interrogated permutations of the public fetus through the practice of ultrasounds,14 fetal surgery,15 
medical risk,16 vehicle advertisements,17 maternal responsibilities around nutrition and exercise,18 
racialized maternal innocence,19 and rights-bearing heteronormative subjects.20 In sum, feminist 
scholarship around the fetus observes that when the fetus is foregrounded to become what Susan 
Bordo called a “super subject,” the gestating woman is backgrounded. 21 
Further, framing the public fetus as an awe-inspiring (or aww-inspiring) national figure in 
need of protection not only omits gestating women from the public view, but even serves to 
vilify them as faulty, selfish incubators.22 Deployments of the public fetus as an intelligible 
national figure in the United States paved the way for the construction of the nation’s “unborn” 
as they occur at the NMU. While the site rarely forwards or circulates common visual 
representations of the fetus such as ultrasound images, the development of an identifiable public 
                              
14 Lisa Mitchell, Baby’s First Picture: Ultrasound and the Politics of Fetal Subjects (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2001). 
 
15 Monica Casper, The Making of the Unborn Patient: A Social Anatomy of Fetal Surgery (Chapel Hill, NC: 
Rutgers University Press, 1998). 
 
16 Deborah Lupton, “‘Precious cargo’: Foetal Subjects, Risk and Reproductive Citizenship,” Critical Public 
Health 22, no. 3 (2012): 329-340. 
 
17 Janelle Taylor, “The Public Fetus and the Family Car: From Abortion Politics to a Volvo 
Advertisement,” Public Culture 4, no. 2 (1992): 67-80. 
 
18 Anne Balsamo, “Public Pregnancies and Cultural Narratives of Surveillance,” in Revisioning Women, 
Health and Healing: Feminist, Cultural, and Technoscience Perspectives, eds. Adele Clark and Virginia 
Olsen (New York: Routledge, 1999). 
 
19 Angela Davis, “Racism, Birth Control and Reproductive Rights,” in Feminist Postcolonial Theory: A 
Reader, eds. Reina Lewis and Sara Mills (New York: Routledge, 2003), 353-367; Dorothy Roberts, Killing the 
Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty (New York: Pantheon, 1997). 
 
20 Lauren Berlant, The Queen of America Goes to Washington City: Essays on Sex and Citizenship 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997). 
 
21 Susan Bordo, Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body (Oakland: University of 
California Press, 2003), 80. 
 
22 Gena Corea, The Mother Machine: Reproductive Technologies from Artificial Insemination to Artificial 
Wombs (New York: Harper & Row, 1985). 
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fetus in the last forty years is crucial to the NMU’s conception of the unborn. The NMU not only 
adopts but also intensifies the ascriptions of innocence, appeals to maternal protection, and 
attributions of sacredness typical in popular representations of the public fetus. 
When feminist scholars approach the fetus with a biopolitical lens, they often critique the 
imperatives of self-care mandated for pregnant women. Popular representations of the fetus as 
inherently vulnerable circumscribe women within what Deborah Lupton called an “intense 
ascetic regime of self-regulation and discipline of their bodies.”23 In the same vein, scholars have 
also noted the similarity between the entrepreneurial, self-regulating ideal neoliberal subject with 
the ideal maternal risk-adverse “reproductive citizen.”24 Explicitly necropolitical approaches to 
the public fetus are less common, although Monica Casper and Lisa Moore used a necropolitical 
frame to inquire after deaths that are typically hidden from the public view—the 28,000 
preventable newborn deaths that occur each year.25 
Given the obvious centrality of reproduction for the importance of re/producing 
populations, it is jarring that most of the flagship pieces of biopolitical scholarship fail to 
substantively address reproductive politics. Ignoring reproductive (bio)politics—which include 
processes that necessarily inhabit the bodies of women more than men—is equivalent to ignoring 
women. Penelope Deutscher attributes this omission to an endemic male bias in biopolitical 
theory. While Deutscher finds Foucault’s treatment of women “passable,” she decreed 
                              
23 Lupton, “Precious Cargo,” 329. 
 
24 P. Lealle Ruhl, “Disarticulating Liberal Subjectivities: Abortion and Fetal Protection,” Feminist Studies 
28, no. 1 (2002): 37-60; Lorna Weir, Pregnancy, Risk, and Biopolitics: On the Threshold of the Living Subject (New 
York: Routledge, 2006). 
 
25 Although they cite Mbembe, they take liberties with his definition of necropolitics. Berlant’s slow death 
would be a good rejoinder to their claims. 
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Agamben’s “gender fissure” a “nonaccident.”26 Reproduction, she argued, as the creation of 
future individuals, should occupy a central place in biopolitical theory, especially amid 
contemporary anxiety around the quality and quantity of human reproduction. She is concerned 
at the extent to which the “defense of the future of the “people” through an intensified 
biopolitical focus on women as reproductive” shortchanges women as a whole by suturing them 
to an essentialized femininity.27 This study, then, can be understood partly as a response to 
Deutcher’s call for feminist biopolitics of reproduction. 
Scholars of rhetoric have also addressed the fetal entity, most often through the lens of 
abortion rhetorics. Celeste Condit’s Decoding Abortion Rhetoric tracked the rhetorics of pro-life 
and pro-choice movements from 1965-1985 within a social movement framework—an important 
volume at a time when rhetorical studies was just starting to concede that women and their leaky, 
fecund bodies constituted worthy objects of study.28 Following Condit’s lead, scholars of 
communication and rhetorical studies have addressed abortion rhetorics, such as the rhetoric of 
Roe v. Wade,29 the ideographs of life and choice, 30 sex-selective abortion in transnational 
                              
26 Penelope Deutscher, “The Inversion of Exceptionality: Foucault, Agamben, and ‘Reproductive 
Rights,’” South Atlantic Quarterly 107, no. 1 (2008): 55-70, 57. Also of interest here is that many major biopolitical 
theorists (Giorgio Agamben, Roberto Esposito, Antonio Negri) hail from Italy, a country famous for its public 
anxieties around a disappearing ethnically Italian population.   
 
27 Penelope Deutscher. “Reproductive Politics, Biopolitics and Auto-immunity: From Foucault to 
Esposito,” Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 7, no. 2 (2010): 217-226, 224. 
 
28 Celeste Condit, Decoding Abortion Rhetoric: Communicating Social Change (Champaign: University of 
Illinois Press, 1994). This book is commendable for its cross-disciplinary readership unusual for rhetorical studies 
publications. Most of its 300-plus citations are in feminist theory and sociology journals. 
 
29 Katie L. Gibson, “The Rhetoric of Roe v. Wade: When the (Male) Doctor Knows Best,” Southern 
Communication Journal 73, no. 4 (2008): 312-331. 
 
30 Sara Hayden, “Revitalizing the Debate Between <Life> and <Choice>: The 2004 March for Women’s 
Lives,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 6, no. 2 (2009): 111-131. 
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contexts,31 arguments in the constitutional disputes around abortion,32 the analogous arguments 
of fetal rights and animal rights movements,33 and the rhetoric of philosophical arguments around 
abortion.34 As is evident, most of these studies focus on the arguments employed by both pro-life 
and pro-choice movements. However, there has been less emphasis on rhetorics of the public 
fetal entity itself, minus some important exceptions. Recently, John Lynch described the public 
fetus as a demonstration of biorhetoric. “Biorhetoric” is John Lyne’s term for the discursive 
strategy that smuggles culturally specific moral injunctions into statements of apparent biological 
fact. In the case of the public fetus, which Lynch, following Condit, identified as a “metonymic 
construction borrowed from the abortion debate,” the allegedly neutral and value-free language 
of science is mobilized to make claims for the substantiality of the fetus as a person.35  
At the intersection of biopolitics and posthumanist rhetoric, Nathan Stormer built a 
considerable body of work exploring constructions of the public fetus. Arguing for articulation 
theory as a mediating logic, Stormer discussed the biopower materially and discursively divested 
in what he called “prenatal space.” His distinction between when an embryonic or fetal entity 
shifts from “becoming-alive” to “being-alive” is instructive for zoerhetorics of the fetus: 
 
                              
31 Christine Garlough, “The Risks of Acknowledgment: Performing the Sex-Selection Identification and 
Abortion Debate,” Women’s Studies in Communication 31, no. 3 (2008): 368-394. 
 
32 Edward Schiappa, “Analyzing Argumentative Discourse from a Rhetorical Perspective: Defining 
‘Person’ and ‘Human Life’ in Constitutional Disputes Over Abortion,” Argumentation 14, no. 3 (2000): 315-332. 
 
33 Jason Edward Black. “Extending the Rights of Personhood, Voice, and Life to Sensate Others: A 
Homology of Right to Life and Animal Rights Rhetoric,” Communication Quarterly 51, no. 3 (2003): 312-331. 
 
34 Chris Kaposy, “Proof and Persuasion in the Philosophical Debate about Abortion,” Philosophy and 
Rhetoric 43, no. 2 (2010): 139-162. 
 
35 John Lynch, “Stem Cells and the Embryo: Biorhetoric and Scientism in Congressional Debate,” Public 
Understanding of Science 18, no. 3 (2009): 309-324, 322. 
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Prenatal space configures a zone “before life” and is a fundamental consequence of the 
diverse articulations that mediate biopower. Ironically, the space of becoming-alive is 
coeval with all of life and is not “before life” except relative to a specific event that 
marks a beginning or birthing. I use “birthing” cautiously because I refer not to the first 
moment of a newborn, but to a life threshold when an organism or entity changes status 
from becoming-alive to being-alive. Where that threshold lies depends on the prevailing 
regime of living that constitutes what is and is not “life” and is no longer dependent on 
the pregnant body for its measure.36 
 
As Stormer observed, the reigning biopolitical regime of living will make the distinction between 
“becoming-alive” or “being-alive,” a distinction that used to ontologically reside within the body 
of the gestating woman (often in the moment of “quickening”). 
Although Stormer positioned abortion through a lens of cultural amnesia,37 few scholars 
have tapped the underdeveloped rhetorical canon of memory to understand constructions of the 
public fetus. Even the recent collected volume Places of Public Memory, which explores various 
museums, monuments, and memorials, does not offer a systematic theory of contemporary 
memorialization practices. For that, I turn to art historian Erika Doss. In her authoritative book 
on the subject, Doss calls the recent increase in memorializing activity in the United States 
memorial mania, or “an obsession with issues of memory and history and an urgent desire to 
express and claim those issues in visibly public contexts.”38 As she catalogued, the list of 
memorials built in the last twenty years includes not only hundreds of memorials dedicated to 
unborn babies, but also memorials for organ donors, executed witches, astronauts, victims of 
lynching, victims of terrorism, murdered teenagers, tragic roadside accidents, cancer survivors, 
                              
36 Nathan Stormer, “Mediating Biopower and the Case of Prenatal Space,” Critical Studies in Media 
Communication 27, no. 1 (2010): 8-23, 16. 
 
37 Nathan Stormer, “In Living Memory: Abortion as Cultural Amnesia,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 88, 
no. 3 (2002): 265-283. 
 
38 Erika Doss, Memorial Mania: Public Feeling in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 
2. 
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soldiers in any number of wars, and a number of persons famous for medical, technological, or 
generally humanistic advances. According to Doss, the performances of public feeling in the 
U.S. crystallized in memorialization practices stem from heightened anxieties about who and 
what should be remembered, and are often accompanied by larger assertions about citizen rights 
and representation—as is clearly the case at the NMU.  
Despite the pervasive public visibility of the fetal entity, and the serious consequences for 
women’s reproductive practices the public fetus carries, a robust rhetorical literature has not yet 
formed around the fetus. This omission, I believe, goes beyond a male bias in the rhetorical 
tradition or the overdetermined intractability of the abortion debate. Rather, the fetal entity is 
undertheorized because of its capacity to confound boundaries dear to the rhetorical tradition, 
such as human/nonhuman, life/thing, and speech/silence. The fetus troubles even the most 
inclusive posthumanist rhetorical theories that attempt to enfold all corporeal entities, including 
animals, within their bounds. For example, in Inessential Solidarity, Diane Davis described a 
fundamental rhetoricity inherent in the vulnerability of corporeality, a rhetoricity ostensibly 
available to humans and animals alike. Yet unlike even an animal, the fetus is both corporeally 
exposed (that is, it has the capacity for injury, just like my liver or my heart) but also completely 
corporeally enfolded within another corporeality. In addition to disrupting the almost universal 
assumption that one human body equals one human person, the fetus is also poised to trouble 
deep rhetorical questions such as who constitutes a speaking subject and the ethical obligations 
we have towards silent others. 
The fetus also poses conundrums for biopolitical theory. The re/production of the 
population is intimately tied to biopolitical mandates. The state needs to regulate the population 
to ensure its continued sustenance, because the state is only as strong as the health of its people. 
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However, there are competing biopolitical pressures on reproductive practices from different 
factions. I will use the example of a pregnancy to illustrate these rival logics. On one side, the 
neoliberal market logics that underlie regimes of living pressure women to delay or limit 
childbearing based on the financial stability of the family unit. Within this orientation, a pregnant 
woman might be encouraged or even applauded for choosing to delay childbearing with an 
abortion prior to the achievement of, for example, career security. On the other side, the pro-life 
movement pressures women to choose “Life.” Within this orientation, a woman might be 
encouraged or even applauded for carrying a pregnancy to term, regardless of financial, familial, 
relational, or even health exigencies. Of these competing biopolitical rhetorics—the logic of the 
market and the logic of Life—the NMU espouses the logic of Life. 
A recent development in biopolitical theory, Didier Fassin’s concept of biolegitimacy 
explores exactly this logic of Life. Instead of Foucauldian biopower, Fassin contended that 
contemporary regimes of living are best characterized by the imposition of biolegitimacy, or the 
recognition of the sacredness of life itself. The shift from biopower (power over life) to 
biolegitimacy (power of life) explains the extent to which capital-L Life has become “a crucial 
issue in the moral economies of contemporary societies.”39 In other words, societies gain a 
rhetorical currency from espousing a commitment to life itself. It is important to distinguish here 
between a society’s commitment to Life through actions and policies versus commitment to life 
through word alone. In the War on Terror, for example, the United States seems to have 
mastered the rhetorical maintenance of biolegitimacy while pursuing asymmetric, ruthless, and 
bloody acts of war. Because the United States at least somewhat convincingly performs 
biolegitimacy, it literally gets away with murder. Although Fassin never expressed it in these 
                              
39 Didier Fassin, “Another Politics of Life is Possible,” Theory, Culture & Society 26, no. 5 (2009): 44-60, 
50. 
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words, his concept of biolegitimacy is enacted as a rhetorical performance. Furthermore, 
Fassin’s biolegitimacy is a rhetorical resource available not just to nation-states, but to 
organizations (like the NMU) and individuals as well.  
The benefits of public performances of biolegitimacy are observable at the NMU. The 
pro-life movement and its ancillary extensions tend to accrue the credibility that derives from 
expressing a commitment to the sanctity of life itself. Comparably, Fassin’s examples of appeals 
to biolegitimacy include the rhetorics of humanitarianism and global human rights. One of the 
most important implications of biolegitimacy for Fassin is that biopolitical regimes produce 
inequalities, a movement that Fassin felt was intimated but never fully realized in Foucauldian 
biopolitics. In other words, to “make live” supposes mostly implicit choices about who gets to 
live what kind of life, and for how long they get to live it. Zoerhetorical theory tries to codify the 
rhetorical dimensions of these processes of inequality production. The NMU’s attempt to 
discipline and control reproductive practices (or at least orientations to these practices) is better 
explained by the contemporary rhetorical force of performing biolegitimacy than the 
Foucauldian state-driven concept of biopower.  
Now that I have established the scholarly literature that guides my conceptual approach 
to the NMU, how do I go about actually making sense of the site? The past fifteen years have 
witnessed the beginning of attempts to codify rhetorical field methods,40 which have centered 
mostly around sites of museums and memorials.41 Scholars have found rhetorical field methods 
advantageous in terms of going beyond traditional text-based rhetorical criticism in the areas of 
                              
40 Michael Middleton, Samantha Senda-Cook, and Danielle Endres, “Articulating Rhetorical Field 
Methods: Challenges and Tensions,” Western Journal of Communication 75, no. 4 (2011): 386-406. 
 
41 For example, see Greg Dickinson, Carole Blair, and Brian Ott eds., Places of Public Memory: The 
Rhetoric of Museum and Memorials (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2010); Thomas Dunn, 
“Remembering “A Great Fag”: Visualizing Public Memory and the Construction of Queer Space,” Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 97, no. 4 (2011): 435-460. 
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addressing materiality, accessing vernacularity, fostering a sophistic aesthetic, and accounting 
for embodied movement in spaces.42 While practitioners of rhetorical field methods have yet to 
confirm a standard set of field practices, my field method practices seem to align with what is 
typical. I took two trips to Chattanooga, each lasting three to four days, in the space of a little 
over a year. I supplemented this time in the field with three in-person interviews and two phone 
interviews with volunteers or visitors at the NMU, as well as a range of texts available at the site 
and the website. 
A practice of rhetorical field methods allows the researcher to be present to the throbbing 
congregation of material-discursive components at the NMU. The NMU can be thought of as an 
assemblage, or a 
 
…heterogenous, historically particular collection of parts whose interactions and 
dispersed agencies produce a range of emergent qualities and consequences. 
Assemblages come into organization but move, change, discharge, and attract 
components, and sometimes disperse. They have both material and signifying 
dimensions, traverse human and non-human realms of being, and include persons, 
networks, language, cognitions, concepts, techniques, habits, organizations and all modes 
of physical matter and materiality.43  
 
Like any other place, the NMU is a material-discursive assemblage, the material objects of which 
include not only the physical site itself, but an array of geographically dispersed elements. 
Comprising these dispersed components are: the brass plaques parents receive by snail mail; the 
website displayed by pixel on scattered computers and hand-held devices; the culturally 
                              
42 See above citations, as well as: Carole Blair, “Contemporary U.S. Memorial Sites as Exemplars of 
Rhetoric’s Materiality,” in Rhetorical Bodies, eds. J. Selzer & S. Crowley (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1999): 16–57; Aaron Hess, “Critical-Rhetorical Ethnography: Rethinking the Place and Process of 
Rhetoric,” Communication Studies 62, no. 2 (2011): 127-152; Peter Simonson, “The Streets of Laredo: Mercurian 
Rhetoric and the Obama Campaign,” Western Journal of Communication 74, no. 1 (2010): 94-126. 
 
43 Allison Rowland and Peter Simonson, “The Founding Mothers of Communication Research: Toward a 
History of a Gendered Assemblage,” Critical Studies in Media Communication 31, no. 1 (2013): 3-26, 5. 
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inscribed bodies of international participants; and the varied zoerhetorical effects of its meaning-
making practices. An assemblage can be understood as the thing that makes the mixing of 
material and discursive modalities possible. In turn, these material and discursive components 
are subject to assemblage territorialization and deterritorialization. As Delueze described it, 
assemblages “territorialize” whenever their boundaries are sharpened or there is an internal 
increase in homogeneity; assemblages “deterritorialize” (lines of flight) whenever their 
boundaries are blurred and there is an internal increase in heterogeneity.44  
 An assemblage theory approach provides an additional benefit for this rhetorical field 
methods study in particular. Namely, it allows me to sidestep a debilitating tension in feminist 
approaches to the fetus. As Linda Layne, Helen Keane, and others have argued, feminists are 
typically hesitant to lend any substantiality to the fetus because they fear the political 
consequences of doing so. As a result, feminist scholars often fail to adequately address women’s 
negative experiences with reproductive loss. For example, some second-wave feminists have 
attributed a false consciousness to women who grieve or regret abortions or miscarriages.45 
Because of the substantiality these feelings imply for the fetal entity, feminists have belittled the 
reality of these emotional responses. This has resulted in impoverished feminist approaches to 
abortion. Because assemblage theory, however, attributes a vibrant agency into all objects and 
matter, it allows us to conceive of the fetus as an actant in an assemblage without falling into 
discourses of humanist obligations such as “rights” towards said assemblage component. In the 
NMU assemblage, the fetal entity is a potent actor indeed.  
                              
44 Manuel DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity (New York: 
Continuum, 2006); Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, 1,000 Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian 
Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003). 
 
45 Helen Keane, “Foetal Personhood and Representations of the Absent Child in Pregnancy Loss 
Memorialization,” Feminist Theory 10, no. 2 (2009): 153-171; Linda Layne, Motherhood Lost: A Feminist Account 
of Pregnancy Loss in America (New York: Routledge, 2003). 
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Under the rubric of assemblage theory, we can understand the fetus as possessing what 
Jane Bennett called a “thing power.”46 The fetal entity is often attributed the similar 
characteristics as the child entity. Claudia Castañeda’s work on the potentiality of the child as a 
perpetually unfinished entity ascribes a certain kind of thing power. She asserted: 
 
What is distinctive about the child is that it has the capacity for transformation…This 
implies that the child is also never complete in itself. It is precisely this incompleteness 
and its accompanying instability that makes the child so apparently available: it is not yet 
fully formed, and so open to re-formation. The child is not only in the making, but also 
malleable—and so can be made.47 
 
Castañeda’s claims about the qualities of “the child” as a component of the assemblage—its 
malleability, its incompleteness, its instability—are true of fetal entities as well. Further, the fetal 
entity’s essential malleability is a double-edged sword to the successful establishment 
(re/territorialization) of the NMU and its affiliate pro-life organizations. On one hand, the fetal 
entity’s fungibility and silence territorializes the NMU, because the NMU can repeatedly “speak 
for” one particular homogenous iteration of the fetal entity—in this case, the holy child. On the 
other hand, the fungibility of the fetus also deterritorializes the NMU, especially when the 
visitors at the site fail to match their authorial narrative of the fetal entity onto the prescribed 
narrative (resulting in multiple heterogenous characterizations of the unborn).48 Paradoxically, 
                              
46 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2009). 
 
47 Claudia Castañeda, Figurations: Child, Bodies, Worlds (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002),  2-
3. 
 
48 I witnessed an NMU volunteer remove a note from the Wall whose flippancy and irreverence did not 
conform to the prescribed narrative. The postcard said, “I am sorry to have aborted you. But I guess that’s life. Or 
not life, in your case.”  
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then, one of the major threats to the NMU’s ongoing successful self-establishment is the 
contestable and malleable nature of the unborn itself.  
All living entities, even those who are members of multiply-privileged groups, are 
zoerhetorically modulated, but there are some entities for whom impassioned zoerhetorical 
contestation is central to their public representation. These include not only fetuses but also 
animals, brain dead persons, the environment, and historically oppressed groups of human-
identified entities. Yet among all of these entities, the fetus alone enjoys an almost maximum 
amount of “zoerhetorical swing,” or range of attributions of status and value for a group of 
entities. The fetal entity ranges from either nothing (a clump of cells, a blob of tissue) or a 
supercitizen (an unborn child deserving human rights and protection that supersede those of the 
mother, who may be a legal citizen) depending for the most part on how we talk about it. 
Because of this stupendous span of status assignations, and because each of these status 
assignations demands different ethical obligations to the fetus, the fetus furnishes a crucial case 
study to advance zoerhetorical theory. The range of possible value assignations attached to the 
fetus span the zoerhetorical hierarchy, or the implicit biopolitical ordering system, in the 
contemporary United States. In order to elaborate the contours of these status assignations at the 
NMU, I will first provide a description of the physical site of itself. 
 
Touring the National Memorial for the Unborn 
   
This is how I “discovered” the NMU. Familiar with my interest in fetal rhetorics, 
Professor Jerry Hauser, a member of my doctoral committee, alerted me to a pubic controversy 
ignited by a local church. Boulder’s Sacred Heart Memorial Wall for the Unborn (located at 
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Sacred Heart of Mary Catholic church) came under scrutiny in 2005 when it was discovered that 
their pro-life committee had been secretly burying fetal abortion remains surreptitiously stolen 
from a local mortuary by a Catholic-identified employee of the mortuary. When the secret burial 
ceremonies were revealed in 2005, the left-leaning Boulder community reacted with outrage. Dr. 
Warren Hern, a famous pro-choice activist, medical scholar, and one of the few late-term 
abortion providers in the country, called the church’s actions a “macabre death ritual.”49 Many of 
the fetal ashes buried at Sacred Heart came from his clinic. To this day, the Sacred Heart of Mary 
Church maintains a website for its Memorial Wall for the Unborn and lists the NMU as an 
affiliate on its website. The website boasts, “Since 1996, the ashes of approximately 5,500 
aborted babies have been buried at the Memorial Wall for the Unborn located at Sacred Heart of 
Mary Cemetery at 6739 South Boulder Road in Boulder, Colorado.”50 
I found the NMU through a link from Sacred Heart’s abortion memorial website, in the 
relatively mindless act of clicking on one of the “Relevant Web Links.” I remember sitting up a 
little at my desk when I landed on the NMU’s homepage—how interesting, I thought. It wasn’t 
until much later that I would fully understand the friendly and financial connections between 
Sacred Heart and the NMU. One woman I interviewed at Sacred Heart said that all plaques 
requested from the state of Colorado are both displayed at the NMU and Sacred Heart’s Wall. 
Sacred Heart’s website instructs viewers to use the resources of the national body while also 
keeping it local: 
 
                              
49 David Kelly, “Church Plans to Bury the Ashes of Fetuses from Abortion Clinic,” Los Angeles Times, 
January 22, 2005,  http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jan/22/nation/na-fetus22. 
 
50 “Welcome,” Memorial Wall for the Unborn, http://www.sacredheartofmary.org/wall/index.html. 
 
 75 
If you are ready to order a plaque for the Memorial Wall for the Unborn, please click on 
the link below to connect to the National Memorial for the Unborn website and order 
form. If possible, please note you would like the plaques sent to Sacred Heart of Mary 
Church.51 
 
Nestled in the suburbs east of Chattanooga and gated with minimal signage, the National 
Memorial for the Unborn doesn’t get much incidental foot traffic. I certainly did not stumble 
upon it while cruising the suburbs, but rather, it came to my attention as I imagine it does for 
most people: through web-browsing affiliated sites. To this day, Sacred Heart’s Wall is one of at 
least fifteen memorials to the unborn across the United States with which the NMU has a formal 
relationship of support. Many of these memorials display the customized bronze nameplates, it is 
my understanding that the NMU is the only manufacturer of these nameplates, demonstrating its 
status as a central hub in the unborn memorialization community. 
Although the NMU’s website and social media presence have matured in the past two 
years since I have been a regular web visitor, many core components have remained in place. It 
is likely that the website mediates most people’s first experiences (and perhaps only experiences) 
with the NMU, as it did mine. At the same time, visitors and volunteers at the NMU I spoke with 
also heard about the NMU through their church or friends. For the local Chattanooga 
community, the NMU holds a series of events such a sing-alongs, memorial ceremonies, or pro-
life rallies. A series of photographs of the site cycle along the homepage’s banner, and the 
opening text welcomes visitors: 
 
A Burden Lifted. The National Memorial for the Unborn, located in Chattanooga, 
Tennessee, is dedicated to healing the generations of pain associated with the loss of 
                              
51 Ibid. 
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aborted children. On this site where 35,000 babies have died, the memory of unborn 
children is honored.52 
 
As the website details in depth, the NMU is located on the site of a former abortion clinic. In 
addition to being featured at the actual site and on the website, the admittedly incredible story of 
the NMU’s provenance is retold in two recently published Christian books: 101 Stories of 
Answered Prayers and Empty Arms: More Than 60 Stories of Hope from the Devastation of 
Abortion. The story is as follows.  
The Pro-Life Majority Coalition of Chattanooga (ProMacc) was engaged in a “fight” 
against the “lucrative” abortion-providing Chattanooga Women’s Clinic. By dint of luck and a 
certain heroic “Christian Realtor,” ProMacc discovered a last-minute opportunity to purchase the 
building that the clinic occupied. In less than forty-eight hours, ProMacc raised $294,000, which 
allowed them to outbid the “abortionist” by just a few thousand dollars and take possession of 
the building. Later, a reporter asked ProMacc’s Patricia Lindley why they overpaid for a building 
worth only $189,000. Lindley’s reply condensed the classic pro-life stance that zoerhetorically 
amplifies the fetus at the expense of the gestating woman: “You can never put a price tag on the 
value of even one human life.”53 This 1993 take-over of an abortion clinic would later serve as 
the template for other pro-life communities shutting down or taking over clinics.54 
                              
52  This text is taken from an iteration of the website that occurred prior to the site’s overhaul and 
redevelopment in December 2013.  
 
53 Wendy Williams and Ann Caldwell, Empty Arms: More than 60 Life-Giving Stories of Hope from the 
Devestation of Abortion (Chattanooga, TN:Living Ink Books, 2005), 6.  
 
54 For example, a clinic in Kansas detailed in this 2007 editorial exemplifies such a take over. The editorial 
also mentions an abortion clinic in Baton Rouge, Louisiana taken over by a pro-life group and renamed the 
“American Holocaust Memorial.” See Josh Harkinson, “The Exorcists: Pro-Life Activists Take Over an Abortion 
Clinic and Cast Out the Demons Within,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, June 10, 2007. 
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As a result of these events, proponents of the NMU understand the site as a landmark 
victory in God’s battle against abortion. “We prayed and the Lord answered,” is a common 
refrain.55 NMU founders estimate that 35,000 babies died on site. The website claims that each of 
these babies are now remembered by the 35,000 rocks in the “rock garden.” As another woman 
told me, “God’s hand is all over this place.” A plaque in the rock garden states: “The glory of 
this latter house shall be greater than of the former, saith the Lord of hosts, and in this place will 
I give peace. Haggai 2:9.” Founders and proponents call the site a holy ground of America, “as 
much as a Civil War battlefield is holy because of the lives lost there.”56 
The most salient feature of the NMU’s website is the Virtual Wall, where a user can 
search for the plaque for their baby or the baby of a loved one. Although it is impossible to 
ascertain online how many brass nameplates honor unborn babies at the NMU, searches for 
common Christian names can yield tens of results. The website also features a photo gallery, a 
document that offers a “tour” through the NMU, a contact page, a video that takes the viewer on 
a tour (linked from the “Godtube” website), an online store, and an order form for a $40.00 brass 
nameplate or brick paver. In addition to links from affiliated memorials to the unborn, the NMU 
is also digitally available via hyperlinks across the broader Christian media assemblage, which 
includes a number of websites addressing issues of abortion, miscarriage, and infant loss. 
The homepage of the website sells a book called Empty Arms: Over 60 Life-Changing 
Stories of Hope from the Devastation of Abortion by Wendy Williams and Ann Caldwell.57 
Williams and Caldwell were involved in the formation of the NMU in the mid-nineties and still 
                              
55 Williams and Caldwell, Empty Arms, 6. 
 
56 Ibid., 7. This is but one of the handful of moments where the Wall’s intertextuality with war rises to 
surface. 
 
57 Ibid.  
 
 78 
maintain seats on its governing board. Free copies of their book are distributed to women who 
seek pregnancy care at the Choices pregnancy center next door to the NMU. Most of the stories 
feature a young woman who chooses abortion when faced with an unplanned pregnancy. As she 
gets older, she realizes with the help of a Bible Study or abortion recovery group that she is 
dealing with the symptoms of Post-Abortion Syndrome. She grieves her abortion (often with the 
help of folks at the NMU), and God gives her peace of knowing she will see her baby in heaven. 
Each story begins with the NMU nameplate dedicated to that particular woman’s unborn baby, 
and ends with a Bible quote. In the narratives offered in this book, the NMU “stepped in to bring 
hope and healing” to the multitudes of women with “deep wounds and unresolved emptiness in 
their heart [sic].”58  
In the book, abortion is portrayed as an event that often results in deep grief, drug abuse, 
infertility, depression, divorce, and heartache. Ann Caldwell confirmed her anti-abortion stance 
clearly in the book’s preface: “One purpose of this book is to show that all women who have had 
abortions suffer afterwards.”59 As a committed pro-choice feminist, I was troubled by the 
misinformation this book promoted about abortion. I was further disturbed that the book 
threatened women with Post-Abortion Syndome, a “disease” widely discredited by the 
psychological establishment.60  
Guided by instructions from the website, I sojourned to the Wall in May of 2012 and 
August of 2013. Each visit was a radically different experience. My first visit serendipitously 
coincided with Mother’s Day, and I arrived at the NMU that Sunday during when I thought 
                              
58 Ibid., back cover. 
 
59 Ibid., xviii.  
 
60 Eva M. Dadlez and William L. Andrews, “Post‐Abortion Syndrome: Creating an 
Affliction,” Bioethics 24, no. 9 (2010): 445-452. 
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would be the prime post-church rush. Much to my surprise, there was no one there. Dressed in 
my nearest approximation of Sunday best, I paced (read: sulked) around the site for hours 
waiting for people to arrive. There was one guestbook entry from the entire week prior in 
addition to my own—a woman from nearby Chickamauga, Georgia. Looking back now, it seems 
absurd that I expected women to celebrate Mother’s Day there! As much as I felt like an 
interloper while I was there alone, those few hours of solace at the site gave me an opportunity to 
look around and take pictures. 
The NMU promotes active subsidiary branches all over the country, a fact that belies the 
quietness of the actual physical site. In fact, I’ve never seen more than two cars in its eight-car 
parking lot. But this quietness, rather than suggesting obsolescence, contributes to what one 
visitor described as an “aura of holiness” at the NMU. A person entering the gates is greeted with 
a sign that says, “Welcome…The gates and doors of the National Memorial for the Unborn are 
always open…please enter in peace.” An Ebenezer Rock of Deliverance as big as my compact 
rental car circumvents passage to the main built structure. According to its placard, the rock is an 
Old Testament symbol of victory in the progression of God’s plan. As former NMU Executive 
Director Carol Martin explained of the massive rock, “It represents the deliverance of this 
property from death and despair to hope and life.”61 
Inside the NMU, the most commanding feature is the fifty-foot marble Wall of Names, 
which consists of hundreds of small plaques, each dedicated to an aborted baby. The oblong 
shape of the built structure invites bodies to mill back and forth across the space in front of the 
Wall. As I walked to and fro, I let my eyes run over the hundreds of nameplates on the Wall, 
stopping to read the ones that caught my attention. With each iteration of this alternating 
                              
61 “A Place of Hope,” Memorial for the Unborn, http://www.memorialfortheunborn.org/about-us/a-place-
of-hope. 
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movement, I “discovered” new nameplates. It became clear to me with this initial “skimming” 
reading that the following words appeared over and over again on the Wall: angel, baby, John, 
love, mommy, and sorry. Interestingly, I was much more comfortable reading the Wall when 
walking left to right, mimicking the direction in which I have been trained to consume text for 
years, rather than walking right to left.  
 Above the Wall, the King James version of Psalms 51:17 is quoted in large black print: 
“…a broken and contrite heart, O God, thou will not despise.” (Not unimportantly, the first 
sentence of the passage omitted in the quotation reads: “The sacrifices of God are a broken 
spirit”). Crowded together colorfully across the shelf under the Wall are hundreds of gifts, 
letters, and other “remembrance items” for the unborn. Hand- and typewritten notes on ripped 
loose-leaf, Hallmark cards, postcards, bespoke stationery, and even the backs of abortion receipts 
are among the many epistolary vehicles for textual communication with the unborn. Among the 
notes pressed stuffed animals, plastic figurines, candles, jewelry, baseball gloves, dolls, Mylar 
balloons, and other objects intended as gifts for the unborn babies at the Wall. For a few minutes, 
I tried to triangulate nameplates on the Wall above with names on the gifts and notes below, but 
that became a tiresome labor. Sometimes gifts were placed directly under their corresponding 
nameplate, but other times there was no nameplate in sight that matched the names on the notes 
and letters below. 
 81 
 
With a ten-foot wooden cross suspended from the ceiling and thoughtfully placed tissue 
boxes on a half-circle of chairs around a lectern, the indoor space felt simultaneously like a 
church and a funeral home. To the right side of the Wall hangs a pair of plaques signed in 1997 
by Norma McCorvey (the anonymous “Roe” of Roe v. Wade) and Sandra Cano (“Doe” of Doe 
v. Bolton). Seventeen years ago at this site, McCorvey and Cano publicly recanted their 
involvement in their respective high profile abortion rights court cases and committed 
themselves to the sanctity of life. This was one stop in a national pro-life tour for the seasoned 
plaintiffs-turned-activists.62 Both women claimed that their attorneys manipulated them and that 
the pro-choice movement used them as pawns. The declaration on McCorvey’s plaque 
acknowledges the restorative and sacred properties that many people experience while visiting 
the NMU: “In this place of healing, the National Memorial for the Unborn, I stand with those 
who honor the worth of every unborn child as created in the image of God. I will strive, in the 
name of Jesus, to end this Holocaust.”  
Although there are a few generic or nameless plaques that repeat themselves throughout 
the Wall (such as “Our Baby, Mommy’s Sorry,” and “My Beautiful Baby”), a number of 
nameplates rise to this uncanny rhetorical situation with panache. Many plaque writers choose 
                              
62 Gayle White, “The 25th Anniversary of Roe v. Wade: Two Women Remember Why,” The Atlantic 
Journal and Constitution, January 17, 1998. 
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not to provide a first name or a surname: “Fourth Baby Newton,” “Eighth Baby Newton,” 
“Sibling of Brian and Megan.” Some plaques supply surnames, most of which sound European, 
like the plaques in remembrance of “Angel VanDyke” or “Abigail Grace Rothgery.” A handful 
of plaques are in Spanish, like “Siempre sere tu primer amor,” which translates to “I will always 
be your first love.” Some plaques are not from mothers or parents but other family members, 
such as “Irma’s Grandbabies/ I cried for you together/ now in heaven.” One plaque’s paratext 
offers a cryptic statement of absolution, that hints perhaps at a coerced abortion: “Baby Ernst/ 
1974/ I forgive my ex-husband.”  
Participants have the option to determine 75 characters of text distributed over three lines 
on their baby’s brass nameplate. While a few choose to acknowledge an unborn baby with one 
line (such as the nameplate that says only “Baby Martinez”), most participants engage the 
opportunity to supply more text. Quoting Biblical passages is one of the most common textual 
practices for nameplates. Among the hundreds of passages quoted include Luke 1:50, Matthew 
5:9, and Psalms 27:3.63 Some plaques are intended to represent the combined abortion loss for a 
family (“Mendy’s two babies”) or even an entire institution (“In memory of the babies/ of 
Maryland General Hospital/ 1965-1972 – a nurse”), while some families maintain a distribution 
of one aborted baby per plaque. The Roy family, for example, commissioned separate plaques 
each for Brian Andre’ Roy, Rebecca Christina Roy, Joshua Roy, and Gabriella Roy. If most 
plaques stand for one aborted baby, quilting these plaques together on the Wall gestures to the 
millions more aborted babies whose lives remain unacknowledged and whose stories remain 
untold. 
                              
63 Here are these Bible passages in the King James version that the NMU favors: Luke 1:50 “And his 
mercy is on them that fear him from generation to generation;” Matthew 5:9 “Blessed are the peacemakers: for they 
shall be called the children of God;” Psalms 27:3 “Though an host should encamp against me, my heart shall not 
fear: though war should rise against me, in this will I be confident.” This is just a sampling from the hundreds of 
Biblical passages reference on the nameplates at the Wall. 
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Except for me, no one visited the Wall during that Sunday afternoon on Mother’s Day of 
2012. Profoundly disappointed, I wondered if there was enough going on at the site to justify 
devoting an entire chapter of my dissertation to it. I felt misled by what now seemed like the self-
aggrandizing title of “National” Memorial for the Unborn. The NMU’s founders wanted the 
American-identified cultural cache that indexed the biggest and most influential memorial for the 
unborn with the word “national,” a word that I naïvely thought would deliver as many daily 
visitors as other “national” memorials that I have visited. To be fair, the NMU assemblage is 
“national” in the extent to which the spokes issuing from its hub reach across the United States. 
The NMU provides resources for smaller state-affiliated memorials to the unborn, such as the 
Kentucky Memorial for the Unborn, as I have mentioned earlier. Said former director Carol 
Martin, “It’s our prayer that one day we will have affiliates in every state in the nation.” They 
even offer an affiliate site package to start a memorial “in your own area.” Despite these facts, at 
that particular moment, the self-bestowed title of “national” seemed more hopeful than actual, 
and even a little disingenuous. 
On that day, I read hundreds of public letters and guestbook entries, many of which were 
addressed to the unborn. Later that evening, I composed the following bitter fieldnote: 
 
I find myself judging the people who mourn here. If I lost or aborted a baby, I would 
never write a public letter that said, “Dear baby, I’m so sorry. REAL SORRY :( Love, 
Mommy.” Frowny faces!? Capital letters? Who are these half-literate twits? I’m pretty 
sure I dropped both of those textual conventions prior to menarche. Ethnographic 
methods: cynicism, ivory tower snobbishness, liberal feminist superiority. 
 
I share this fieldnote—of which I am rather ashamed—partially to perform reflexive 
vulnerability and partly as a narrative device to demonstrate the ways in which my understanding 
of rhetorics at the NMU developed over the course of my second visit, just over a year later. 
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During this follow-up visit, I arranged for a number of interviews with the director of the NMU 
and with various volunteers. It was not until these interviews that I was able to “see” the NMU 
from a different perspective, and exit my own judgmental headspace. Hearing the stories of the 
site that these women shared with me allowed me to understand the extent to which the NMU is 
tied to its “sister ministry,” the pregnancy center next door, the shift in the pro-life movement 
these women were trying to foment, and even the affective intensity of the site. 
 Barbara June,64 a long-time volunteer at the NMU and the Choices pregnancy care center 
next door, sat with me for about an hour on a weekday inside the NMU during my second visit. 
She explained the relationship that the NMU shares with its sister ministry, the Choices 
Pregnancy Resource Center next door. Although they are located in the same building, they have 
separate entrances, mission statements, 501(c)3 statuses, websites, executive directors, and 
parking lots. At the same time, the administrative offices for the NMU are housed on the Choices 
side of the building and the volunteers for each site overlap considerably. To reach the NMU 
from the pregnancy center, you have to walk outside and around the large gated yard. The 
Choices Pregnancy Resource Center, like many pro-life pregnancy centers, is “fake” because 
they advertise guidance about “choices” but with a hidden political agenda to counsel against or 
discourage abortion. Reproductive health activists condemn these institutions for using deception 
and misinformation that threaten women’s health.65 According to the volunteers I interviewed, if 
a woman seeking pregnancy care at Choices consented, it is standard procedure to bring her next 
door for a tour of the NMU. The volunteers I interviewed identified this practice as particularly 
                              
64 This is a pseudonym, which University of Colorado human review board policy obligates me to use, even 
though many of the women I interviewed encouraged me to use their real names. 
 
65 Julie Mertus, “Fake Abortion Clinics: The Threat to Reproductive Self-Determination,” Women & Health 
16, no. 1 (1990): 95-113.  
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moving and persuasive for women considering abortion. They also disclosed that many women 
still considering abortion declined the invitation to take a walk next door to the Wall. 
 I asked Barbara June and a number of other volunteers about their relationship to the 
broader pro-life movement. They were tired of being associated with an angry, shaming, and 
even violent pro-life movement that used shock-and-awe tactics like images of bloody fetuses. 
They wanted the NMU to embody what they saw as an important shift towards caring for all 
women. “We are pro every life, and that includes the mother,” one visitor at the Wall told me, in 
an interesting appeal to biolegitimacy that maintains the zoerhetorical status of both woman and 
fetus. As the director explained to me, the NMU’s mission evolution away from shaming and 
towards caring is reflected in the juxtaposition of its old logo and new logo, pictured below. 
 
 
 
 Finally, it was only with speaking with women at the NMU that I was able to briefly 
experience an affective commingling that allowed me to see, just for a moment, how other 
women may experience the Wall. When one volunteer was talking about how often the siblings 
of unborn babies can really “see” and “feel” their lost brothers and sisters, I briefly “caught” her 
emotional intensity. Her wide, wet eyes and eager grip on my arm showed me that many people 
experience the Wall as wondrous and mysterious. When she told me that some women report 
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seeing fleeting glimpses of the ghosts of their babies in its spacious reflection, I found myself 
checking the Wall for fugitive shadows out of the corners of my own moist eyes.  
 
Zoerhetorical Theory at the National Memorial for the Unborn 
 
Because of the fetal entity’s sweeping scope of contemporary zoerhetorical swing—that 
is, because of the fetal entity’s ongoing and essentially contested status as human—it provides a 
unique case study for advancing zoerhetorical theory. If zoerhetorics make and unmake humans, 
the fetal entity is poised to show us a lot about how, exactly, humans are rhetorically made. In 
this chapter, I have zoomed in on one particular zoerhetorical movement: the inflation of the fetal 
entity as it occurs at the nation’s premier fetal memorialization site. Although the fetus is 
certainly a special case, attuning to the zoerhetorical processes by which the fetus is made into a 
human (and indeed, a gendered human) can shed light on how we are all made into humans.  
Zoerhetorical theory is an attempt to map the rhetorics of inflation and deflation of status 
for groups of living entities, especially as this status corresponds to livable or unlivable lives. But 
what relationship does the NMU have with biopolitics? Unlike the state, the NMU does not 
directly benefit from the rendering of bodies both useful and docile. The NMU is not part of the 
state’s governmental apparatus, nor does it traffic with the neoliberal market logics that contract 
around most state-driven discourses of reproduction. At the same time, I insist that the NMU and 
its affiliate memorials to the unborn are engaged in a biopolitical project. For starters, the NMU 
milks the rhetorical power of biolegitimacy. Their mission, and the pro-life mission writ large, is 
animated by and lent force through the rhetorical performance of a commitment to “life itself.” 
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In addition, the prohibition of abortion they seek would control and discipline female 
reproduction.  
Earlier in this dissertation I discussed the vestigial presence of the Great Chain of Being 
as it manifests in the contemporary zoerhetorical hierarchy. An entity’s position on the 
zoerhetorical hierarchy largely determines the extent to which that entity experiences 
nourishment toward life, neglect towards deterioration, or targeting towards death. Its position on 
the hierarchy also bears a correlation to the extent to which it is granted rhetorical agency or 
“animacy.”66 The most salient, status-laden threshold on the zoerhetorical hierarchy is 
humanhood—and it is precisely this threshold around which zoerhetorics of the fetal entity 
concern themselves. It follows, then, that the most patent zoerhetorical movements at the NMU 
are those that address precisely this burden of establishing the unborn as a human “person” or 
“life.”  
Humanity, an identificatory marker and performance, is one of the stickiest thresholds of 
the zoerhetorical hierarchy. Like Judith Butler’s “congealed” performances of gender, humanity, 
too, sticks to us like a thick pelt. The threshold of humanhood can be considered a stratum, or 
“thickening” within the NMU assemblage, that locks and territorializes.67 If the NMU is a place 
committed to making humans out of fetuses, precisely how does this happen? I argue that 
humans are partly made in a series of tropes—iterable turns, movements, displacements—that 
function to raise or lower the status of a particular entity. We might call these “zoerhetorical 
tropes” zoetropes, or rhetorical or material devices that raise or lower the status of a life. I intend 
the term trope as an expansion of the typical use of the word that means rhetorical device. Tropes 
                              
66 Mel Chen, Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2012). 
 
67 Deleuze and Guattari, 1000 Plateaus. 
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are not merely verbal ornamentations, but rather, in Richard Lanham’s words, “part of our 
original evolutionary equipment.”68 My tropology follows the vein of Paul de Man (himself 
extending Nietzsche’s theory of tropes), who in The Rhetoric of Romanticism attempted to define 
broad philosophical implications for tropes. Referencing Nietzsche’s “army of tropes” 
marshalled in the service of anthropomorphic personification, de Man hinted at the life-giving 
qualities of tropes for animals and objects.69 Inflationary zoetropes territorialize the NMU in 
three primary movements: naming, apostrophe (en-voicing an absent other), and prosopopeia 
(en-facing an absent other).  
 
	    
 
There are two reasons why the Victorian-era zoetrope toy, pictured above, serves as a 
useful metaphor for zoetropological rhetorics. First, just as the optically illusive device creates 
animated “life” in the moment of its turning, life is also “created” in the turning/troping 
movement of zoetropological rhetorics. Also like the toy, zoetropological rhetorics involve a 
sleight of hand or misdirection. Often publicly sanctioned zoerhetorics draw attention to a 
particular movement (such as the inflation of fetal entities) as a means to draw attention from 
                              
68 Richard Lanham, A Handbook of Rhetorical Terms (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 80. 
 
69 Paul de Man, The Resistance to Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 241. 
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another movement (the deflation of a less visible Other). In the case of the NMU, these Others 
are often women whose reproductive practices do not conform to dutiful maternity prescribed 
there.  
 
Naming 
 
 Within pro-life narratives of healing from an abortion, giving your baby a name is often 
cited as one of the first steps of repentance that will ultimately lead to healing.  The back matter 
of Empty Arms states: “Healing is possible through claiming one’s child, naming one’s child, and 
honoring one’s child.” Naming is not only one of the first acts that inaugurates a newborn into 
human society, but for Kenneth Burke, naming (as an act of summation or condensation) is one 
of the central rhetorical acts of language. Naming is always an interpretive act that shapes 
profoundly the significance of the thing named. Each of the brass nameplates on the Wall (or the 
brick pavers reserved for miscarried babies in the garden outside) represents an opportunity for 
NMU’s publics to engage in or observe this powerful act of bequeathing a name. Searching for 
any popular name on the NMU website’s “Virtual Wall” yields many “hits.” For example, a 
search for “John” yields 54 search results of nameplates with babies named John (or plaques that 
quote from the Biblical book of John).  
Similarly, McKerrow centers the power of naming on the “power of language to 
constitute subjects.”70 Here we can make a linguistic distinction between naming a common noun 
and proper noun, the latter of which are reserved for subjects. Participants at the Wall engage 
both types of nominalizations. Fetal entities are “named” common nouns such as “my baby” or 
                              
70 Raymie E. McKerrow, “Critical Rhetoric: Theory and Praxis,” Communications Monographs 56, no. 2 
(1989): 91-111, 105. 
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“angel,” as well as proper nouns such as Charles, Joseph, or Elizabeth. As Mel Chen wrote of 
nominalizations, “They function to fix, stabilize, and most crucially, enable bounding…and 
hence—this is no minor consequence—to render identities finite.”71 When participants of the 
Wall name the unborn, they engage in these subject-forming, identity-bounding acts of 
nominalization.  
Arguably, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial inspired the particular commemorative 
practice that permanently inscribes the names of the dead on a wall, a practice that Blair, 
Jeppeson, and Pucci described as uniquely attentive to the individuals commemorated.72 The 
names of the veterans were physically engraved in granite, lending them a permanence and 
importance. This commitment to the unborn as individuals is exactly the effect that the NMU 
intends to achieve. A further commonality between the two walls is that they are both reflective 
and thus, “quote” whomever is in their reflective range.73 At the NMU, confronting your mirror 
image at the Wall bears the additional significance of “confronting yourself” with the 
consequences of (your) singular abortive act or the cumulative abortive acts of the nation. 
Intertextuality with the Vietnam Veterans Memorial is not lost on the volunteer staff at the 
NMU. A quoted testimonial on the website asserts that the NMU is “as significant as the 
Vietnam Memorial.”74 
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Regarding the literature on tropes, the trope of naming as it operates at the NMU 
dovetails with a handful of traditional rhetorical devices. Writ broadly, the zoetrope of naming at 
the NMU is metonymical, insofar as something is given a new name in order to convey 
additional meaning. The meaning conveyed in giving fetal entities names is that, of course, they 
are human babies. More narrowly, we can call the naming zoetrope at the NMU antonomasia or 
pronominatio, “the use of an epithet or patronymic, instead of a proper name, or the reverse.”75 I 
would playfully suggest that we might also call the naming zoetrope at the NMU a catechresis, a 
deliberate misnaming or strained use of an already existing word or phrase. Calling the 
nameplates catechrestic would invite an absurdist, critical orientation to them. 
Zoerhetorically speaking, just as fetuses are raised, family members appropriately 
performing contrition are raised as well. Rather than just constituting the unborn as subjects, the 
brass plaques and the naming practices associated with them also constitute subjects interacting 
with the Wall as mothers, fathers, and general heaven-bound protectors and guardians of the 
unborn. Following the necropolitical insights of Mbembe and Fassin, we must remember the 
heuristic that zoerhetorics move dynamically. An inflationary zoerhetoric often has deflationary 
consequences elsewhere. As the unborn and their families at the NMU are named and inflated, 
the absent deflated Other includes families who are not publicly grieving abortions. 
It is not just the plaques that nominalize. According to one woman’s testimony, the 
effects of naming were also realized during a memorial service at the NMU: 
 
You see, when you have an abortion, you want to deny that your baby exists, and you 
don’t want anyone to know about him. The memorial service was one way I could 
                              
75 Lanham, Handbook, 17. 
 92 
recognize my child was a real person with a name and identity, and restore him to the 
dignity that I had taken from him.”76  
 
Because many names are gender-specific, naming an entity often goes hand-in-hand with 
gendering the entity. A human is not zoerhetorically identifiable as such until she or he has not 
only a name but also a gender. To be fair, pragmatically, participants at the Wall need a gendered 
pronoun to avoid the clunkiness of the periphratic “he or she” construction, or the objectification 
of “it.” Yet I argue that there is more invested in gendering than just linguistic ease of use at the 
level of sentence building. Rather, at the NMU, hegemonic gendering is also an inflationary 
zoerhetoric by which the fetus/unborn attains status. This is particularly fascinating because most 
abortions occur before ten weeks, when the embryo has no distinguishing genitalia, but rather 
develops (especially around six weeks) what is called a “genital tuber,” or a tiny protrusion that 
will eventually become a labia majora, a penis, or something in-between in the case of intersex 
presentations of genitalia. Therefore, for the majority of abortions, it would have been impossible 
to receive any kind of medically sanctioned confirmation of fetal sex.77  
Some parents manage this tension by choosing gender-neutral names (such as “Jordan”) 
while others simply provide two names for one unborn baby, like the plaque that reads “Melody 
Ellen or Noah.” One woman I interviewed said that it came to her in deep prayer that her baby 
was a boy. Indeed, this prayer-driven or dreamlike intuitive “knowing” seems to be the most 
common way of sexing the unborn baby. As transgender studies scholars Sandy Stone and Susan 
Stryker have noted, a chief part of being recognized as “human” is being recognized as 
                              
76 Williams and Caldwell, Empty Arms, 43. 
 
77 I use the word fetus generously here. Given the most abortions occur before ten weeks prior to last 
menstrual period, most abortions technically abort embryos, not fetuses.  
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normatively gendered. Further, reflective of a worldwide preference for male babies, there are 
more traditionally masculine than traditionally feminine names on the Wall.  
 Of course, across U.S. culture, gendering operates in more zoerhetorically complex ways, 
both inflationary and deflationary. Often to emasculate a man who identifies as a man—to 
gender him as woman—is zoerhetorically deflationary. The attribution of gender may not always 
be inflationary, but the attribution of a normative, hegemonic cisgender often is, as most trans-
identified persons know. Entities near the top of the hierarchic social order, the same entities that 
are most likely to be targeted for health and vitality in regimes of life, perform hegemonic 
gender. Indeed, the “binary phallocratic founding myth by which Western bodies and subjects 
are authorized” is in full cry at the NMU.78 These distinctions are also evident in the gender-
specific toys left under the Wall. Dolls and pink stuffed animals are left for baby girls and 
baseball gloves and blue stuffed animals are left for baby boys. But naming is but a mere baby 
step in the accumulation of personhood, given that we name pets and even vehicles. Often the 
next step is to address the named entity with an apostrophic act. 
 
Apostrophe: En/Voicing the Unborn 
 “The province of apostrophic address is invocation, calling into being entities that are 
not present (Kacandes 1994, 331), such as the unborn, as well as invisible, suprahuman 
entities like infinity, eternity, or life (Johnson 1986; Franklin 1991).” 
      —Nathan Stormer, emphasis mine79 
 
                              
78 Sandy Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto,” in The Transgender Studies 
Reader, eds. Susan Stryker and Stephen Whittle (New York: Routledge, 2006): 221-235, 231. 
 
79 Nathan Stormer, “Looking in Wonder: Prenatal Sublimity and the Commonplace ‘Life,’” Signs 33, no. 3 
(2008): 647-673, 663. 
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To the fetus’ mutability we can at least partially attribute muteness. Or, the fetus is mute 
at least regarding the classic definitions of speech. Because of this silence, the fetus requires 
rhetorical mediation if it is to become a social actor—mediation that no shortage of willing 
parties have supplied. As Megan Foley observed of Terri Schiavo, a clamor of voices was 
willing to speak for her in an attempt to fill the silent void left by her brain death.80 The clamor 
of voices willing to speak for the fetus and for brain dead persons like Schiavo fall into similar 
zoetropic genres. I suggest that apostrophe, or the tropological address to an absent or distant 
other as if they had a voice with which to respond, operates at the Wall as a way of 
zoerhetorically inflating the fetal entity. Often described as fractured address, etymologically 
apostrophe “turns away” to address an absent entity as a way of addressing a broader public. 
We can observe apostrophic address at the NMU in a number of distinct forms. First, the 
unborn are addressed on hundreds of the plaques affixed to the Wall. Underneath the aborted 
baby’s name is additional text that often hails the unborn directly, such as these: “Dance with 
Jesus until I come;” “Forgive me angel for robbing you;” “I hold you in my heart;” “Your sister 
loves you;” and “I do love you now.” Some of this additional text also addresses the wider 
public, often in ways that manage responsibility for the uncondoned nature of abortion as an 
action: “I didn’t have Jesus then;” “1946 was a tragic time;” “Foolishness of our youth.” Second, 
the unborn are apostrophically addressed in the hundreds of open letters strewn underneath the 
Wall. What Brandon Ibanet called the “hybrid form” of the open letter, 81 these epistolary 
rhetorics are addressed directly to the unborn, but by virtue of their public placement, also “turn 
                              
80 Megan Foley, “Voicing Terri Schiavo: Prosopopeic Citizenship in the Democratic Aporia between 
Sovereignty and Biopower,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 7, no. 4 (2010): 381-400. For Foley, this 
speaking-for was constitutive of citizenship itself. 
 
81 Brandon Inabinet, “When Pastors Go Public: Richard Furman’s Public Letter on Slavery,” Southern 
Communication Journal 76, no. 3 (2011): 169-190, 170. 
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away” to address the broader public audience of NMU visitors. The following excerpts from 
letters underneath the Wall exemplify the genre. The first is from a stepmother, the second from 
a father, and the third from a sister of different unborn babies memorialized at the Wall: 
 
This letter is to let you know we all think about you. We love you. We (Laura, Corbin, 
Brendon, and I) came to Chattanooga to see Chandler, Sydney, & Tyler and you. Well, 
your name & plates & stones. You are all in Heaven with God. Your father is very sorry 
for what happened and I have not talked to your mother but I know by her actions she is 
sorry as well. All children are precious and we would love to have you here with us. That 
choice can not be changed unfortunately but we know we will see you and the other 
‘babies’ in heaven.  
 
Hey little one, this is your dad. This might be the hardest letter I’ve ever had to write… 
You would’ve been the apple of my eye, whether I was showering you with all the things 
a little princess could ever want to teaching you to hunt and fish. All the things a little 
boy could want…I also know deep in my heart I would have been the greatest dad ever. It 
kills me inside to know that you are not here. But god needs all the angels he can get. I 
also know that your mother would also have loved you very much. We were very young 
and I was fool of vinegar [sic]. I’m so so sorry. I guess things weren’t going so well 
between us. I was very blind and pretty ignorant too. We had boy and girl names picked 
out and had big plans…Love, your daddy Josh 7/14. 
 
Dear Jer, 
I don’t even know what to say…I love you, I miss you. I miss all the silly little arguments 
we would get in. When you taught me how to drive because mom and dad were too 
afraid. You would love dad, I picture you just like him, strong, laidback. I’m about to 
have a boyfriend, sure wish you were here to chase him off. I miss you….a lot. I need 
you…more. I don’t know why mom kept me and not you. 5 years later she was in the 
same spot but chose me…why? I ask God that a lot. Well whatever the reason don’t 
worry I’ll make you proud! Living for the both of us…miss you. Love, you little sis Jess 
6-27-12. 
 
Immediately remarkable in all of these letters is their informal chattiness combined with strict 
gendered and familial roles. The unborn are not only apostrophically addressed as human 
persons, but more specifically as hegemonically gendered boys who go fishing and intimidate 
their little sister’s (imaginary) boyfriends. Taken together, the three excerpts demonstrate the 
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instability of this relatively new rhetorical practice of memorializing the unborn. 
Understandably, they seem unsure how exactly to address the unborn baby. The closest narrative 
resource would be funeral rhetorics, but they immediately offer a dilemma, insofar as funeral 
rhetorics derive their content from a person’s lived life. This content would obviously be 
unavailable to rhetors memorializing the entities who have never “lived.”  
This narrative instability is observable not only in the first excerpt’s confused placement 
of “babies” in scare quotes (as if to ask, “are you all actually babies?”), but also in the vacillating 
attributions of omniscience to the unborn. The first letter patiently explains who is visiting “you” 
today at the NMU. The Unborn are also addressed in guestbook entries at the Wall. One couple 
visited the NMU and signed the guestbook a few times a month for most of 2013. They 
addressed their entries to Eli, their unborn baby. In these entries, their repeated requests for 
forgiveness juxtaposed with almost quotidian details of their lives is striking. These parents 
attribute a near-omniscience to their child, the candid moments of which I have italicized for 
emphasis below: 
 
1-13-13. Hello Eli, As you know it is mom and dad. We came on the bike it is very cold 
outside. Eli I am sorry I have not talked to you at home a lot of the last few weeks or have 
not been able to come see you a lot. Your Aunt Jackie has been down, then we drove to 
Kentucky with her which was a nightmare (but I know you already know all of this as you 
know I still miss you everyday). 
 
A few months later, Eli’s father wrote: “Hey Eli, Sorry for being so Long in coming. Mom is 
sick and I miss you a lot. Jesus forgive us for not allowing a bright new life upon this earth.” 
Two weeks after that, he signed the guestbook again, updating Eli on his mother’s health: “4/13 
My Dear Eli, Mom is better. I miss you. I have had to forgive myself for what I did to you.” 
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There is veritable refrain at the Wall that conforms to the mode of apostrophic address, 
and it occurs so often across a range of media that it deserves its own analysis. Some close 
variation of “I will hold you in heaven” not only appears on over two hundred nameplates on the 
Wall, but it is also the name of a large, well-lit and centrally featured painting at the NMU and 
the name of a book distributed for free at the pregnancy center next door. The zoerhetorically 
interesting thing about the phrase “I will hold you in heaven” is that it implies an inflation in 
status (matched by a literal physical ascendant upward movement, towards heaven) for both the 
addressed fetal entity and the speaker. The implication is that by asking for forgiveness, the 
persons who committed the act of abortion will be redeemed and forgiven. Just as is true with the 
naming zoetrope, the apostrophic act raises not only the fetal entity but also the speaker. 
In a brilliant 1986 essay, Barbara Johnson explored the political consequences of 
apostrophically addressing the fetus. For Johnson, addressing fetal entities was a way to animate 
them into being: “Apostrophe is a form of ventriloquism through which the speaker throws 
voice, life, and human form onto the addressee, turning its silence into mute responsiveness.” 82 
More recently, Lauren Berlant picked up on the potential of apostrophic address to “conjure 
other [subjects]” in her volume Cruel Optimism. Berlant called apostrophe a 
“phenomenologically vitalizing movement of rhetorical animation” but she remained critical of 
its political implications for subject-ifying fetuses. Referring to it as “fake…intersubjectivity,” 
she was wary of the suspended optimism of speakers who engaged in apostrophic address. 
Berlant’s ultimate condemnation of the apostrophically-engaged speaker can also read as an 
ungenerous psychoanalytic description of participants at the NMU. Here she describes those 
speakers while playing with the “turning away” Greek meaning of apostrophe: 
                              
82 Barbara Johnson, “Apostrophe, Animation, and Abortion,” diacritics 16, no. 1 (1986): 29-47, 30. 
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The present is made possible by a fantasy of you, laden with x qualities I can project onto 
you, given your convenient absence. Apostrophe therefore appears to be a reaching out to 
you, a direct movement from place x to place y, but is it actually a turning back, an 
animating of a receiver on behalf of the desire to make something happen now that 
realizes something in the speaker, makes the speaker more or differently possible, 
because she has admitted, in a sense, the importance of speaking for, as, and to, two—but 
only under the condition, and illusion, that the two are really (in) one.83 
 
Just as the oft-repeated phrase “I will hold you in heaven” suggests, an apostrophic address of 
the fetal entity hails into being not only the fetal entity as a human but also the speaker as an 
ethical subject (and heaven-bound protector). Importantly we might note that this apostrophic 
address excludes parents who fail to publically perform ritualized apologies to their aborted 
babies. 
In a wholly different engagement with apostrophe, Johanna Hartelius argued that 
apostrophe and prosopopeia are tandem rhetorical operations. Importantly, Hartelius defined 
apostrophe as a trope of thought in which an absent or deceased entity is addressed “as though it 
had a voice with which to respond.”84 The epigraph with which I opened this chapter 
demonstrates a quite literalized apostrophic en-voicement: “My precious babies in Heaven—I 
will be your voice!” Although her object of study was representation of immigrants in the New 
York Times, Hartelius’ tropological analysis of the en-voicing properties of apostrophe can be 
extended to the constitution of rhetorical subjectivity on a wider scale. Following Paul de Man, 
Hartelius described the two tropes of apostrophe and prosopopeia as inextricable operations, so I 
will focus next on the zoetropological effects of prosopopeia. 
                              
83 Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), Loc 339, Kindle Edition. 
Emphasis in the original. 
 
84 Johanna Hartelius, “Face-ing Immigration: Prosopopeia and the “Muslim-Arab-Middle Eastern” 
Other,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 43, no. 4 (2013): 311-334, 314. 
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Prosopopeia: En/Facing the Unborn 
 
That which has been “faced”—or that which has experienced enfacement, can be acted 
on and toward in the social world.  
—Johanna Hartelius85 
The classic definition of prosopopeia is “an animal or inanimate object is represented as 
having human attributes and addressed or made to speak as if it were human.”86 What this 
definition misses, however, is the importance of face for prosopopeia. Paul de Man enchained 
apostrophe with prosopopeia as the tropological attributions of voice and face, respectively, 
through etymological evidence: “[V]oice assumes mouth, eye, and finally face, a chain that is 
manifest in the etymology of the trope’s name prosopon poien, to confer a mask or a face 
(prosopon).”87 For de Man, the face as the “locus of speech” is necessary to the constitution of 
the speaking subject.88 In Inessential Solidarity, Diane Davis comments on de Man’s figural 
linking of apostrophe with prosopopeia. Like de Man and Hartelius, Davis recognized 
prosopopeic enfacement as necessary to the constituting of subjects: we don’t exist until we are 
“troped as enunciating subjects.”89 
                              
85 Ibid., 11. 
 
86 Lanham, Handbook, 123. 
 
87 Paul de Man, “Autobiography as Defacement,” The Rhetoric of Romanticism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1984), 76. 
 
88 Ibid., 89. 
 
89 Diane Davis, Inessential Solidarity (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010), Kindle Edition, 
Loc 598. François Cooren covered similar terrain in the field of communication theory. In his 2010 book Action and 
Agency in Dialogue, he posited ventriloquy as the constitute event of all communication, thereby exposing the 
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The double-punch of apostrophe and prosopopeia carries with it human-izing 
zoetropological effects. I have arranged the order of these tropes in the logical order of 
accumulation. First a name, then voice, then face. Although each of these three tropes occur in a 
slow iterable processes, prosopopeia is the most advanced form of human-making. Or more 
accurately, an entity is rendered as most human when mediated prosopopeically.90 The difference 
between a human component and a non-human component of an assemblage is that the former 
has been enfaced as a social actor and the latter has not. We attribute more rhetorical agency 
(usually in the form of the trope of voice) to these enfaced human components of a particular 
assemblage. Zoerhetorics at the NMU exemplify a clear moment when an entity is 
zoetropologically given voice and face, and the result is a human-ized social actor. 
Evidence of prosopopeic enfacement at the NMU includes not only the existence of the 
memorial to the unborn in the first place, but also any rhetorical event at the NMU in which the 
unborn have faces, bodies, or are generally considered social actors. When Jessica Renee wrote 
of her unborn baby in the Open Arms book, “In her very short lifetime, she changed my life,” her 
unborn baby is prosopopeically enfaced as an agentic, change-making human actor.91 The 
common practice of leaving gifts at the NMU can also be understood as prosopopeic, especially 
insofar as many of the gifts imply not only absent voices and faces, but also absent bodies. The 
embodied, iterable habits of play that these gendered gifts entail, of throwing and catching a 
                                                                                              
illusion of the rational, speaking agent as the originator of speech. See Action and Agency in Dialogue: Passion, 
Incarnation and Ventriloquism (Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 2010). 
 
90 Hartelius, “Face-ing Immigration,” 311-334. Hartelius observed that despite prosopopeia’s etymology as 
the Greek word for face or mask, rhetorical scholars have historically linked it to voice (c.f. Megan Foley), which 
her essay intended to redress. 
 
91 Williams and Caldwell, Empty Arms, 57. 
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baseball with a baseball glove, of dressing and cuddling a doll or stuffed animal, further enface 
the unborn as social actors. 
There is an uncanny acceleration and cessation of time that occurs at the NMU that can 
partially be explained by prosopopeic mediation. Ray Harvey’s original painting, pictured below, 
is encased in glass on the left side of the indoor area, and is called “I will hold you in heaven.” 
The painting depicts an alabaster woman holding a large baby. It is the size of this “baby” that 
best represents the temporal acceleration/cessation at the NMU. Most abortions occur before ten 
weeks, at which point the embryo/fetus is roughly the size and shape of a cocktail shrimp.92 In 
the mythology of the NMU, sometime between the abortifacient event and the fetal entity’s 
arrival in heaven, the baby balloons to over 500% of its original size, growing into a fully 
developed, even large, infant. Then, it stays this size—conveniently, the size of an intelligible 
baby—as it waits to rejoin his or her family in heaven.93 This intense and rather logic-defying 
one-time “growth spurt” occurs because it is impossible to enface the fetal entity at its actual size 
when aborted. Because we do not have a frame for recognizing shrimp-sized entities as enfaced 
human actors, prosopopeic mediation is required.  
                              
92 “Fact Sheet: Induced Abortion in the United States,” Guttmacher Institute. 
 
93 In a famous 1984 essay that linked the “cult of fetal personhood” to mass anxieties around human 
extinction in the face of nuclear war, Zoe Sofia compared the temporal distortions mobilized by the pro-life 
movement to the trope of temporal distortion in science fiction. “Exterminating fetuses: Abortion, disarmament, and 
the sexo-semiotics of extraterrestrialism,” diacritics 14, no. 2 (1984): 47-59. 
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If these are the prosopopeic inflations at the NMU, what are the corresponding 
deflations? Davis recognized the duality of prosopopeia when she rhymed that it “defaces and 
effaces precisely to the extent that it enfaces.”94 This affords with the interdependent modulations 
of status I propose in zoerhetorical theory. In the case of the NMU, as the unborn are enfaced, 
women whose reproductive practices do not conform to the NMU’s regime of living are defaced 
or effaced. These women are effaced at the NMU by means of exclusion from a life-loving 
public sphere. They are robbed of the credibility accrued through the rhetorical performance of 
biolegitimacy that the NMU monopolizes. Further, because of the Wall’s shiny surface, visitors 
can see their shadowy reflections in it. Therefore, visiting the Wall means “facing yourself”—
and therefore the murderous effects of your reproductive decisions. As the unborn, then, are 
prosopopeically en/faced at the Wall, visitors to the Wall also “face” themselves. 
As we saw with the hegemonic gendering practices at the NMU, the unborn are not just 
zoetropologically inflated towards enfaced humanhood. Rather, they are also raised towards a 
prescriptive American-identified hegemonic humanhood. The fetal entities at the NMU are not 
just babies, infants, children, or persons. They are more than that; they are, in various texts and 
modes across the NMU, “Holy Innocents,” “martyrs,” “soldiers,” and “angels.” The NMU does 
                              
94 Davis, Inessential Solidarity, Loc 621. 
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not just remember the unborn; the NMU is an encomium to the unborn. When participants at the 
Wall make humanizing attributions to the unborn, they reappropriate a zoerhetorical hierarchy 
when they do so, hitching fetal entities to those entities, objects, or practices with higher statuses, 
such as angels. When Susan Squier observed that the public fetus seems to be understood as 
“white and male,” she remarked on this exact practice.95 
As I have shown, a series of zoetropological practices gender, en/voice, and en/face the 
unborn as “persons.” These seem to occur in an order of necessity—a slow building of status 
accumulation. First, most primally, naming calls them into being. Gendering makes them one of 
“us.” While apostrophe addresses them as if they have a voice, prosopopeia gives them a face. 
Toys like baseball gloves lend them gendered, embodied, American-identified, habitual practices 
like playing catch. One inflationary zoerhetoric does not a human make. Rather, at the NMU, it 
is a process that happens across a range of repeated tropes.  
It is important to recognize here that the NMU is by no means the first organization to 
inflate fetal entities using these tropological strategies. In fact, merely the existence of a 
memorial to the unborn suggests we are well into an historical period of fetal inflation, of which 
the NMU is a only a late but critical marker.96 Still, the NMU, as the nation’s premier abortion 
memorial, brings to the table the zoerhetorical practice of memorialization. On the one hand, 
fetal memorialization can only be possible once the unborn have already been troped into being 
through naming, en/voicing, and en/facing. On the other hand, fetal memorialization further 
shores up the accumulated humanity of the fetal entity. 
 
                              
95 Susan Squier, “Fetal Subjects and Maternal Objects: Reproductive Technology and the New 
Fetal/Maternal Relation,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 21, no. 5 (1996): 515-535, 530. 
 
96 Thank you to Nathan Stormer for helping me see this. 
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Conclusion: The Slow Zoerhetorical Accumulation of Humanhood 
 
I opened up this chapter with a cursory outline of the many voices attempting to speak for 
the fetal entity, perhaps the most contested and zoerhetorically saturated entities in the 
contemporary United States. One of these public voices that “speak for” the fetal entity is the 
National Memorial for the Unborn, an arm of the pro-life movement. The NMU is deeply 
invested in the rhetorical construction of the fetal entity as a sacred unborn life. In order to 
territorialize this particular construction of the fetal entity as a sacred human, the NMU relies on 
a series of strategies that I call zoetropological rhetorics, or zoetropes. Zoetropes are rhetorical 
devices that inflate or deflate the status of a life or lives.  
In this chapter, I analyzed three zoetropes as they occur at the NMU: naming, apostrophe 
(en/voicement) and prosopopeia (en/facement). These rhetorical devices are the means by which 
the slow, iterable accumulation of humanhood is achieved for the unborn at the NMU. My hope 
has been that the series of zoetropological enfacements I have identified here can be used to 
understand the en-facing, or rhetorical “making,” of humans more broadly. All human-identified 
entities are embedded within accumulations of the effects of zoetropological gestures. At the 
same time, not all human-identified entities share the feature of the fetus that makes it so 
“available” for zoetroping; namely, silence. The ways in which other human-identified entities 
are zoetroped as subjects would be a great direction for future research.  
One tentative proposition of zoerhetorical theory supported by the literature of 
necropolitics would be that zoerhetorics are interdependent. Inflations result in deflations, just as 
all inclusions result in exclusions. Rather than conforming to the strict equations of zero-sum 
games, it serves as a useful heuristic to be attuned to the deflations in the face of inflations. I 
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have tried to be attuned to the group excluded from and deflated by the NMU over the course of 
this analysis: fecund women whose abortifacient reproductive practices inspire in them no regret 
or mourning. 
While the NMU has not yet manifested an entire world, or even a dominant public, where 
its proposed regime of living must be observed, it is important to note here that its zoerhetorics 
have effects for the livability of lives. For women, one thing that makes life more livable is 
control over their body’s reproductive capacities. When ProMacc took over the Chattanooga 
Women’s Clinic, Chattanooga became one of first cities of its size to not have an abortion clinic. 
Because of the pro-life movement’s efforts, there are now large geographic areas in the U.S. that 
we might call “abortion deserts.”97 The vision for a regime of living that the NMU forwards—a 
regime of living that includes compulsory pregnancy—is hardly a livable life for women of 
child-bearing age. Zoerhetorics matter. 	  
 
 
                              
97 There are only a few abortion clinics left in the huge swath of land between Idaho and the Dakotas. 
Robin Marty, “America’s Abortion-Free Zone Grows,” The Daily Beast. April 14, 2014. 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/04/14/america-s-abortion-free-zone-grows.html. Depending on where 
you live in the deep South, as well, you may have to travel up to ten hours in a car to get obtain a legal abortion. The 
one remaining abortion clinic in Mississippi, for example, is constantly under siege. 
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Chapter Three 
The Zoerhetorics of Drones: 
Manufacturting Strike Targets in the CIA’s War on Terror 
On any given day, an average U.S. citizen might come into contact with a multiplicity of 
representations of drones. Drones have achieved a buzz in the popular imagination in the United 
States—albeit a very different buzz than the omnipresent one heard over Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas in Pakistan since 2009.1 Indeed, Pakistan, the United States, and the rest of the 
world now live in what some pundits call a “drone moment,” although national and locoregional 
experiences of this moment differ immensely. Conspicuously absent from my own relatively 
secure U.S.-based drone encounters, for example, is any sense of threat, awareness of my own 
vulnerability, or contact with weaponized drones. Like other folks in biopolitically privileged 
classes, my drone experiences are radically incongruent with those of persons living in any of the 
recognized or unrecognized theaters of the Global War on Terror over which my country’s 
combat aerial vehicles fly—a list that currently includes areas in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen. It is precisely these incongruities—of security, of 
vulnerability, of livable worlds—that I’d like to rhetorically ask after in relation to drone 
warfare. 
                              
1 New York Times journalist David Rohde, kidnapped by the Taliban in 2008, said in a documentary 
interview with Al Jazeera that American drones “are circling overhead all the time” in North Waziristan. “Attack of 
the Drones,” http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2012/07/201271872041648814.html; Human 
rights activist Sarah Knuckey said of persons living in Waziristan, “I was struck by how afraid people are of the 
constant presence of drones,” Margaret Sullivan, “Questions on Drones, Unanswered Still,” New  York Times, 
October 13, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/14/public-editor/questions-on-drones-unanswered-still.html. 
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Our technologically mediated world produces a lot of handwringing, but perhaps no 
single weapons technology since the atomic bomb or chemical weapons has resulted in as much 
contention as the Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), or weaponized drone.2 The remote, 
disembodied nature of “flying killer robots” captured the imagination of the American public, 
even as there’s little novel about remote, asymmetric, or so-called push-button warfare.3 In the 
last five years, citizens of the United States have had the opportunity to consume drone rhetorics 
in news media and popular culture. Like some kind of Jungian manifestation of repressed 
collective shadow guilt, it seems that the longer the Obama administration declined to officially 
acknowledge our climbing drone strike civilian death toll abroad, the more representations of 
drones saturated popular culture at home.  
I read the appearance of drones in U.S. public culture as the dyspepsia that results when 
we collectively attempt to swallow the ethically dubious drone war we wage. The logic of the 
drone campaign extends from the agarose matrix from which it arose: the U.S.-led Global War 
on Terror.4 Classic characteristics of the War on Terror intensified in the current drone campaign 
include technological asymmetry, disingenuous political maneuvers,5 a justification for violence 
                              
2 Although scientists and military officials rarely use, and occasionally detest, the word “drone,” I’ll 
continue to use the word here because that’s what the public most commonly uses, and this essay focuses on drones 
in mass media rhetoric. 
 
3 Arguably, the Gulf War was the first war fought like a video game. See Robert Stam, “Mobilizing 
Fictions: The Gulf War, the Media and the Recruitment of the Spectator,” Public Culture 4, no. 2 (1992): 101-126. 
See also Rachel Plotnick, “Predicting Push-button Warfare: U.S. Print Media and Conflict from a Distance, 1945–
2010,” Media, Culture & Society 34, no. 6 (2012): 655-672.  
 
4 I’ll resist Obama’s rebranding attempt of the War on Terror as the “Overseas Contingency Operation.” 
 
5 Compare, for example, John Brennan’s claim that the number of civilians dead from CIA drone strikes 
was “zero” or “single digits” with Bush’s disingenuous WMD rhetoric, as documented by Douglas Kellner, 
“Bushspeak and the Politics of Lying: Presidential Rhetoric in the War on Terror,” Presidential Studies 
Quarterly 37, no. 4 (2007): 622-645. 
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in the name of “life itself,”6 and abysmally entrenched transnational corporate interests.7 Like the 
broader War on Terror, the drone campaign relies on what Barbara Beisecker described as the 
melancholic post-9/11 rhetoric of patriotism, a rhetoric that allowed the remilitarized state to 
defend a logic of preemption—“let’s get them before they get us.”8 Further, like the War on 
Terror at large, the drone campaign is marked not by public assent and civic engagement but 
rather an acquiescence that “now powers the war machine.”9 Thus as the drone campaign offered 
“more of the same,” it also offered the U.S. public something fresh about the long War on 
Terror. Mediated representations of drones capitalize on their sex appeal. “Flying killer robots” 
sound like the stuff of science fiction, and the names “Predator” and “Reaper” cater to these 
hunter-killer entertainment fantasies. The sex appeal of drones is not unexploited by the global 
media industries.10 For example, the media’s insistence on the word “drone,” despite pleas from 
military leaders and scientists for the more technically accurate phrases like “remotely piloted 
aircraft,” kindles notions of independent and autonomously controlled flying machines. 
Ironically, it just may be the sexiness of drones that brings social justice issues like dead civilians 
and due process to the national stage—although in problematic ways for distributions of 
livability, as I’ll develop below. 
                              
6 Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live, Vol. 8 (New York: 
Routledge, 2009). 
 
7 Solomon Hughes, War on Terror, Inc: Corporate Profiteering from the Politics of Fear (London: Verso, 
2007). 
8 Barbara A. Biesecker, “No Time for Mourning: The Rhetorical Production of the Melancholic Citizen-
subject in the War on Terror,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 40, no. 1 (2007): 147-169. 
 
9 Jeremy Engels and William O. Saas, “On Acquiescence and Ends-Less War: An Inquiry into the New 
War Rhetoric,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 99, no. 2 (2013): 225-232, 226. 
 
10 For more on the intersection between the entertainment industries and the War on Terror, see: James Der 
Derian, Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-industrial-media-entertainment-network, (New York Routledge, 2009; 
Ian Shaw. “Playing War.” Social & Cultural Geography 11, no. 8 (2010): 789-803; Roger Stahl, “Have you Played 
the War on Terror?” Critical Studies in Media Communication 23, no. 2 (2006): 112-130. 
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Drones are the new face of the seemingly endless (and ends-less, according to Engels and 
Saas11) War on Terror. In addition to investigative journalism and opinion pieces in news outlets, 
weaponized drones have been treated seriously (Homeland) and jocoseriously (Nikita; Arrested 
Development) across television shows, pervaded satirical news websites like The Onion, 
entertained in videogame franchises like Call of Duty and Battlefield, and congested social media 
sites. Cinematic ventures into drone politics include the controversial blockbuster Zero Dark 
Thirty (2012) and Marvel’s Captain America: Winter’s Soldier (2014), while Jerry Bruckheimer 
and Tom Cruise are rumored to be in talks about a sequel to Top Gun that asserts that virile 
necessity of pilots in the age of drone warfare.12 Videos of drone wreckage in Pakistan flood 
YouTube, a popular Twitter feed assumes the first-person role of an intoxicated drone,13 and 
Rand Paul’s recent filibuster, called one of the longest in history, protested drone strikes on U.S. 
citizens at home. Last year, Amazon.com, the nation’s largest online retailer, floated the notion 
of home-delivery drones, and both Facebook and Google have recently invested in drone-capable 
aerospace technology companies.14 In short, drone rhetorics abound in contemporary American 
popular culture, (de)sensitizing publics towards certain conceptions of U.S.-led drone warfare. 
 
Towards a Zoerhetorical Theory: How to Make a Human 
This mass percolation of drone rhetorics in news media and popular culture influences 
cultural meanings regarding humanity, belonging, and innocence. Contemporary U.S.-based 
public rhetorics of drone warfare suggest some bodies as worthy of protection and demand other 
                              
11 Engels and Saas, “Ends-Less War.” 
 
12 Ibid. 
 
13 @drunkenpredator. 
 
14 Maureen Dowd, “Game of Drones,” New York Times, April 15, 2014. 
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bodies as targets. That is, rhetorics of drone warfare are zoerhetorical. As I’ve defined them, 
zoerhetorics are discourses, objects, events, or practices that raise or lower the status of lives, 
targeting some populations for vitality, slow deterioration, or death. The worth or value of 
someone (or something, in the case of nonhuman living entities like animals) is subject to 
zoerhetorical construction and modulation. My contention is that the rhetorical inflations and 
deflations of status for various living entities conform to discernible patterns for a given 
sociohistorical milieu. I will attempt to make sense of these patterns of lives zoe/rhetorically 
constructed as more or less livable using the contemporary U.S.-led drone campaign as a case 
study.  
Rhetorics of drone warfare allow me to explore particular features of zoerhetorical 
hierarchies. Specifically, rhetorics of weaponized drones exemplify how a particular entity’s 
opportunities for a livable life—in this case, military-aged males coded as targets in Pakistan—
are disrupted and maintained by zoerhetorical inflations and deflations. The gradient nature of 
zoerhetorical hierarchies produces a fungibility that is used as a resource for rhetorical status 
modulation via a process of metonymic sliding. Metonymic “sliding” is perhaps the most 
common mechanism of zoerhetorical modulation. In the contemporary regime of living, 
biolegitimacy becomes a powerful resource for this metonymic sliding. 
In Albertus Magnus’ iteration of the Great Chain of Being, the principles of continuity 
and gradience are established clearly. According to Magnus, borrowing from Aristotle, 
everything on the scala naturae was substantively linked, in uninterrupted enchainment, to the 
entities between which it was sandwiched. For example, Sub-Saharan Africans, were considered 
to possess overlapping qualities with both apes and “full” humans, just as “full” humans 
possessed qualities of both angels and animals, and so on. The imbricative fluidity between 
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entities buttresses the logic of, or becomes the possibility for, metonymic shifting up and down 
the hierarchy.  
The shifting mechanism works like this. Rhetorics that associate an entity with an entity, 
quality, or object higher on the hierarchy tend to inflate the status of that entity. For example, the 
rhetorical hitching or tethering of an entity to a god term (at the apex of the hierarchy, the “title 
of all titles”15) would “buy” that entity a currency with which it could ascend the ladder. 
Inflationary zoerhetorics mine god terms like dignity, humanity, personhood, and rights. When 
zoerhetorics inflate, they are quite literally bringing a group of entities closer to god. This 
lumping movement of inflationary zoerhetorics is evident in zoerhetorically rich phrases like 
“universal human rights.” Similary, the opposite is also true. Rhetorics that associate an entity 
with an entity, quality, or object lower on the hierarchy tend to deflate the status of that entity. 
Rather than a God term, for example, deflationary zoerhetorics often stick an entity with an 
animal term or a devil term. In line with the making of enemies in the War on Terror, Sara 
Ahmed noticed that when we metonymically slide “lower” figures together, it “constructs a 
relation of resemblance between figures. What makes them ‘alike’ may be their ‘unlikeness’ 
from ‘us.’ […] The sliding between signs also involves ‘sticking’ signs to bodies: the bodies who 
‘could be terrorists’ are the ones who might ‘look Muslim.’”16  
Metonymy is the rhetorical figure that calls a thing or concept not by its own name, but 
by the name of a similar thing or concept. For Ahmed, it is exactly this “metonymic proximity” 
that saturates signs with stickiness. In other words, the uninterrupted enchainment of entities in 
                              
15 Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (New York: New York Press, 1950), 252, 306; A Grammar of 
Motives (University of California Press, 1969), 351. Richard Weaver borrowed and extended Burke’s ultimate terms 
into concepts like charismatic terms and universal terms, while maintaining the strong thread of hierarchy and 
ranking in Burke’s treatment in The Ethics of Rhetoric (New York: Routledge, 1985). 
 
16 Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion (New York: Routledge, 2013), 44. 
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our vestigial Great Chain of Being is what allows for entities to be fluidly and continually grafted 
onto one another. 
These lumping/splitting zoerhetorics carry two important logical extensions. The first is 
that zoerhetorics are dynamic and interdependent. Often, an inflation for one group results in the 
deflation of another, and vice versa. Even the most explicit split (you’re not part of our group) 
implies a grafting somewhere else (you’re part of another group). I suggest here neither that 
zoerhetorics conform to some kind of natural equilibrium, nor do they feature the rigidity of a 
zero sum game. Rather, an important and pragmatic guiding heuristic would be to look for the 
shadow of deflation in the light of inflation, especially given that the resources of livability—
material or otherwise—are limited. So while it might be tempting to say that inflationary 
zoerhetorics create consubstantiality and deflationary zoerhetorics promote division, 
disidentification, and scapegoating, the larger picture is more complex than that. That human 
privileges require populations excluded from those privileges is a central insight of biopolitics 
that Cary Wolfe teased out from Hannah Arendt to Roberto Esposito.17 Inclusions beget 
exclusions, or as Jeremy Engels wrote, “Naming—or identifying—the enemy is a prerequisite 
for the political.”18 From this we may infer that U.S. drone rhetorics not only lower the status of 
lives for “militants” and other “targets” in Pakistan, but also raise the status of lives for 
American-identified persons deserving of protection and security.  
The second logical extension of the framework I have proposed is that attributions of 
agency for a given entity are determined by that entity’s position on the hierarchy. Entities at the 
zenith of the hierarchy are attributed the most agency (again, think of God) or potentiality to 
                              
17 Cary Wolfe, Before the Law: Humans and Other Animals in a Biopolitical Frame (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2012), 7. 
 
18 Jeremy Engels, “Friend or Foe?: Naming the Enemy,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 12, no. 1 (2009): 37-64, 
56. 
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affect, whereas entities at the nadir are attributed the least agency. For example, mere dirt is 
below nutrient-rich soil in the Great Chain. Mel Chen captured this dynamic well in her concept 
of animacy hierarchies.  In recent pathbreaking work, Chen upcycled a mainstream idea in 
linguistics, animacy, defined as the “grammatical effects of the sentience of liveliness of nouns” 
into a concept whose queer and necropolitical affinities complement zoerhetorical theory. At the 
level of sentence building, speakers across languages prefer some nouns as subjects and others as 
objects. Using this and other linguistic indicators of hierarchy, Chen redeveloped animacy 
hierarchies to demonstrate the sexualized and racialized means of “conceptual and affective 
mediation between human and inhuman.”19 Like zoerhetorical hierarchies, animacy hierarchies 
carry broad implications for nationality, security, “lifeliness,” and ecology, given that they create 
and constrain zones of im/possible agencies. These hierarchy-driven attributions of agency have 
enormous implications for rhetoric—who is allowed to speak? 
In contemporary regimes of living, one of the primary assignators of status is what Didier 
Fassin called biolegitimacy. Biolegitimacy is the extent to which a society (or an entity) is 
considered to value “life itself.” Fassin intended the concept of biolegitimacy to replace 
biopower, and further described it as the recognition of life as supreme good.20 When George W. 
Bush declared America as having a “culture of life,” he exemplified the exigencies of 
biolegitimacy. Similarly, when the U.S. wages war on terror “in the name of life itself,” we 
valorize biolegitimacy. Weaponized drones, at least as they get circulated in hegemonic rhetorics 
in the U.S., are biolegitimate weapons par excellence. They accrue biolegitimacy through 
rhetorics of life-saving (the lives of service-persons, the lives of innocent Americans, the lives of 
                              
19 Mel Y. Chen, Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2012), 2. 
 
20 Didier Fassin, “Another Politics of Life is Possible,” Theory, Culture & Society 26, no. 5 (2009): 44-60. 
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civilians abroad) and through rhetorics of life-saving medicine (drones have the “surgical 
proficiency” to remove the “cancerous tumor” of Al-Qaeda, according to John Brennan). 
 
The New York Times Assemblage 
 
To focus this investigation, I analyze New York Times coverage of drone warfare during 
the Obama administration years, up until the first few months of 2013. This includes but is not 
limited to the post-2008 articles curated into a “Times Topics” page collection on “Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles.” I pay special attention to Times coverage of covert CIA strikes. The CIA 
executed the majority of the strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. The timeline of 2009 
through early 2013 is justified because almost all of the Times coverage of covert drone warfare 
occurs within this time frame. While focusing on the Times necessarily renders the wide swath of 
popular culture representations of drones as secondary to this investigation, a number of factors 
recommend the New York Times as the primary site of inquiry for a manageable study. Along 
with its status as the U.S.-based newspaper of record, the Times has taken a leadership role 
among news agencies in investigative journalism on covert drone attacks. Laureled journalists Jo 
Becker, Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti, and David Sanger—who have all published influential 
breaking articles or well-researched books on contemporary drone warfare—work for the Times. 
In a piece in April 2013, the Times editorial board condemned the lack of transparency in drone 
strikes abroad, and, along with the ACLU and other reporters, the Times was a litigant in at least 
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one Freedom of Information Act suit seeking documents related to the targeted killing of U.S. 
citizens in Yemen.21 
Although the Times website is reportedly the most popular online news source for 
Americans in general, its demographics skew towards white, educated, older, middle-to-upper 
class liberals, a target group in which I mostly fit.22 Like most of its readership, I look to the 
Times as a reputable national and international news source. Simultaneously (channeling 
anarchist friends here), I try to retain a reflexive awareness of the Times as an establishment 
newspaper. For example, despite the courageous investigative journalism activities listed above, 
the Times delayed publishing information on a drone base in Saudi Arabia at the behest of the 
Obama administration, to much criticism.23 To be clear, what is particularly interesting about 
drone coverage in the Times is not that life gets valued and devalued in war talk—in fact, that 
seems rather obvious—but that these zoerhetorical modulations happen within the allegedly 
neutral and objective space of “all the news that’s fit to print.” This is why I chose the New York 
Times over, say, Fox News Channel, where the zoerhetorical movements of drone campaign 
coverage more obviously privilege American-identified persons.24 
                              
21 The Editorial Board, “The Trouble with Drones,” New York Times, April 7, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/08/opinion/the-trouble-with-drones.html?_r=1&. 
 
22 Quantcast offers rankings of major publishers: https://www.quantcast.com/nytimes.com. 
 
23 To be fair, the Obama administration cited security concerns. See Margaret Sullivan, “The Times was 
Right to Report–at Last–on Secret Drone Base,” New York Times, February 6, 2013. 
http://publiceditor.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/06/the-times-was-right-to-report-at-last-on-a-secret-drone-base/. 
 
24 For example, consider work by Sean Aday that finds Fox News Channel was more likely to adapt the 
Bush administration’s characterization of enemies. Fox news used the more zoerhetorically powerful term 
“terrorists” than more neutral (although still loaded) terms like insurgent, Taliban, or Al Qaeda. See Sean Aday, 
“Chasing the Bad News: An Analysis of 2005 Iraq and Afghanistan War Coverage on NBC and Fox News 
Channel,” Journal of Communication 60, no. 1 (2010): 144-164. 
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Although I receive daily deliveries of the newspaper at my doorstep, most of my research 
was conducted in Times online archives and the LexisNexis database. I understand Times drone 
coverage as a place where I can engage in ethnographically-inspired in situ field methods in 
order to analyze my rhetorical experience as a U.S. citizen concerned and curious about my 
country’s practices of drone warfare.25 Like any other “place,” the Times is a material-discursive 
assemblage, the material objects of which include the gray printed newspaper, the website 
displayed by pixel on my laptop computer, the headquarters in midtown Manhattan, and the 
culturally inscribed bodies of its dispersed readership.26 Journalistic and source bodies, emplaced 
habits of field reporting, media technologies, and organizational hierarchies and relationships 
also constitute the Times as a field-assemblage. 
More broadly, the Times assemblage is a journalistic node, accessible to the average 
person of privilege (willing and able to pay for a subscription or affiliated with a university), 
connecting persons to information regarding drone warfare, in a profit-driven and journalistically 
principled space. Spokes issuing from the hub of the Times coverage on drone warfare include 
not only the investigative articles and op-ed pieces published in the Times, but also work by 
Times journalists on drone strikes published elsewhere, readers’ comments on nytimes.com fora, 
videos and other media available on the website, and drone news and analyses hyperlinked by 
the Times to another publisher—all text-places through which a solicitous citizen (like myself) 
would likely perambulate through the forest of personalized adaptive hyperlinks when she started 
to see news coverage of drone strikes increase in frequency in early 2009. I would not claim that 
                              
25 Michael Middleton, Samantha Senda-Cook, and Danielle Endres, “Articulating Rhetorical Field 
Methods: Challenges and Tensions,” Western Journal of Communication 75, no. 4 (2011): 386-406.  
 
26 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2009); Manuel DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity (New York: 
Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006). 
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my drone-related browser history conforms to that of the prototypical citizen interested in drone 
strikes, but it certainly represents a perfectly likely rhetorical experience, which I use partly as 
narrative device and partly to call attention to experiences more than simple texts. 
Further, the New York Times assemblage collates rhetorics around drone strikes that the 
public uses as a resource as bloggers, institutions, and everyday persons contend, defend, or 
neutrally forward these material-discursive fragments. In addition to the primary text of Times 
drone coverage, I also occasionally consider, as components of the larger Times assemblage, 
White House rhetoric concerning CIA drone strikes, CIA drone strike discussions in the 
blogosphere, marketing material for corporations with Department of Defense contracts, and 
everyday vernacular talk about CIA drone strikes, as represented in reader comments, for 
example. The agenda-setting public rhetorics of the Times and its nodal ancillaries are rife with 
explicit and implicit zoerhetorical assignations and form part of the homeostatic biome of 
zoerhetorical distributions of the Obama-led War on Terror. Here, I analyze these central and 
ancillary rhetorical experiences of Times coverage of CIA drone warfare, paying special 
attention to trajectories of amplification or deflation of status for particular groups. 
 
Drone Warfare and Obama’s War on Terror 
 
Technically a drone is any aerial vehicle flown remotely, so anything from a hobby plane 
to a hand-launched reconnaissance device (like the military’s Wasp III) falls under the Remotely 
Piloted Aircraft umbrella. Of specific interest to me here, however, are the weaponized drones 
used for surveillance and targeted execution in the War on Terror—the drones that have become 
the Obama administration’s signature weapons, as demonstrated by former CIA leader Leon 
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Panetta’s oft-quoted line that drones are “the only game in town.”27 Although George W. Bush 
authorized military deployment of a handful of these drones to Afghanistan before he left 
office,28 Obama and his national security advisors not only increased the number of lethal drone 
missions, but also shifted the responsibility of the targeted killing drone campaign away from the 
military and towards the Central Intelligence Agency. Obama authorized his first CIA drone 
strike three days after his inauguration, on January 23, 2009. The first of what now number over 
four hundred, this strike (which killed five civilians) targeted a Taliban hideout in Pakistan. 
Since then, drone attacks issued by the Air Force found and missed targets mostly in 
Afghanistan, while the CIA’s secretive drone program found and missed targets in Pakistan, 
Yemen, Libya, the Philippines, and Somalia. An estimated 4000 people have been killed by CIA 
drone strikes since Obama took office.29 The Obama administration credits drone warfare for 
effectively decimating Al-Qaeda and debilitating the Taliban. 
These weapons have household names: the MQ-1B Predator and the MQ-9 Reaper. The 
CIA and the Air Force predominately fly the Predator drone (first flown in the mid-nineties) or 
the more advanced Reaper, both manufactured by General Atomics Aeronautical Systems. These 
models can be identified by their bulbous dorsal nose, a signature feature of drones that they 
share with Northrop Grumman’s Global Hawk, a high-altitude remotely piloted surveillance 
                              
27 Noah Shachtman, “CIA Chief: Drones are the ‘Only Game in Town’ for Stopping Al Qaeda,” Wired: 
Danger Room blog, May 19, 2009, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/05/cia-chief-drones-only-game-in-
town-for-stopping-al-qaeda/. 
 
28 George W. Bush’s last year in office saw a spike in drone strikes, according this report by The Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism: “The Bush Years: Pakistan Strikes 2004-2009,” April 10, 2011. 
 
29 These numbers are radically different depending on the reporting body. In this study I generally cite data 
from the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (Covert War on Terror: The Datasets,” accessed May 4, 2014), because 
Stanford and NYU’s exhaustive joint study “Living Under Drones” recommend them as the superior source for 
accurate drone data (International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic, Stanford Law School, and Global 
Justice Clinic, NYU School of Law, “Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians from U.S. Drone 
Strikes in Pakistan,” September 2012). 
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vehicle. In addition to scouting and surveillance, the Predator and Reaper drones are engineered 
specifically to “engage targets.” As an Air Force fact sheet boasted of both the Predator and 
Reaper, they provide “a unique capability to autonomously execute the kill chain (find, fix, track, 
target, engage, and assess) against high value, fleeting, and time sensitive targets.”30 Drones are 
manufactured and employed in response to a particular construction of the enemy—in this case, 
the insidious Islamic fundamentalist with terrorist tactics that hides among civilian populations in 
remote areas.  
The reasons that drones proliferated in the last ten years are complex and span real and 
manufactured exigencies of self-defense, economics, and politics. For the sake of providing 
background, I’ll name five reasons that drones are now a primary facet of the War on Terror. The 
most obvious is convenience. Not only do drones cost less than “boots on the ground,” but also 
they can be deployed faster and without the logistical problems of housing and supplying 
servicepersons, especially in remote or non-internationally recognized theaters of war. The 
second reason is the nature of the “War on Terror.” Rather than a conflict between defined 
nation-states, the “enemies” in the GWOT are non-state actors in loose networks like Al Qaeda 
that may “hide” among civilians. Predator and Reaper drones, as their manufacturers insist, are 
uniquely equipped to engage these border-spilling “targets.” The complex re-election politics of 
Obama’s first term must also be considered in an investigation of drone proliferation. An 
imperative to be tough on terror, coupled with the lack of a long-term detention policy and a 
desire to avoid Bush-era scandals regarding illegal capture and detainment policies like those at 
Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay, created what journalist Daniel Klaidman called a “perverse 
                              
30 Official website of the U.S. Air Force, “MQ-1B Predator,” published April 29, 2013. 
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=122. 
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incentive” for killing over capture or release options.31 The fourth reason for drone proliferation 
is money; drones are big business in the United States. The weapon owes at least some of its 
present use to informational and political campaigns funded by the military-industrial complex, 
which includes organizations such as the Congressional Unmanned Systems Caucus. Finally, 
drone warfare creates more drone warfare. The anonymity and violent wreckage of drone strikes, 
some of which have been claimed to target civilian residences and funerals, fuel anti-American 
sentiment and, some studies say, aid Al Qaeda recruitment efforts.32 And of course, proliferating 
“terrorists” translate into a need for more RPAs with which to target them. 
The base model of the Predator drone was not weaponized, but in the last decade, they’ve 
been equipped with Lockheed Martin’s laser-guided ATM-114 Hellfire missiles and increasingly 
advanced sensors such as the “Gorgon stare” and ARGUS-IS, which are citywide multi-camera 
surveillance systems. Most Air Force-published information regarding these aerial vehicles 
stresses that they are part of a larger aerial combat system that requires a number of skilled 
personnel to maintain. In fact, the Air Force stopped calling drones Unmanned Aerial Systems 
(UAS) or Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) because they thought the term 
“unmanned” was misleading given the number of people required to maintain, operate, and 
process the intelligence from these aerial vehicles, which is upwards of 150 per twenty-four 
hours of flight.33 To match this personnel demand, there are now more drone pilots and sensor 
                              
31 Daniel Klaidman, Kill Or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama Presidency (New 
York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012). 
 
32 Leila Hudson, Colin S. Owens, and Matt Flannes, “Drone Warfare: Blowback from the New American 
Way of War,” Middle East Policy 18, no. 3 (2011): 122-132. 
 
33 Medea Benjamin and Barbara Ehrenreich, Drone Warfare: Killing by Remote Control (New York: OR 
Books, 2012). 
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operators being trained in the Air Force than there are combat pilots,34 while the Air Force 
currently operates with a shortage of drone pilots.35 A Predator system consists of four aircraft, a 
ground station, a satellite link, and a maintenance crew.36 There are about thirteen bases in the 
U.S. that operate drones, along with a number of public or secret CIA or military drone bases in 
countries in the Middle East and North Africa, including Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, and 
Djibouti.  
The earliest New York Times reference to modern military drones, published in 1999, 
described NATO forces using surveillance Predators in Kosovo in tandem with manned 
aircraft.37 In 2001, a few isolated articles about the Predator’s first remote-control kills in 
Afghanistan cropped up in the Times; one asserted that drones were a central part of Donald 
Rumsfeld’s “revolution in military affairs.”38 Times coverage of drone warfare trickled from a 
handful of articles per year during the George W. Bush administration to hundreds of articles per 
year during the Obama administration, an increase that corresponded to Obama’s more 
aggressive drone campaign, which reached its peak activity in 2010. While Bush-era Times 
articles reported the surveillant capacities of drones in Iraq and Afghanistan, Obama-era Times 
articles are more likely to report the “engagement,” or killing, capacities of drones. Similarly, 
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Bush-era reports were more likely to discuss the technical problems and high crash rates of the 
Predator, whose fragility seemed to disappear in Obama-era Times articles, when drones are cast 
as technologically sleek and superior, although there are exceptions to this pattern.39 It’s not until 
later in the Obama administration that we start to see investigative journalism about the “covert” 
drone programs in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. My analysis of drone rhetorics in the Times 
ranges from 2009, when CIA drone attacks increased in non-traditional theaters of war, and is 
bookended by Obama’s speech at the National Defense University in May 2013, which had a 
quieting effect on New York Times drone rhetorics in the ensuing months.40 As I compose this 
chapter in mid-2014, the number of drone strikes per year has fell consistently since 2010 highs. 
A chronological list of significant events in the semi-covert CIA drone campaign, as 
reported in the New York Times, from 2009, include: U.S. provided Pakistan with surveillance 
data from drones (May 2009); the White House authorized expansion of drone program in 
Pakistan to parallel burst of troops in Afghanistan (December 2009); 2010 named “year of the 
drone” as strikes reach all-time high for that year (December 2010);41 a drone attacked U.S. 
citizen Anwar Al-Awlaki in Yemen (September 2011); John Brennan gave a speech about the 
“rigorous standards” of drone strikes (April 2012); Becker and Shane broke the story of the 
“secret kill list” and the prevalence of covert CIA drone attacks (May 2012); the Department of 
Justice leaked a white paper on targeted killing (February 2013); Rand Paul filibustered Obama’s 
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nomination of John Brennan to head CIA (March 2013); Obama’s counterterrorism speech 
acknowledged the deaths of U.S. citizens by drones for the first time and called for an end to the 
“perpetual” War on Terror (May 2013).   
Perhaps the most heavily circulated Times article on drones was published in May 2012 
and titled, “Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will.”42 With information 
acquired from interviews with unnamed top officials, Jo Becker and Scott Shane broke the story 
about Obama’s “secret kill list” and his administration’s reproachable protocol for counting 
civilian deaths. In addition to the robust exchanges of reader commentary on the website, this 
article influentially structured the ensuing debates. The “secret kill list” terminology originating 
with the article surfaced repeatedly in online news media outlets like Reddit, in the work of op-
ed columnists like Glenn Greenwald with the Guardian and Conor Friedersdorf at the Atlantic, 
and in scholarly work like geographer Ian Shaw’s academic book review on drones.43 Further, 
the lengthy article is currently the top-billed “highlight from the archives” on the nytimes.com 
“Times Topic” page devoted to UAVs, so I’ll summarize its major features here.  
The article depicted Barack Obama as the “pragmatism over ideology” realist deciding 
the fate of hundreds of alleged terrorists on a top-secret government kill list. In the drone 
wreckage calculus of the Obama administration, any male over the age of fourteen whose life is 
extinguished in a drone strike is considered a militant, unless exculpatory evidence emerges ex 
post facto. Even more controversially, Becker and Shane were among the first to claim that the 
CIA targets people without knowing their identities. In something called a “signature strike,” the 
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CIA conducts “pattern of life” analyses, collecting geographical and behavioral information to 
determine the alleged militant status of persons of interest. Unlike a concept like “surgical 
strike,” which has been a component of military strategy for some time, “signature strikes” are a 
tactic epiphenomenal to the drone age. Parenthetically, the word “signature” functions on a 
figurative register as a stamp, imprint, or impression, as well as literally, “Any typical physical 
or behavioral characteristic…by which an object may be identified,” while at the same time 
accruing the authority of “signature,” as in signing one’s name to a formal document.44 Although 
signature strikes have not ended, as Obama (somewhat) promised in his counter-terrorism speech 
in May of 2013, the CIA decreased the number of signature strikes in the last few years.45 The 
criteria regarding signature strike data collection still remains secret, so the precise behaviors 
observable by drone surveillance that implicate an anonymous person in terrorist activity are still 
unknown to the American public.46 The ensuing quip is that any three men doing jumping jacks 
together in Pakistan are CIA targets.47  
A crucial factor regarding Times coverage of drone strikes is that the covert CIA war was 
widely known to the public for years but not officially acknowledged by the Obama 
administration until May 2013. Even as hundreds of drone strikes in Pakistan, for example, were 
publically reported, the Obama administration spent years avoiding the word “drone.” 
Journalists, including editors of the Times, accused the White House of purposefully “leaking” 
                              
44 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “signature.”  
 
45 The Editorial Board, “The Perpetual War,” New York Times, May 23, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/opinion/obama-vows-to-end-of-the-perpetual-war.html?pagewanted=all. 
 
46 “Emerging From the Shadows: US Covert Drone War Strikes in 2012,” Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism, January 3, 2013, http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/01/03/emerging-from-the-shadows-us-
covert-drone-strikes-in-2012-2/. 
 
47 The “3 guys doing jumping jacks” line originated in Becker and Shane’s ‘Secret Kill List’ article and was 
picked up by hundreds of commenters, pundits, and bloggers. 
 
  
125 
drone strike successes in order to shore up public approval. Further, the Pakistani military 
quickly feigned responsibility for drone strikes conducted by the CIA as part of a secret deal, 
which helped keep the CIA drone campaign clandestine.48 As Trevor McCrisken noted, the first 
time Obama acknowledged the drone campaign was in a joke during the White House 
Correspondents Dinner in 2010, where he warned the boy band the Jonas Brothers to stay away 
from his daughters: “Two words for you: Predator Drones. You will never see it coming.”49 The 
Obama administration didn’t officially admit to a covert CIA drone campaign or the drone deaths 
of four U.S. citizens until May 2013—years after these events were widely reported in the Times 
and beyond. This government double-dealing prompted the Times editorial board to condemn the 
way the Obama administration manipulated the press, while calling for a transparent legal 
framework for future drone strikes.50 In April of 2014, a bipartisan bill calling for transparency 
around covert CIA drone strikes and deaths was put before the House of Representatives. 
The New York Times and its ancillary drone rhetorics are organized around two 
zoerhetorically significant dichotomies: the citizen/non-citizen and the civilian/militant. These 
two assignations of social belonging and innocence, respectively, serve as allocators of 
zoerhetorical status and interlocking systems of domination in the U.S.-led Global War on 
Terror. Both organizing dichotomies of CIA drone strikes in the New York Times demonstrate 
the metonymically shifting zoerhetorical distributions of status described above. These 
zoerhetorical processes serve as proxies for racialization that ultimately legitimize unjust 
distributions of livability. 
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“What’s separating us from the terrorists now?”: Drones and the Zoerhetorics of American 
Citizenship 
After 2011, public drone rhetorics in the United States swerved towards the topic of 
citizenship. Within the complex politics of drone warfare, the issue that provokes some of the 
most passionate public responses in the United States is the targeting and execution of U.S. 
citizens without trial. And for good reason—the CIA’s drone program targeted and executed one 
American citizen, Anwar Al-Awlaki, without due process in 2011, and killed at least three others 
as collateral damage or in signature strikes since then. The Obama administration didn’t 
officially confirm the rumors of these attacks until two years later. Ever since the New York 
Times broke the story of a drone attacking the New Mexico-born Anwar Al-Awlaki in Yemen in 
2011, energetic public voices have taken a range of positions regarding Awlaki’s assassination 
and drone attacks on citizens more generally. Perhaps the most famous of these responses is 
Senator Rand Paul’s thirteen-hour filibuster in March of 2013. Paul protested Obama’s 
nomination of John Brennan as head of the CIA because, as Obama’s counterterrorism advisor at 
the time, Brennan was largely credited with the creation of the covert drone program. As reasons 
against Brennan’s nomination, Paul cited lack of government transparency around drone strikes, 
especially the potential of citizen strikes on U.S. soil. In this section, I’ll analyze New York Times 
news coverage, op-eds, and reader responses in conjunction with Paul’s filibuster in order to 
understand how citizenship functions zoerhetorically in the CIA’s drone campaign. I contend 
that in the context of the drone campaign, American-identified rhetorics of U.S. citizenship 
zoerhetorically re/distribute status towards U.S. citizens and away from Islamic Others. 
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Four of the 2636 to 4730 people killed in covert CIA drone strikes overseas were U.S. 
citizens: Anwar Al-Awlaki and his son, Abdul Rahman Al-Awlaki, as well as Samir Khan and 
Jude Kenan Mohammad.51 The elder Al-Awlaki served as the director of external operations for 
Al Qaeda Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). He was known for his gift of persuading youth towards a 
life of jihad, and was linked to foiled terrorists like the shoe bomber and the Christmas Day 
bomber. Samir Khan, creator and editor of Inspire, Al Qaeda’s English language magazine, was 
killed in the same blast in Yemen that killed Al-Awlaki. Sixteen-year-old Abdul Rahman Al-
Awlaki was killed two weeks after his father, in a strike allegedly targeting Ibrahim al-Banna, an 
Al Qaeda propagandist. Jude Kenan Mohammad was also killed in a signature strike, along with 
twelve other “militants,” in South Waziristan, Pakistan. Attorney General Eric Holder asserted in 
a 2013 letter to Congress that these last three American citizens—the junior Al-Awlaki, Khan, 
and Mohammad—were “not specifically targeted,” a claim that, as many analysts have already 
noted, is substantively different from claiming that these deaths were accidental.52 
When American-identified persons speak or write about these citizen attacks, they often 
start from the assumption that the U.S. government targeting and attacking its own citizens is 
outrageous. My plan is not to dispute these presumptions, but to push on them with the lever of 
critical citizenship studies. A range of scholars have discussed citizenship as a system for 
distributing privilege,53 while others have pointed specifically to 9/11 as a moment where 
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practices and discourses of security changed modes of belonging in relation to citizenship.54 
Scholars argue that contemporary norms of citizenship reinforce an ideal image of U.S. citizens 
as being white, financially laboring, appropriately consuming, and reproductively heterosexual.55 
Among the host of legal privileges associated with U.S. citizenship is due process, or a right to a 
fair trial. According to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, due 
process acts as a safeguard from arbitrary denial of life, liberty, or property by the government 
outside the sanction of the law. Some Times journalists, and many Times reader comments, along 
with Senator Paul, argued that the targeted execution of U.S. citizen Anwar Al-Awlaki in 
September 2011 was illegal because he was stripped of his Constitutional right to a fair trial. 
Others have responded that Al-Awlaki surrendered his American citizenship when he engaged in 
treasonous activity, thereby rendering his targeted execution not only legal but also just. Here it 
may be useful to make a distinction between the legal and cultural aspects of citizenship. Rather 
than making a claim regarding the legality of Al-Awlaki’s assassination, my aim here is to 
investigate the cultural meanings attached to citizenship and the advantages of performing a 
citizenship that approximates those of the idealized citizen. Citizenship, as it operates in U.S. 
drone attacks rhetorics, must be understood both as a materially productive legal apparatus and 
as a zoerhetorically distributive apparatus.  
The New York Times and other major news sources have covered the deaths of U.S. 
citizens in drone attacks extensively. Al-Awlaki has been the central feature of at least two major 
Times articles, one directly after his assassination in 2011 and another two years later, 
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provocatively titled, “How a U.S. Citizen Came to Be in America’s Cross Hairs.” This article, 
published in 2013, obliquely addressed Paul’s filibuster, stating, “Some wondered aloud: If the 
president can order the assassination of Americans overseas, based on secret intelligence, what 
are the limits to his power?”56 Samir Khan is mentioned in these articles as also dying in the 
same strike that killed Al-Awlaki, and later he gets an article of his own, titled: “2ND American 
Killed in Strike Waged Qaeda Media War.” This piece depicted Khan as a quiet, web-savvy 
radical from a respectable middle-class family. Notably, Khan and Al-Awlaki have a “Times 
Topics” page dedicated to each of them, both of which billboard their citizenship or American-
born status. The Times also covered the ACLU-assisted lawsuit the Al-Awlaki and Khan families 
brought against Leon Panetta for failing to offer due process to citizens. Jude Kenan Mohammad 
was the victim of a signature strike, so his identity was unknown for some time afterwards. 
Eventually he got his own 2013 article, titled “One Drone Victim’s Trail from Raleigh to 
Pakistan.” The article traced his development from a young man living in the U.S. to a fugitive in 
Pakistan. The article does not contain discussions of signature strikes or the legality or ethics of 
targeting U.S. citizens.57 Although we can ascribe the frequent mention of Al-Awlaki’s name in 
Times coverage to his infamy before the drone strike that killed him (he was featured in a Times 
“Room for Debate” forum that invited experts to speculate on how dangerous he was five 
months before he was targeted),58 he is thus far the only person killed in a drone strike to receive 
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multiple full-length reports from the Times, including one whose headline and content 
emphasized his citizen status.  
Importantly, concern for drones attacking U.S. citizens is one of the organizing public 
discourses of drone rhetoric within the United States. From a global perspective, public outrage 
in the United States over the targeting and execution of U.S. citizens by drone strike seems 
myopically disproportionate, given the total number of people killed in CIA drone strikes. To 
phrase this a different way, consider that for every one American citizen killed in covert CIA 
drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia, roughly 658 to 1081 non-citizens are killed.59 
Perhaps the most obvious zoerhetorically significant differences between Times coverage of 
citizens/non-citizens are practices of naming and recognition. The Obama administration 
admitted to killing four U.S. citizens in drone strikes conducted by the CIA. Not unexpectedly, 
the names of these men are stated with more frequency than the names of non-citizens killed in 
strikes. A few intervening factors complicate the rate at which these names are mentioned. First, 
these names are not American-identified names, but rather these names encode racialized bodies 
of Islamic Others. This must attenuate, at least somewhat, American-identified outrage to these 
strikes. The journalistic practices of juxtaposing an American place with one of these names (for 
example, “North Carolina-born Jude Kenan Mohammad”) can be read partially as a mediating 
response to these already-racialized names. Of course, the discrepancy in naming frequency in 
citizens versus non-citizens killed in strikes is partially explained by the fact that, in the case of 
signature strikes, not even the CIA knows the identities of their targets. Still, it’s not difficult to 
see that the Times and similar nationally focused news outlets privileged reporting and 
recognizing citizen drone casualties over those of noncitizens. 
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Here we must not forget that silence serves a zoerhetorical function as well. Unlike the 
drone attacks on U.S. citizens, much of the American-identified drone rhetoric of attacks on non-
citizens does not start from the same assumption that these deaths are outrageous. Senator Paul’s 
filibuster is a powerful example, because his concern for the hundreds of non-citizen drone 
deaths was only cursory, while the bulk of his condemnation of the drone program centered on 
the hypothetical threat event of U.S. drones striking U.S. citizens on U.S. soil. These drone 
zoerhetorics reflect and create a clear preference for recognizing some deaths—and therefore 
some lives—over others. Judith Butler made similar observations about the discrepancy between 
sanctioned American performances of mourning in response to 9/11 in comparison with the 
nonsanctioned, absent, invisible, or even condemned performances of mourning in response to 
deaths as a result of the Iraq War. Like the discrepant practices of American-identified post-9/11 
grief, rhetorics of citizens killed in drone strikes are acts of nation building. What Butler called 
“grievability” is an important indicator of zoerhetorical status.60 
At the same time, the Times rhetoric of U.S. citizens targeted and killed in drone strikes 
doesn’t squarely match typical reportage rhetorics of memorialization, mourning, or grief. While 
citizen deaths in drone warfare are certainly named and recognized, epideictic eulogies these are 
not. The post-death rhetorics of U.S. citizens killed in drone strikes maintain a strange 
ambivalence, as these persons are remembered as both citizens and enemies, as both “us” and 
“them.” There’s an inherent dilemma in these rhetorics, because in order to qualify for distinct 
remembrance, these men require American citizenship, yet at the same time, these men pursued 
harm to the United States in affiliation with a group that has declared war on the United States. 
Even their names mark them as ethnically Other. As a result, while these deaths are often 
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condemned in Times reader comments, they are rarely condemned with prototypical appeals to 
the sanctity, dignity, or intrinsic value of human life—the standard inflationary zoerhetorics. 
Rather, their deaths are condemned in appeals to law, the American Way, or in a way that 
constructs their deaths not as grievable but as marked threats for all American-identified 
persons.  
Said one commenter, whose objection was couched in legal language, “I’d rather live in a 
country with the legal system than with a lawyer politician who has abandoned the law.” Said 
another commenter, “A government that murders its citizens is no different from a criminal gang 
with Obama as the godfather,” suggesting that all of “us” (that is, American-identified persons) 
are at risk. Often, the comments identify a threat to American-identified persons explicitly, such 
as this one: “[Obama] has killed fellow U.S. citizens without trial. The war on terror is really 
practice for the war on you and me.” Similarly, a commenter with the username of Robert Cicero 
wrote: 
 
Al-Awlaqi may have been a seditionist and an enemy of the state, [but] he was 
nevertheless, a US citizen and therefore was entitled to [the] same protections and 
the same due process to which the rest of [us] are entitled…Even Jeffrey Dahmer, 
an admitted cannibal, was afforded due process. If this crime is allowed to stand 
without prosecution, the United States Constitution is dead…Doesn’t anyone 
understand that if this becomes precedent, any administration will be able to 
execute any of us who they deem to be their enemies? 
 
This comment juxtaposed the racial Otherness of cannibals with that of terrorists to demonstrate 
that even the most primitive and murderous of actors should be afforded fair trials. Further, 
Obama is attributed the utmost rhetorical agency as a necropolitical sovereign—a tyrant to be 
feared by all Americans, a depiction on which ensuing Times headlines capitalize for sex appeal, 
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like this one: “The Rise of the Drone Master: Pop Culture Recasts Obama.”61 As we can see from 
Times coverage and reader comments, the deaths of the Al-Awlakis, Khan, and Mohammad are 
named and recognized more than the deaths of non-citizen victims of drone attacks. However, 
the Times rhetorics around these deaths do not conform to classic rhetorics of mourning. Rather, 
in American-identified rhetorical outlets, their deaths are used to construct a threat to American-
identified persons. Their deaths, in Butler’s terms, are not grievable.  
This qualifies Plato’s dictum that it is not difficult to praise Athenians in Athens.62 In the 
case of drone warfare, it is difficult to praise Americans in America—because the Al-Awlakis, 
Mohammad, and Khan are “not real Americans.” In the rhetoric involving these deaths in the 
Times, readers and participants take time to distance these men from their American citizenship. 
They do this along legal lines, citing the deprivation of citizenship as a legal and just response to 
treason, or do this along more racialized lines, whereby these men were never understood as true 
Americans in the first place. Many reader comments cheer hurrah for Anwar Al-Awlaki’s death, 
like this animalizing zoerhetoric: “This death dealing insect got all the process he was due.”  
Here the specter of the ideal citizen starts to lurk in the corners—a specter we see most in Rand 
Paul’s filibuster. 
Rand Paul took the Senate floor in an old-fashioned Jimmy Stewart-style filibuster in 
March 2013. Although after the fact he self-servingly framed his filibuster as an unequivocal 
victory for government transparency in drone attacks, he does deserve some credit for getting 
drone attacks on citizens on the national stage. Paul’s primary message was that U.S. citizens 
should not be attacked in drone strikes without first being charged with a crime and offered a fair 
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trial. Deep into the fifth hour of the filibuster, he compared Obama to the Red Queen in Alice’s 
Wonderland, who makes a verdict before the trial. The two most zoerhetorically productive 
things about Paul’s filibuster are his constructions of ideal citizenship, and his condemnation of 
U.S. citizen drone deaths by appealing to American citizenship and American-identified 
belonging rather than broader human rights. The filibuster not only privileged U.S. citizens but 
also depicted them as the most innocent amid everyday performances of consumption and 
whiteness. Although Paul never ceded the floor, he allowed other senators to ask him questions, 
like this one by Texas Senator Ted Cruz: 
 
…the United States government killing a U.S. citizen on U.S. soil who is not 
flying a plane into a building, who is not robbing a bank, who is not pointing a 
Bazooka at the Pentagon but who is simply sitting quietly at a cafe, peaceably 
enjoying breakfast. Is the Senator from Kentucky aware of any precedent 
whatsoever for […] the United States government, without indicting him, without 
bringing him before a jury, without any due process whatsoever, can simply send 
a drone to kill that United States citizen on U.S. soil?63 
 
In fact, the words “café” or “restaurant” are mentioned at least ten times just in the first three 
hours of the event.64 For Paul, American-identified innocence is located squarely in everyday 
moments of consumption: “They’re in a car, they’re in their house, they’re in a restaurant, 
they’re in a café.”65 Not only did Paul’s filibuster reify an appropriately consumptive subject 
drenched in whiteness, but it also echoed a White House message to the American people as old 
as 9/11: Business as usual. As Jeremy Engels and William Saas asserted in response to George 
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W. Bush’s post-9/11 rhetoric, “To contribute to the war effort, Americans needed only to go 
about their daily routines and maybe enjoy a nice vacation.”66 Politician rhetoric that suggests 
appropriately acquiescent responses to the War on Terror isn’t limited to Bush or Paul. In 
Obama’s May 2013 speech that called for an end to the War on Terror, he praised the resilience 
of “the New Yorkers who filled Times Square the day after an attempted car bomb as if nothing 
had happened.”67 Here Times Square serves as a redolent symbol of entertainment, consumption, 
and display—a fact certainly not lost on the Al Qaeda operatives who targeted it. 
In addition, Paul’s rhetoric never explicitly couches a right to due process as a universal 
human right (as it does, for example, in Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights). Instead, the repeated phrase “our rights” refers to the rights of Americans. In his 
filibuster, Paul discussed “rights” in relation to the Constitution, the Bill of “Rights,” American 
democracy, our “limitless rights,” “rights” to privacy, the government “taking our rights,” and 
Miranda “rights,” but not once do his myriad invocations of rights ever imply rights for anyone 
outside of American-identified social belonging. As such, Paul’s filibuster exemplifies the ways 
that cultural citizenship and social belonging—especially as indexed by whiteness, filtered 
through the racialization of the War on Terror—act as zoerhetorical distributors of status.  
When U.S.-based rhetorics emphasize the unjust, illegal, or “un-American” aspects of 
drones executing U.S. citizens, we bury the gravity of, or even implicitly sanction, the killing of 
non-citizen “Others.” This rhetoric marks a moment where the global biopolitical product and 
project—humanity—recedes into the background as the nationalized version of a superhuman, 
the U.S. citizen ascending to whiteness, deserving of absolute protection and security, comes to 
                              
66 Engels and Saas, “Ends-Less War,” 226. 
 
67 I used the transcript of Obama’s speech offered here: “Transcript: Obama Addresses Counterterrorism, 
Drones,” NPR. May 23, 2013. http://www.npr.org/2013/05/23/186305171/transcript-obama-addresses-
counterterrorism-drones.	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the forefront. In the rhetoric of the deaths of U.S. citizens in CIA drone strikes, these men are not 
constructed as grievable. Rather, their deaths are positioned as threats—but not as threats to the 
Pakistani bodies already abjectly vulnerable to drone stares and strikes. Instead, they are 
positioned as threatening to aspirationally ideal U.S. citizens. More specifically, they threaten 
American-identified citizens occupying locations of white, heterosexual, re/producing-and-
consuming ideal belonging. Therefore, even when the kairic moment opened when Americans 
could have mourned their own citizens, and questioned the constructions of enemyship in the 
War on Terror, this possibility was not seized.  
Other drone scholarship complements an investigation of the way whiteness is operating 
here as an implicit mode of ideal belonging. In a study addressing the scopic regimes of drones, 
Keith Feldman offered a concept of “racialization from above” to supplement theories of 
racialization on the ground.68 Feldman’s is part a larger project to map the insidious vectors of 
racialization in the nominal antiracism of the so-called post-racial era. Focusing both on the 
killing of Osama bin Laden and drone warfare generally, he documented a number of moments 
where phrases like “homeland security” eclipsed and perpetuated Westphalian sovereignty, 
marking the transnational borders of the U.S. as everywhere. I would expand Feldman’s analysis 
of the racialized bodies produced in the “drone stare.” As Foucault noted, race is the primary 
means by which biopower exercises control, a kind of control that presupposes the distribution of 
the human species into groups.69 These groups are zoerhetorically differentiated—in other words, 
these bio/necropolitical distributions of livability are created and sustained rhetorically. 
Racialized bodies are produced pervasively in the War on Terror, and especially in U.S.-based 
                              
68 Keith Feldman, “Empire’s Verticality: The Af/Pak Frontier, Visual Culture, and Racialization from 
Above,” Comparative American Studies 9, no. 4 (2011): 325-341. 
 
69 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976, trans. David 
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journalism like the New York Times, in vernacular reader’s comments, and on the Senate floor, as 
I’ve shown here.  
Through these processes, the U.S.-based rhetoric of CIA drone strikes zoerhetorically 
re/distributes status along the potent dichotomy of citizen/non-citizen. In accord with the 
zoerhetorical principles outlined above, citizenship rhetoric around drones not only deflates non-
citizens, but also inflates American-identified citizens. This is accomplished in a number of 
ways. Through a zoerhetorics of absence and presence, U.S. citizens are remembered and foreign 
bodies are not. Inflationary zoerhetorics hitch or tether one group or entity to another group or 
entity higher up on the zoerhetorical hierarchy. God terms like American and citizen achieve this 
aim. Finally, through a process of splitting, Islamic Others are zoerhetorically lowered. Further, 
movement in one direction for a group invite movements for another direction for a different 
group. As necropolitical theorists would concur, this process of raising, or human-izing, can only 
occur across the space of an excluded Other; in this case, the Islamic Other discussed extensively 
in critical War on Terror research.70 As the title of this section suggests, the failure to adequately 
distinguish between U.S. citizens and non-citizens rhetorically aligns the U.S. with terrorists, as 
multiple reader comments linked targeted drone strikes to terrorist tactics.  
 
 
 
 
                              
70 In addition to Feldman’s piece cited earlier, consider: Nathan C. Funk and Abdul Aziz Said, “Islam and 
the West: Narratives of Conflict and Conflict Transformation,” International Journal of Peace Studies 9, no. 1 
(2004): 1-28; Inderpal Grewal, “Transnational America: Race, Gender and Citizenship after 9/11,” Social 
Identities 9, no. 4 (2003): 535-561; Richard Jackson, “Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Political and 
Academic Discourse,” Government and Opposition 42, no. 3 (2007): 394-426. 
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The “Civilian Death Toll”: Drones and the Zoerhetorics of Innocence 
 
In addition to citizenship, American-identified drone rhetorics in the Times and its 
ancillaries organize around another problematic dichotomy: the civilian/militant distinction. 
Times coverage of the Obama-era drone campaign, as well as reader commentary, responds to 
the tension between the protection of civilians versus the targeting of combatants, and 
impassioned public voices add to the fray. Aggregating the tension of this dichotomy is that 
wildly different numbers of civilian deaths depending on who counts (and whose counting). The 
civilian death toll for strikes in Pakistan ranges from John Brennan’s disingenuous “zero” or 
“single digits” to well into the hundreds—the Bureau of Investigative Journalism cites a range of 
416 to 957 civilians killed by drone strikes in Pakistan since 2004.71  
Under International Humanitarian Law (IHL), the “principle of distinction” obligates 
nations to distinguish between civilians (persons who are not members of the armed forces) and 
combatants (persons authorized by a nation’s military to engage in combat).72 Although the 
principle of distinction wasn’t officially codified into IHL until 1977 in Additional Protocol II to 
the Geneva Conventions, the notion that war makers should discriminate between militants and 
civilians is at least as old as the American Civil War, although protecting innocents during war 
                              
71 These figures don’t include civilians reported killed in U.S. drone actions in Yemen or Somalia. The 
Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “Covert War on Terror: The Datasets,” accessed May 4, 2014. 
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drone-data/. 
 
72 There’s a further distinction between lawful and unlawful combatant that gets activated with non-state 
actors like Al Qaeda or the Taliban. Once unlawful combatants, however, engage in hostilities, they become lawful 
combatants. 
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conflicts is a discourse seen through history. The U.S. military currently instructs servicepersons 
that distinction is one of the foundational principles of the Law of Armed Conflict.73 
Civilian deaths in drone attacks, especially those issued by the CIA, started to get press a 
few years into Obama’s first term. In 2011, the New York Times published two pieces on civilian 
deaths in drone strikes. The first, by Salman Masood and Pir Zubair Shah, covered a drone strike 
that killed a number of elders and community members while they were meeting with Taliban 
mediators over access to a local chromite mine in Pakistan.74 The second, by Scott Shane, called 
“CIA is Disputed on Civilian Toll in Drone Strikes,” challenged John Brennan’s claim that there 
had been zero civilian drone strike deaths “because of the exceptional proficiency” of drone 
technology.75 A piece the following year by Mark Landler identified the marked discrepancies 
between the U.S. government’s counting of civilian deaths in strikes and the much larger 
numbers reported from other sources, such as the Long War Journal and the Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism.76 The Times also published a number of op-ed pieces that have 
condemned civilian drone deaths, asserted their unfortunate necessity, or forged a path in-
between. One of the primary arguments that appears in op-ed pieces about civilian drone deaths 
is that they inflame anti-American sentiment, especially in Pakistan, where CIA drone strikes 
                              
73 This document, for example, is written for soldiers in the Air Force: 
http://www.hanscom.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-100916-030.pdf. 
 
74 Salman Masood and Pir Zubair Shah, “C.I.A. Drones Kill Civilians in Pakistan,” New York Times, March 
17, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/world/asia/18pakistan.html. 
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concentrate, and thereby aid Al-Qaeda recruitment efforts.77 In November of 2012, political 
scientist Avery Plaw published a short piece in a “Room for Debate” Times forum on how drones 
save lives because they are less harmful to civilians than other means of reaching Al Qaeda.78 
The headline of this piece is noteworthy for the zoerhetorical ranking in the title: “Drones Save 
Lives, American and Other.” This forum featured four other disparate voices on the utility of 
drone attacks, and the bulk of Times reader comments on civilian casualties concentrate here. I’ll 
quote at length from the following comment, voted to the top of the “Reader’s Picks” section, 
because it’s a vernacular critique of zoerhetorical hierarchies: 
 
I suppose that the logic of “more harm than good” does not quite mean for you 
that you would not object to the FBI (or other authorities) killing your entire 
family in a bombing raid against your apartment building because somehow it has 
been calculated that killing the target (who may or may not be in the building and 
may or may not exist) is “more good” than the harm of killing your family. Of 
course you find this analogy unthinkable and quite off the mark. Perhaps even 
unreasonable. That is because you have a deeply held belief, that you are largely 
unaware and would certainly deny, that the life of Americans needs to be 
analyzed with a different arithmetics than the life of those “who-cares-what-they-
are-s” in far away places.79 
 
 
In this message, a reader with an anonymous screen name identified the discrepant zoerhetorical 
assignations in U.S. security policy in regards to drone warfare and innocence. In this section, I 
will further this reader’s nascent zoerhetorical theory. I contend that when American-identified 
                              
77 As argued, for example, in this piece: Ibrahim Mothana, “How Drones Help Al Qaeda,” New York Times, 
June 13, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/opinion/how-drones-help-al-qaeda.html. 
 
78 Avery Plaw, “Drones Save Lives, American and Other,” New York Times, November 14, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/09/25/do-drone-attacks-do-more-harm-than-good/drone-strikes-save-
lives-american-and-other. 
 
79 Ibid. 
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persons reference the combatant or noncombatant status of a person in relation to the drone 
campaign, the perceived innocence connected to those terms acts as a zoerhetorical distributor of 
status. 
Political scientist Helen Kinsella wrote in the introduction to her critical genealogy of the 
civilian/combatant distinction that the guideline has served as a “significant referent of 
engagement and standard of judgment guiding operational strategy” during ground operations in 
both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.80 Indeed, we see evidence of this in official U.S. government 
or military documents as well as White House rhetoric, and the U.S. public rhetoric, often 
through the prism of journalism, typically mirrors back a commitment to civilian protection. 
Official government discourse around drone warfare frequently references the principle of 
distinction, or its sister rule, the principle of proportionality, which states that military 
intervention must not exceed the force required to meet its objectives. Repeatedly, the Obama 
administration has assured the American people that every possible precaution is taken in order 
to limit civilian deaths.  
The logic of discriminating between militants and civilians has become so central to our 
understanding of ethical warfare that it is during the moment of failing to meet the obligation of 
distinction that the Obama administration comes under the most sustained fire for its drone 
campaign. To be sure, the predominant left-leaning or liberal objections to Obama’s drone 
campaign, second only to the targeting of citizens without due process, is the number of civilian 
deaths abroad.81 Killing civilians is seen as a primitive and evil terrorist tactic, adamantly 
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abhorred in post-9/11 American-identified public rhetorics. Within the purview of Global War 
on Terror logic, it is the stamp of virtue and civilization to distinguish between civilians and 
combatants and it is a stamp of primitive, backwards Islamic Others like Osama bin Laden to 
purposefully target civilians, as he did in the 9/11 attacks. This is evident in a bonanza of Times 
reader comments, pithily summarized by a reader screennamed Janet Ellingson, who wrote, 
“Drones are the tools of terrorists.”82 
But the omnipresence of the oversimplified civilian/militant dichotomy in U.S. official 
and popular logic disguises its convoluted nature. While the U.S.-led War on Terror marks a 
moment in which IHL is more central than ever in the terrain of popular, official, and human 
rights discourses, it also marks a time when the civilian/combatant dichotomy is more blurred 
and abused than ever. Legal scholar Gabriel Swiney described a contemporary world where the 
principle of distinction is violated all the time. The principle of distinction nostalgically hearkens 
towards the era of set battlefields, interstate conflict, and clearly uniformed servicepersons—
none of which we see today in the War on Terror, where insurgencies rather than armies are the 
norm.83 As Banu Bargu claimed, the civilian/combatant dichotomy is completely eroded in the 
contemporary world.84 
Evidence of this erosion exists abroad in figures such as in/voluntary human shields, 
suicide bombers, “regular” people moonlighting as low-level Al Qaeda workers, and child 
soldiers, as well as domestically in institutions such as the non-military CIA and figures like the 
                              
82 This reader produced this comments in response to the New York Times Room for Debate forum on 
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telecommuting drone pilot. In Middle Eastern and North African countries, especially those that 
harbor violent Islamic groups like Al Qaeda or Al-Shabaab, militant and civilians blend in a 
mangled dance. Where would you place, for example, a Pashtun tribesman elder in the Federally 
Administered Tribal lands of Pakistan who meets with Al Qaeda operatives in order to establish 
boundaries of adjoining lands? Members of Al Qaeda use involuntary human shields often—for 
example, they’ll locate a weapons cache or meeting site near a hospital or school. They often 
“hide” among civilians, such as among Pashtun tribespersons in Pakistan’s semi-autonomous 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), or among passengers on a commercial flight in the 
case of the 9/11 attacks. They are neither defined nor effectively contained by the borders of any 
nation-state, as they have or had strongholds in many Middle Eastern and North African 
countries. The particular nature of the war against Al Qaeda and similar groups lends itself to 
drone warfare—or more accurately, drones were developed in response to the need to surveil and 
execute “high value targets” that are also non-state actors in non-internationally recognized 
theaters of war. 
Comparably, the civilian/militant distinction also has gray areas with the border of the 
United States. For example, is a drone operator still an internationally recognized combatant 
when she’s at home lying in bed in the evening? Even more problematically, the bulk of the 
drone program in Pakistan is conducted clandestinely by the CIA, an executive agency staffed 
mostly by non-military personnel. Finally, privately employed contract workers proliferate in 
roles such as drone weapons development, training, piloting, sensor operations, and intelligence 
analysis. Private contractors often fulfill roles critical to unmanned aerial systems mission 
execution. This includes not only maintenance and repair (75-100% of the Air Force’s 
maintenance and repair of unmanned aircraft is outsourced) but also intelligence activities 
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including tactical and imagery analysis, and sensor operation—activities incontestably situated 
along the infamous “kill chain.”85 According to Times reports, the vilified security firm 
Blackwater, renamed Academi for public relations purposes, enjoys an intimate relationship with 
the CIA.86  
If the civilian/militant distinction was already problematic in the War on Terror, the 
complexities of drone warfare further muddy the waters. Yet the New York Times and other U.S.-
based drone rhetorics are still organized around this distinction. This is problematic because 
contemporary humanitarian and legal values of assigned worth maintain a zoerhetorical 
distribution of status that goes unquestioned. Typical zoerhetorical distributions for Islamic 
Others run like this: Civilian = innocent = deserving of life; militant = guilty = deserving of 
death. Even journalists on the far left like Glenn Greenwald uphold this zoerhetorical distribution 
of status when they focus solely on decrying the numbers of civilians killed, without recognition 
of the deeply imbricated nature of civilians and militants (and therefore innocence and guilt) in 
the contemporary Way on Terror. As an example, Masood and Shah’s March 17, 2011 article in 
the Times on civilian deaths in Pakistan reported competing claims of civilian/militant statuses 
for a group of persons, but never addressed the messiness of identifying civilians and militants.87  
Predators and Reapers, with their advanced sensory systems, were developed, 
manufactured, advertised, and deployed as the weapons systems uniquely capable of making the 
distinction between civilians and combatants. Before they were weaponized, they were aerial 
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surveillance vehicles, full participants in what Jasbir Puar called “surveillant assemblages” of the 
War on Terror.88 A pamphlet advertising Sierra Nevada’s Gorgon Stare boasted a “full field of 
regard” and “best-resolution tactical chip-outs.” American-identified drone rhetorics assume that 
if we find enough information—that is, if we execute intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR), if we obtain “persistent wide area aerial surveillance systems” like the 
Gorgon Stare or the Constant Hawk, if we develop DARPA’s Mind’s Eye program,89 and if we 
hire qualified analysts, then patent categorical differences between civilians and militants will 
reveal themselves. The dichotomy of guilt/innocence imposes an epistemological naivety (if we 
just have the right information…) over an ontological mistake (…it will be clear that 
membership in these categories exists). This is exactly what Ian Shaw and Mahjed Akhter called 
the fetishization of targeting—an excessive and irrational commitment to the capacities of drones 
to target accurately.90 
The same brochure selling the Gorgon Stare also advertised that “[h]igh resolution real-
time motion video of activities of interest are collected to supply pattern-of-life and post-event 
forensics.” Here the sales department of Sierra Nevada Corporations (an international purveyor 
of integrated electronic systems) appealed directly to signature strikes, where the identity of the 
target is unknown.91 But signature strikes contradict the principle of distinction—if we do not 
know someone’s identity, how can we be sure he (I use the pronoun purposefully) is in fact a 
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combatant? Tyler Wall and Torin Monahan are concerned with surveillant aeriality of drones 
towards a similar end. In an analysis that accompanies not just drones in areas affiliated with the 
War on Terror, but also domestic drones patrolling the U.S./Mexico border, the authors contend 
that the violent articulations of U.S. imperialism enacted by drones “translate” bodies into 
targets.92 As they argued, the “drone stare” abstracts people from context, while relying on a 
clothing, behavior, and location, in the case of signature strikes, to determine combatant status. 
This creates “security-scapes” in recognized theaters of war and domestic spaces. Perhaps the 
most problematic thing about the drone stare is its legitimation through discourses of 
technological superiority and scientific objectivity, so that the available images, despite the 
complex levels of interpretive work required to “see,” are rendered as “accurate” and “correct”—
even virtuously so. It is as if the “cosmic view” afforded by drones cannot lie. Wall and 
Monahan showed how drones “further normalize the ongoing subjugation of those marked as 
Other,” interrogating the zoerhetorics of drone warfare in different ways.93  
Although the United States has a right to self-defense, and the drone campaign can 
largely be credited with decimating Al Qaeda’s “Af/Pak” stronghold, it seems problematic that 
the exact logic used to defend innocent American-identified humans can be deployed to destroy 
non-American-identified humans. The pernicious militant/civilian false dichotomy, further, 
currently operates as a platform for the U.S. to continue to push an asymmetric military agenda. 
While the bulk of analysts, pundits, bloggers, and op-ed writers criticize the way the Obama 
administration counts civilians, very few of these writers interrogate the decomposition of the 
militant/civilian dichotomy in the first place. As a result, the critical left leaves largely 
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unquestioned that so-called militants—a status determined by no more than the decree of high-
ranking officials—should die in the first place. Therefore, even critics of the U.S. drone 
campaign play into its hands by implicitly sanctioning an ontological gap between civilian and 
militant. The result is what Achille Mbembe called a deathworld—the murder of an imperialized 
group of people legitimated by humanitarian logics.94  
Through these processes, the U.S.-based rhetoric of CIA drone strikes zoerhetorically 
re/distributes status along the potent dichotomy of civilian/non-civilian. The zoerhetorical 
inflation of innocent individuals occurs through the operation of the god term innocence. 
Although not typically considered a god term, civilian is linked by semantic association and 
phonetic resonance to god terms like civilized, civilization, and citizen.95 Lumping rhetorics 
typically inflate and splitting rhetorics typically deflate. Already an “othered” group, Islamic 
Others are further split along a spectrum of evidential guilt and innocence. Distancing and 
deflationary zoerhetorics condition this split, functioning as either devil terms (“terrorists”) or 
euphemisms (“targets.”) Finally, the creation of the enemy specific to the capacities of remotely 
piloted aircraft—the hiding Al-Qaeda member discoverable by excellent reconnaissance—
demands specific types of persons targeted for death living in Mbembian deathworlds. 
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Conclusion: The Zoerhetorical Movements of Drone Warfare 
 
In May of 2013, in honor of Memorial Day, Obama gave a speech that called for an end 
to the boundless, perpetual War on Terror. This speech was notable because it was the first time 
the strikes against U.S. citizens were officially acknowledged by the White House. The same 
Times editorial board that just a few months earlier had castigated Obama over lack of 
transparency in the drone campaign turned to sing his praises.96 However, despite his promises, 
the CIA continued (and continues) to employ the controversial practice of signature strikes, even 
ramping up strikes in the following July.97 During this speech, Obama responded to the outcry 
against targeting U.S. citizens without due process by comparing Al-Awlaki and the others to 
domestic snipers, which I’ll excerpt here because it brings together zoerhetorically significant 
spectra of citizenship and innocence discussed above: 
 
For the record, I do not believe it would be constitutional for the government to 
target and kill any U.S. citizen—with a drone, or with a shotgun—without due 
process, nor should any President deploy armed drones over U.S. soil. But when a 
U.S. citizen goes abroad to wage war against America and is actively plotting to 
kill U.S. citizens, and when neither the United States, nor our partners are in a 
position to capture him before he carries out a plot, his citizenship should no more 
serve as a shield than a sniper shooting down on an innocent crowd should be 
protected from a SWAT team. That’s who Anwar Awlaki was—he was 
continuously trying to kill people.98 
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In order to defend his disputed policy, the President constructed yet another threat to “the 
American people.” However, this was not a threat like Rand Paul’s that relied on a 
zoerhetorically deflated racialized foreigner or an inflated white supercitizen. Instead, Obama 
located the threat right at home in the image of the domestic sniper, reminding us that,  “[W]e 
face a real threat from radicalized individuals here in the United States.”99 The insidious, 
concealed sniper resonates with the insidious, concealed Al Qaeda drone target. This speech, 
then, marks a departure from the typical “disease” White House rhetoric of drones (Brennan 
described drones as being the surgical, sterile way to remove cancerous tissue) while maintaining 
the vague, vacillating threat to American-identified persons that has characterized War on Terror 
rhetoric since its inception. 
Over the course of this chapter, I’ve found it useful to create a character on which my 
narrative voice is autoethnographically based: the solicitous, concerned citizen-subscriber to the 
New York Times. I’ve tried to triangulate (or crystallize, following Ellingson’s important 
incursion into qualitative research methods100) between this more general experience and the 
vagaries of my own rhetorical experience. What is decidedly alarming, however, is the extent to 
which the characteristics of my imagined narrator (broadly based on the demographics of New 
York Times readers) coincide with many of the characteristics of persons that the zoerhetorics of 
drone warfare suggest for protection: whiteness-performing, appropriately consuming, law-
abiding, American-identified, residing outside of the targeted terrain, etc. How is it significant 
for this study that readers of the New York Times are often successfully targeted for the good 
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life? I also acknowledge other zoerhetorical gestures implicit in this essay, which run as deeply 
as the chosen “text” of study (an American-identified newspaper) and include exclusive 
pronouns like “we” when referencing American-identified persons. 
Drone strikes and their accompanying mass mediated zoe/rhetorics show no signs of 
abating. Regarding social belonging and citizenship, drone rhetorics milk American-identified 
social belonging to refocus the public on American-identified persons, rather than already 
Othered vulnerable bodies. Regarding innocence, drone rhetorics in the Times tap the empty 
civilian/militant dichotomy in order to manufacture targets. Whether across the spectra of 
belonging or innocence, New York Times drone rhetorics produce and maintain populations 
nourished toward life and targeted for death. 
To rhetorical theory, zoerhetorical theory offers a heuristic for understanding how lives 
come to matter. To biopolitics, zeorhetorical theory offers a framework for how rhetorical 
processes mark lives for life or death. Zoerhetorics continually lump and split groups of living 
entities along a hierarchy indexed by god and devil terms in order to maintain dominance. 
Rooted in necropolitics, zoerhetorical theory provides a rhetorical dimension for understanding 
how we come to accept and maintain unjust distributions of livability.  
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Chapter Four 
 
The Zoerhetorics of Biocitizenship:  
 
Vitally Building Lives at Athletic Clubs in Boulder, Colorado 
 
 
Your body belongs to the Fuhrer. 
 
        —Nazi propaganda poster 
  
 Imagine this scene. A group of men and women gather for a regular Tuesday exercise-
and-beer evening. On this night, five friends bring their carbon fiber racing bicycles and bike 
trainers to Blaine’s house for a favorite activity: viewing the hit cable television show The 
Biggest Loser while racing each other for mileage. 1 This group of fit, white, attractive, 
professional thirty-to-forty-somethings, a few of them semi-professional athletes, call The 
Biggest Loser the “best fitspo.” (Fitspo is a portmanteau of “fitness inspiration”). They all agree 
that host Jillian Michaels—famously known as the “mean” host—provides the most motivation. 
“I don’t care if you both die on this floor. Let’s go! You better die looking good,” Michaels 
shouts at two obese contestants doing push-ups.2 The friends pump their legs harder as they 
watch a large man project exercise-induced vomit over an arrangement of indoor foliage. After 
the ride, they chat about their PR (personal record) goals for their next races over locally brewed 
craft beer that tastes better “when you’ve really earned it.” Before they leave, they make plans to 
                              
1 A pseudonym, a practice repeated throughout this chapter. 
 
2 This Jillian Michaels quote is immortalized in many DIY fan mash-up videos of The Biggest Loser on 
YouTube, like this one, called “The Wrath of Jillian”: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ovfW59st9xc. 
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meet at the outdoor pool at the local athletic club for a Masters swim class at 5:30 the following 
morning.  
 When I retell this story, it reliably produces grimaces. People say, “That’s so Boulder,” 
roll their eyes, and generally find something at least mildly objectionable about the way that the 
fit bodies use the fat bodies as motivation, or as a kind of audiovisually-mediated primetime fuel 
for enhanced exercise performance.3 Further grounds for reproach include the ways that the fit 
bodies have the opportunity to experience the double pleasure of simultaneous identification with 
(Jillian Michaels is shouting at me!) and disidentification from (Look how much fitter I am!) the 
show’s contestants. I began with this scene, as it was casually recounted to me in an interview, 
because it summarily imparts a number of themes that define the local Boulder, Colorado 
subculture in which I find myself half-way immersed: aspirations towards fitness, antipathies 
towards fatness, exercise-oriented socialization, flesh-gazing (that “gets off” towards 
cardiovascular arousal), orientations to “earning” food, and preoccupation with measurable 
personal performance, all wrapped inside class-specific performances of consumption, leisure, 
whiteness, and athleticism.  
In an attempt to understand the consequential rhetorics of these fitness practices, I 
conducted field method research at two athletic clubs in Boulder, Colorado reputed to exemplify 
this subculture of vitality—one a full-service gym with a “country club feel,” and the other a top-
billed indoor climbing and fitness facility. The above anecdote exemplifies a central contention 
of this chapter, present in observations across both fieldsites—that populations encouraged 
towards vitality (here, the fit bikers) are in a hierarchical relationship with populations marked 
                              
3 I am at risk of furthering a harmful fit/fat dichotomy here. I acknowledge that many “fat” bodies are 
capable of scoring high on various types of biometric health and fitness tests. However, these terms are emic to my 
sites.  
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for deterioration (the obese contestants). Zoerhetorical theory attempts to understand the ways in 
which these unequal distributions of privilege and status are encouraged, enforced, and 
legitimated in biopolitical regimes of living. 
It is a truism of biopolitical theory that regimes of living form ethical subjects. What (or 
who) counts as “good” or “ethical” ties intimately with biopolitical mandates. Didier Fassin 
named this phenomenon, as it operates on the level of the nation-state, biolegitimacy, or the 
recognition of the sacredness of life itself. According to Fassin, the imposition of biolegitimacy 
is crucial to the “moral economies of contemporary societies.”4 In other words, societies gain 
credibility from rhetorically performing a commitment to life itself. To Fassin’s analysis we 
might add that organizations, entities, and things, in addition to nation-states, can perform 
biolegitimacy. In this chapter, I am concerned with the performances of biolegitimacy on the 
level of the individual. Persons engaging in successful performances of vitality (later I will make 
a pitch for identifying them as a particular type of vital “biocitizen”) are marked by the cluster of 
qualities associated with properly internalized regimes of self-care—goodness, virtue, discipline, 
self-control, responsibility, and so on.  
Of course, not everyone has access to life-building biolegitimate practices, and herein lies 
the problem. In Pedagogies of Crossing, M. Jacqui Alexander asked a question that provided me 
with a guiding heuristic for this chapter. She queried, “What do lives of privilege look like in the 
midst of war and the inevitable violence that accompanies the building of an empire?”5 The daily 
practices of vitality at the nonpareil athletic clubs across Boulder, Colorado are poised to supply 
an answer to this question. In fact, it is difficult for me to imagine lives more dramatically 
                              
4 Didier Fassin, “Another Politics of Life is Possible,” Theory, Culture & Society 26, no. 5 (2009): 44-60, 
50. 
 
5 M. Jacqui Alexander, Pedagogies of Crossing: Meditations on Feminism, Sexual Politics, Memory, and 
the Sacred (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 1-2.  
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embedded in the privileges of vitality and well being than these biocitizens. Alexander’s question 
challenges the innocence and built-in virtue associated with vitality-building practices like going 
to the gym. Her question even indicts the daily habits of Boulderites like Blaine and his biking 
pals (who, of course, act as substitutes here for myself and my community). Following 
Alexander leads me down a terrifying road—what happens if we read American-identified 
vitality practices, as they are enacted by privileged populations, as crucially bound to the 
formation of empire? 
In other words, what happens if we analyze vitality practices zoerhetorically? 
Zoerhetorics are discourses, objects, events, or practices that (attempt to) re/distribute groups of 
persons to particular biopolitical populations. That vitality practices, as enacted by privileged 
populations, operate to maintain biopolitical inequality will be a starting assumption of this 
chapter. As daily, embodied, life-building habits, vitality practices both perform biolegitimacy 
and accumulate privilege, such as the very tangible privilege of a body that more closely 
conforms to the fit, slender ideal. What are the qualities, constraints, and textures of the 
biolegitimating rhetorics available to persons in this subculture? Where do these biolegitimate 
rhetorics and practices cluster? How do the often intensely demanding regimes of self-care that 
range from encouraged to compulsory in this town become what Pierre Bourdieu called habitus? 
The chapter will proceed as follows: First, I will elaborate the theoretical framework with 
which I approach vitality at the athletic clubs, centered around complementary threads of 
biopolitics and the growing scholarly corpus that positions itself “against health.” From here I 
will extrapolate the figure of the vitality-performing biocitizen—the privileged person whose 
life-building zoerhetorically ascendant practices accumulate and store embodied privilege. This, 
to answer Alexander’s question, is what lives of privilege look like in the formation of empire. 
  
155 
Next, I will describe how biocitizenship, via biolegitimacy, is articulated in specific modes and 
moments at each site. Rhetorics available to vital biocitizens include training and whiteness. 
These rhetorics encourage and justify the accumulation of embodied privilege—an accumulation 
that occurs at the expense of populations who are, in Lauren Berlant’s words, slowly wearing 
out.  
 
The Zoerhetorics of Vital Biocitizens: A Literature Review 
 
 In Losing it with Jillian, the short-lived reality television spin-off to The Biggest Loser, 
host and trainer Jillian Michaels temporarily moves in with obese families in order to help them 
establish the exercise and nutrition patterns they need to “recover their health” and lose weight. 
In a moment of exertion-induced exhaustion, Agnes Mastropietro says, “Jillian, you’re killing 
me!” The grave-faced Jillian shakes her head. “No,” she responds, “you’re killing you.”6 This 
moribund exchange marks clearly the stakes of performing health in contemporary regimes of 
living. To be healthy is to move towards life; to be unhealthy is to move towards death. If you 
are not performing biolegitimacy, you are dying. This section explores scholarship around 
regimes of living that suture performances of vitality to what it means to be a “good” citizen. 
 According to Foucault’s genealogy, biopolitics has been the primary mode of 
governmentality since the late eighteenth century. The two interlocking poles of biopower, the 
disciplinary control of the individual body (“anatomo-politics,” or care of the self) and the 
regulatory control of the population en masse, collaborate to render bodies both docile and 
useful. Ethical subjects are formed by regimes of living, or what Andrew Lakoff and Stephen 
                              
6 Jillian Michaels, Losing it with Jillian, television program, NBC, Season 1 episode 1, 2010. 
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Collier call the “configurations of ethical elements—forms of practice, norms, modes of 
reasoning” concerned with the social and biological life of individuals and collectivities. 7 In our 
specific historical moment, regimes of living form ethical subjects through performances of 
vitality. In other words, we tend to attribute positive qualities to persons performing 
biolegitimacy, or persons who demonstrate a commitment to “life itself” through health 
practices. 
Biopolitics is system of governing. When citizens internalize these practices of health and 
self-care, the state benefits biopolitically (that is, on the level of population) as well as 
economically. The “health” of a nation is rudely equated with the health of its worker-citizens, 
because sickness under capitalism means an inability to work.8 The state, then, institutes a range 
of public programs and policies by which it encourages “health.” Yet as a growing body of 
necropolitical scholarship shows, not all groups of persons are subject to these liberal modes of 
governance that nourish them towards vitality and longevity. To echo Achille Mbembe, it is not 
an accident of biopolitical governance that some populations are nourished toward vitality and 
others are targeted for death. Rather, it is a necessity for the maintenance of domination—a 
necessity in the building of empire. To summarize this aphoristically, and perhaps too simply: 
All health is stolen. 
 What Mbembe called necropolitics described the ways in which regimes of power create 
populations targeted for both life and death. While Foucault and other biopolitical theorists like 
Roberto Esposito thought that some sort of rupture had to occur before biopolitics became lethal, 
Mbembe maintained that the preservative and lethal qualities of biopower were continuous with 
                              
7 Andrew Lakoff and Stephen J. Collier, “Ethics and the Anthropology of Modern Reason,”  
Anthropological Theory 4, no. 4 (2004): 419-434, 427.  
 
8 David Harvey, “The Body as an Accumulation Strategy,” Environment and Planning D 16, no. 4 (1998): 
401-422. 
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each other.9 While persons of privilege are encouraged towards life in lifeworlds, dispossessed 
persons are targeted for death in deathworlds. Like Jacqui Alexander, Mbembe demands we 
consider the populations targeted for death upon which populations targeted for life both 
materially and symbolically rely. Yet while a concept like Mbembian deathworlds might be 
indispensable for a zoerhetorical analysis of, say, drone strikes in Pakistan in the War on Terror, 
it is less useful for understanding populations that aren’t being directly targeted for death. What 
about populations encouraged towards life, living in lifeworlds? What about populations like the 
obese working poor? 
 Enter Lauren Berlant and her theory of “slow death,” which helps us make sense of the 
less spectacular and more everyday biopolitical distributions of livability. In Cruel Optimism, 
Berlant identified a conceptual blind spot in Mbembe’s necropolitics. Specifically, she was 
concerned with the extent to which Mbembe’s examples of deathworlds were dramatic and 
spectacular. What about, she asked, groups of people just slowly, unremarkably dying? She 
appended Mbembe’s event-ful necropolitical notion of murdering enemies with a theory of the 
daily, slow neglect of populations towards deterioration. While Mbembe’s deathworld occupants 
were Palestinians living in Israeli-occupied territories, Berlant’s slow deathworld inhabitants 
were the obese working poor in the United States. Rather than the attention-grabbing spectacle of 
murder, populations neglected towards slow death experience an unremarkable, daily 
deterioration. Berlant then throws her hat in the ring of competing explanations as to why we 
                              
9 Didier Fassin provided an explanation for Foucault’s perceived ambivalence toward deathly biopolitics. 
He wrote, “But there is another dimension of biopower included in his famous statement (1976: 180): ‘One might 
say that the ancient right to kill and let live was replaced by a power to make live and reject into death’ (I believe 
that in the official English version – ‘a power to foster life and disallow it to the point of death’ – the exact and 
profound meaning of ‘faire vivre et rejeter dans la mort’ is somewhat lost in translation). Biopower is not only about 
life: it is also about death. What ‘to reject into death’ means is not entirely clear in Foucault’s writings…In other 
words, ‘to make live’ – which is how biopower is usually understood – is also ‘to reject into death.’ “Another 
Politics of Life is Possible,” 52. 
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(Americans) are so fat. She imagines that persons dying slowly would use food to expand a 
momentary feeling of psychic well being, regardless of whether or not that food contributed to 
long-term physiological well being.10  
If Berlant’s obese working poor experience “slow death,” we might think of the persons 
who work out at the Boulder athletic clubs as experiencing “slow life.” While Berlant focused on 
the everyday movements of U.S. Americans who are slowly wearing out or “life-expending,” I 
focus on the everyday movements of their counterparts: Americans who are slowly “getting 
better” or “improving” through what Berlant called “life-building” practices.11 Indeed, rhetorics 
of self-improvement abound at the health clubs. Many people are attempting to improve their 
overall physical fitness, health, and well being. The minute, daily, slow accrual of various 
components of physical fitness stands in sharp relief against the frenetic work of exercise itself—
exercise intended to enhance muscle endurance, muscle strength, agility, flexibility, and 
cardiorespitory fitness. These biometrically measurable indicators of vitality are forms of stored 
body privilege. This privilege can later result in culturally desirable pay-offs like longevity and 
attributions of attractiveness. If biolegitimacy is one of the rationalities by which a population is 
rendered governable, then one of the consequences of this mode of governmentality is an intense, 
resource-costly focus on the embodied self. Conveniently, a “properly” internalized gaze of self-
care (paired with the time-consuming, salaried career and perhaps a heteronormative family life) 
leaves little time or energy for resisting these biopolitical mandates—or their necropolitical 
consequences.12  
                              
10 Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), Kindle edition. 
 
11 Ibid., Loc. 586.  
 
12 Under the rubric of vital biocitizenship I will describe here, we can understand the general political 
apathy of U.S. vital biocitizens in a few ways. One way draws on Paul Lazarsfeld’s and Robert K. Merton’s concept 
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Critical Health Studies, Accumulated Body Privilege, and the Zoerhetorical Hierarchy 
 
A healthy body of literature critiques vitality. Robert Crawford’s coinage of the term 
“healthism” in 1980 crystallized an incipient critical health movement. Alarmed at the extent to 
which personal health had become a national preoccupation, Crawford denounced the elevation 
of health to a “super value” and metaphor for all that is good in life.13 Similarly, philosopher Ivan 
Illich’s lecture series in the eighties (provocatively titled “To Hell with Health”) skewered health 
practices as leading towards a host of iatrogenic (doctor-caused) diseases while padding the 
pockets of the medical industries.14 Subsequent scholarship took positions ranging from mild 
critique to outrage, such as Petr Skrabanek’s 1994 treatise that located a nascent totalitarianism 
behind state coercions towards compulsory healthy lifestyles. Like Crawford, Skrabanek’s 
primary objection was the preachy moralism accompanying health talk.  
As a scholar of rhetoric, I would be remiss to not mention the anti-health thread running 
through Kenneth Burke’s corpus. During one of his lengthy word association lists in Counter-
Statement, he linked the following to a “healthy club-offer”: efficiency, prosperity, increased 
                                                                                              
of “narcotizing dysfunction,” in which mass-media generated knowledge about an issue substitutes for action 
regarding that issue. (See “Mass Communication, Popular Taste and Organized Social Action,” in Media Studies: A 
Reader, eds. Paul Marris and Sue Thornham (New York, NYU Press, 2000), 22-23). We can also understand the 
political apathy of biocitizens in terms of Richard Lanham’s notion of an “economics of attention.” As attention-
grabbing rhetorics saturate public culture and the demands of a career, family, and intense self-care regime fill the 
day, this leaves an individual with scarce resources of attention remaining to engage in social justice actions. 
Richard Lanham, The Economics of Attention: Style and Substance in the Age of Information (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2006).  
 
13 Robert Crawford, “Healthism and the Medicalization of Everyday Life,” International Journal of Health 
Services 10, no. 3 (1980): 365-388, 368. 
 
14 Lee Hoinacki and Carl Mitcham, eds. The Challenges of Ivan Illich: A Collective Reflection (Albany, 
NY: SUNY Press, 2002). 
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consumption, higher standards of living, enthusiasm, faith.15 As Debra Hawhee catalogued in her 
chapter of Moving Bodies called “Welcome to the Beauty Clinic,” Burke was critical of the 
sterile, medical approach to health and believed that life “grows out of the rot.”16 Ellen Quandahl 
nicely summed Kenneth Burke’s Janus-faced relationship to health with this line: “Burke is best 
known for his “comic” attitude, but his work is deeply riven, divided between the smilingly 
hypochondriacal pursuit of health and wariness of the discursive regimes of order.”17  
In Skrabanek’s account, in an analysis that Burke would probably agree with, “healthy” 
automatically equaled moral, patriotic, and pure while “unhealthy” indexed the opposite poles: 
immoral, unpatriotic or foreign, and impure.18 The most systematic collection of critical health 
studies to date, Jonathan Metzl and Anna Kirkland’s edited book, Against Health: How Health 
Became the New Morality, followed in this vein of health moralizing. Essays in this volume 
identified health as a colonizing, stigmatizing, normalizing, medicalizing, and consumerist series 
of discourses and practices.19 In daily conversations and media representations, health operates as 
a transparent, universal good employed to “make moral judgments, convey prejudice, sell 
products, or even to exclude whole groups of persons from health care.”20  
                              
15 I read “healthy club-offer” as a typographical error for “health club offer.” Kenneth Burke, Counter-
Statement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 111. 
 
16 As quoted in: Debra Hawhee, Moving Bodies: Kenneth Burke at the Edges of Language (Columbia, SC: 
University of South Carolina Press, 2009), 152. 
 
17 Ellen Quandahl, “It’s Essentially as Though This were Killing Us”: Kenneth Burke on Mortification and 
Pedagogy,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 27, no. 1 (1997): 5-22, 20. 
 
18 Petr Skrabanek, The Death of Humane Medicine and the Rise of Coercive Healthism (London: Social 
Affairs Unit, 1994). 
 
19 Jonathan Metzl, and Anna Kirkland, eds., Against Health: How Health Became the New Morality (New 
York: NYU Press, 2010). 
 
20 Jonathan Metzl, “Introduction: Why “Against Health?” in Against Health: How Health Became the New 
Morality, eds. Jonathan Metzl, and Anna Kirkland (New York: NYU Press, 2010), 2. 
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It was not until medical sociologists and other scholars incorporated Michel Foucault’s 
work on biopolitics that focus shifted to an anatamo-politics of self-care where “good” citizens 
internalized the state’s surveillant, panoptic gaze. The classic Foucauldian move from a top-down 
macropolitics to a bottom-up micropolitics, where citizens actively craft their pleasures, desires, 
and subjectivities, inspired Roberto Esposito, Nikolas Rose, Deborah Lupton, and others to 
address the micro-biopolitics of health regimes. In identifying one of Foucault’s primary 
dispositifs of biopolitics, Esposito described the double enclosure of the body as occurring in two 
movements. First, the individual is conceptually chained to her body, and second, the body is 
incorporated into the state. The above epigraph of a Nazi propaganda poster exemplifies this 
double enclosure. The logical result of the premise that your body belongs to the Fuhrer is that 
you are beholden to care for it. Even though Boulder’s vital biocitizens are not living in fascist 
Germany, failure to adequately care for your body still disavows an ethical relation to society. 
In a similar turn to the biopolitical, British sociologist Nikolas Rose asserted that 
healthism is the ideological linkage between “public objectives for the good […] with the desire 
of individuals for health and well being.”21 Later, in The Politics of Life Itself, Rose examined 
biomedicine’s “molecularization,” the creation of a genomic body, and the concurrent shift from 
health as a practice of healing to a way of governing.22 In an impressive body of work that a 
various times analyzed pregnancy, AIDS, food, fat, and fatherhood, Deborah Lupton identified 
risk as one of the pervasive health rhetorics that further encouraged the responsibilization of the 
                              
21 Nikolas Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 74. 
 
22  Nikolas Rose, The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-first 
Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). 
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individual and brought forth a new health consciousness in the polity.23 Like Rose, Lupton 
formed the foundation for a scholarly dialogue that examined risk and other moral imperatives of 
health as modes of governance.  
If health is a mode of governance, a number of rewards and punishments exist for those 
who successfully perform health (or at least seem like they successfully perform it). A series of 
social science investigations have captured the consequences of failing to successfully perform 
health with empirical measurements. Body size is one dimension of health that has received 
attention. Research shows that obese people are less likely to succeed a job interviews, be 
acquitted by juries, or be attributed positive qualities in general when compared to their thinner 
counterparts.24 To a greater extent than men, women face penalties for deviating from the bodily 
ideal, a phenomena that has been documented in the areas of employment, education, and 
health.25 Obese persons are not only excluded from a range of careers because of their body size 
(such as those in the military, police force, or commercial aviation), but also face higher charges 
for health care and health insurance. Even in mundane daily activities like moving through or 
occupying public space, the larger body is at a disadvantage, at least partially because they are 
persistently subject to what Nike Ayo called “gazes of repulsion.”26  
Conversely, we might infer that bodies that externally manifest the ideals of 
biolegitimacy receive “gazes of approval.” A successful biolegitimate performance of health, 
                              
23 Deborah Lupton, “Risk as Moral Danger: The Social and Political Functions of Risk Discourse in Public 
Health,” International Journal of Health Services 23, no. 3 (1993): 425-435. 
 
24 Abigail Saguy, What’s Wrong with Fat? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
 
25 Ngaire Donaghue and Anne Clemitshaw, “‘I’m totally smart and a feminist… and yet I want to be a 
waif’: Exploring ambivalence towards the thin ideal within the fat acceptance movement,” Women’s Studies 
International Forum vol. 35, no. 6 (2012): 415-425. 
 
26 Nike Ayo, “Understanding Health Promotion in a Neoliberal Climate and the Making of Health 
Conscious Citizens,” Critical Public Health 22, no. 1 (2012): 99-105, 104. 
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often externally manifested as a slender body, operates as a visible status cue. Like race, gender, 
sexuality, or ability, body size/shape comprises one axis of an interlocking system of domination. 
As communication scholar Kathleen Lebesco observed, “if African Americans and Latinos are 
fatter than whites and Asians, and women are more likely than men to be fat, fatness haunts us as 
a reminder of deteriorating physical privilege in terms of race and sex.”27 This spate of research 
establishes body size/shape as another biopolitical fault line along which zoerhetorical status is 
re/distributed. I want to emphasize that the privileges of conforming to a bodily ideal reach far 
beyond the exigencies of vanity—the extent to which a body conforms to the slender ideal 
results in real, tangible, material payoffs. 
What is the link between privileged populations and privileged bodies? Here we can draw 
from sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, or the embodied collection of everyday 
rules and norms that structure how we engage with the world. 28 A habitus is precisely what will 
seem invisibly, viscerally obvious to a community. Through habitus, privileged bodies 
accumulate what Bourdieu called “embodied capital,” or resources manifested in the body. 
Bourdieu usually understood embodied capital under the rubric of cultural capital, but Chris 
Shilling’s work labored to position embodied capital as its own stand-alone form of accumulated 
privilege.29 In Shilling’s conception, embodied capital was intimately tied to the production of 
social inequalities. 
                              
27 Kathleen Lebesco, “Fat Panic and the New Morality,” in Against Health: How Health Became the New 
Morality, eds. Jonathan Metzl, and Anna Kirkland (New York: NYU Press, 2010), 74. 
 
28 Pierre Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993). For an analysis of social capital and its emergent privileges like trust as they developed in 
health clubs in Great Britain, see: Nick Crossley, “(Net)working Out: Social Capital in a Private Health Club,” The 
British Journal of Sociology 59, no. 3 (2008): 475-500. 
 
29 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Forms of Capital.” in Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of 
Education, ed. J. Richardson (New York: Greenwood, 1986), 258; Chris Shilling, “Educating the Body: Physical 
Capital and the Production of Social Inequalities,” Sociology 25, no. 4 (1991): 653-672. 
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In the field of anthropology, David Harvey, following Donna Haraway, posited the body 
as an accumulation strategy. Bodies internalize the effects of the processes that “produce, 
support, sustain, and dissolve [them].”30 Of course, a distinct unevenness persists as to how 
different bodies absorb capitalism’s flows. According to Harvey, privileged bodies accumulate 
capitalism’s rewards and less privileged bodies absorb capitalism’s externalities, such as the 
consumption of nutritionally vacuous food or exposure to toxins. Regarding embodied social 
capital, geographer Louise Holt suggested other ways that bodies accumulate capitalism’s flows. 
Persistent “material socio-spatial inequalities” were reproduced through the iterative movements 
of individual dynamic corporealities.31 Leslie Kern, in turn, mobilized the concept of embodied 
social capital’s iterative movements to analyze yoga’s role in the gentrification of Toronto.32 The 
vitality-performing biocitizen, then, is a figure whose body aggregates and stores the biopolitical 
privilege of embodied social capital. In turn, this figure is allowed to demonstrate this privilege 
daily with the performance of a physically fit, healthy, and even hyper-able body.  
One further quality of the vitality-performing biocitizen is her durable association with 
virtue. A number of studies in the social sciences concur that we are more likely to make 
attributions of “goodness” and virtue to persons whose bodies conform to a thin, fit ideal.33 If 
body size/shape is a biopolitical fault line along which consequential status is conferred or 
denied, then virtue is one of the primary discursive topoi for this particular zoerhetorical 
                                                                                              
 
30 Harvey, “Body as an Accumulation Strategy,” 402. 
 
31 Louise Holt, “Embodied Social Capital and Geographic Perspectives: Performing the Habitus,” Progress 
in Human Geography 32, no. 2 (2008): 227–246, 237.  
 
32 Leslie Kern, “Connecting Embodiment, Emotion and Gentrification: An Exploration Through the 
Practice of Yoga in Toronto,” Emotion, Space and Society 5, no. 1 (2012): 27-35. 
 
33 Christine Halse, “Bio-Citizenship: Virtue Discourses and the Birth of the Bio-Citizen,” in Biopolitics and 
the ‘Obesity Epidemic’: Governing Bodies, eds. Jan Wright and Valerie Harwood (New York: Routledge, 2009); 
Annemarie Jutel, “Weighing Health: The Moral Burden of Obesity,” Social Semiotics 15, no. 2 (2005): 113-125. 
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movement. Attributions of virtue here are deeply linked to another important zoerhetorical topos: 
biolegitimacy. Performances of virtue often draw on “life itself” to accrue the attributions of 
goodness and morality that render them virtuous. The occurrence of fat shaming renders this 
concept in more concrete terms. While persons whose bodies do not conform to the ideal are 
shamed with gazes of repulsion, gazes of approval attribute virtue to bodies that mimic idealized 
forms. 
 
Harder, Better, Faster, Stronger: Becoming Vital Biocitizens  
 
If an ongoing rhetorical suturing continually binds health with virtue, this produces 
populations of citizens that have the opportunity to align themselves with these wellsprings of 
associations with the good that a healthy lifestyle offers. I will refer to these persons as vitality-
practicing biocitizens and their series of practices of social belonging as they pertain to self-care 
as vital biocitizenship. In 2002, anthropologist Adriana Petryna coined “biocitizenship” to 
describe the way in which Ukrainians affected by the Chernobyl disaster took radiation 
poisoning as a point of entry to demand redress from the state. For Petryna, biocitizenship 
referred to projects of health and well being articulated in terms of relationship to the state.34  
While Petryna described a specific post-Soviet population as biocitizens, the concept 
developed traction across biopolitical regimes. Biocitizenship is valuable insofar as it links “the 
matter of the living (biological, whether as an irradiated or infected body) and the meaning of 
                              
34 Adriana Petryna, Life Exposed: Biological Citizens after Chernobyl (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2013). 
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politics (citizenship, in terms of social as well as civil rights).”35 Because of these and other 
competing definitions for the term biocitizenship, Roger Cooter recommended it as a watchword 
for twenty-first century scholarship.36 According to a precept offered by Nicole Charles in her 
study of HPV vaccinations, biocitizens are excellent figures by which to understand 
contemporary neoliberal regimes of biopolitical governance.37 
Evading the easy portmanteau, Nikolas Rose and Carlos Novas offered the phrase 
“biological citizenship” in 2003 to encompass all “citizenship projects that have linked their 
conceptions of citizens to beliefs about the biological existence of human beings, as individuals, 
as families and lineages, as communities, as population and races, and as a species.”38 For Rose 
and Novas, biocitizenship offered a way for biosocial collectivities to develop, often through 
new technologies such as the internet, and was linked to the promise of biomedicine. The 
optimistic hope in their iteration of biocitizenship was that individuals would have recourse to 
demand recognition from the state based on their capacity to self-organize in appropriate 
groups—a group of citizens suffering from multiple sclerosis, for example, might use the 
resources from an online social network to collectively demand medical coverage.  
My mobilization of the term biocitizenship differs from Petryna’s original definition in 
two ways. First, Petryna’s group of biocitizens made claims on the nation-state of Ukraine from 
a place of biological damage after Chernobyl. In contrast, my group of vital biocitizens pursues 
                              
35 Fassin, “Another Politics of Life,” 51. 
 
36 Roger Cooter, “Biocitizenship,” The Lancet 372, no. 9651 (2008): 1725. 
 
37 Nicole Charles, “Mobilizing the Self-governance of Pre-damaged Bodies: Neoliberal Biological 
Citizenship and HPV Vaccination Promotion in Canada,” Citizenship Studies 17, no. 6-7 (2013): 770-784. 
 
38 Nikolas Rose and Carlos Novas, “Biological Citizenship,” in Global Anthropology, eds. Aihwa Ong and 
Stephen Collier (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), 2. 
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status recognition from a set of publics from a place of (purported) biological improvement. In 
this way, my use of vital biocitizenship is similar to Christine Halse’s, who described biocitizens 
as taking (self-)control of markers of “health” in order to live as good, ethical civic subjects.39 In 
the contemporary figure of the biocitizen, Halse reads the birth of a “new species of human 
being,” living among narratives of escalating urgency and crisis around the so-called obesity 
epidemic. Biocitizens can never be too industrious or too diligent engaging in health practices, 
such as the maintenance of a normative body mass index. 
In a similar fashion, LeAnne Petherick described the production of biocitizens in high 
school physical education classes in Canada, especially as these young students used the 
culminating fitness test of the mile run as an opportunity to evaluate and manage their own 
fitness progress.40 When Kathryn Henne described Olympic athletes as biocitizens, she also 
trafficked in the notion of biocitizens as persons whose regimes of health and self-care intimately 
tied them to the state. As a result of their exceptional physical prowess, Olympic athletes both 
accrued transnational privilege (such as mobility) while also garnering heightened surveillance 
(such as gender policing).41 While most of the vital biocitizens at the gyms in Boulder neither 
approach this level of internationally elite athleticism nor garner the kind of surveillance of 
Olympian bodies, the concept of biocitizenship retains traction across this wide range of athletic 
                              
39 Halse, “Bio-Citizenship.” At her most critical, Halse linked her notion of vital biocitizenship to a project 
of racial eugenics. 
 
40 LeAnne Petherick, “Producing the Young Biocitizen: Secondary School Students’ Negotiation of 
Learning in Physical Education,” Sport, Education and Society 18, no. 6 (2013): 711-730. Biocitizenship research 
tends to focus on biopedagogy in schools. Schools are increasingly sites where bodies are included within or 
excluded from good and virtuous biocitizenry. In a provocative move, Katie Fitzpatrick and Richard Tinning go so 
far as to call physical education in schools “health fascism,” where particular messages of control and surveillance 
involve an imposition of truth. See “Health Education’s Fascist Tendencies: A Cautionary Exposition,” Critical 
Public Health 24, no. 2 (2013): 132-142. 
 
41 Kathryn Henne, “Tracing Olympic Bio-Citizenship: The Implications of Testing for Ineligibility,” 
in Problems, Possibilities, Promising Practices: Critical Dialogues on the Olympic and Paralympic 
Games (Ontario: International Centre for Olympic Studies, 2012). 
  
168 
performances. In some ways, the athletes at the gym are demonstrate even more neoliberal 
biocitizenship than Olympic athletes because they maintain a level of conditioning at the elite 
amateur level while simultaneously being committed to some other full-time, successful, often 
high-status, career. Architects, professors, lawyers, city councilmembers, and corporate 
executives work out at either athletic club. 
I will amend my discussion of biocitizens with this reflexive disclosure. While I critique 
biocitizens, I also recognize that I am a vitality-aspirant biocitizen. (And you likely are as well). 
In fact, I feel comfortable condemning practices of vital biocitizenship precisely because they are 
“my people.” I aspire to be one of “them,” and my curiosity about these populations has been 
piqued by moving through these circles—socially, athletically, and professionally. I even wish 
that my body would accumulate the privileges of vital biocitizenship more efficiently. Who 
would not want the promise of privilege that performances of vitality entail? It is precisely the 
affective attachment to this promise on which Boulder athletic clubs capitalize, so I turn my 
attention to them. 
 
Biocitizens at Boulder’s Premier Athletic Clubs 
 
Smile, you’re in Boulder! 
 
     —Sign in Whole Foods regional flagship store parking lot 
 
I made most of my observations while participating at two facilities, although my 
observations easily spilled the boundaries of any physical site and infiltrated social time with 
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friends, amateur race events in which I participated, and my general lifestyle as a graduate 
student in downtown Boulder, Colorado. The first facility is an expensive athletic club with, 
according to its website, “a country club feel” tucked beneath one of the “nation’s premier 
walking malls.” In addition to other amenities, this gym offers a year-round saline outdoor pool 
and over one hundred fitness classes per week in spacious separate studios for spin cycling, bike 
training, Pilates, yoga, and group fitness. The second facility is a climbing gym in Boulder, 
which boasts a world-class clientele, as many professional climbers reside or train in Boulder for 
its proximity to challenging climbing terrain, and yoga, cycling, and fitness classes.  
For the past four years, I have been a regular member of both of these facilities. At both 
sites, I collected fieldnote observations in dual roles, as participant (climber, belayer, treadmill 
runner, fitness class attendee, hot tub soaker) as well as observer (sitting in these spaces and 
taking notes). I spent roughly three to eight hours per week at the athletic club, where my 
membership has not lapsed in four years. (My membership started on a “nanny pass”—the perk 
of a regular babysitting gig that I was using to stretch my graduate assistance funds. Therefore it 
is accurate to say that I started as an outsider). My attendance at the climbing gym has been less 
sustained; I purchased membership in three-month increments once or twice a year. Local 
outdoor climbing sites, like Boulder Canyon, Chautauqua, Eldorado Canyon, and Flagstaff 
Mountain also served as places where I encountered biocitizenly practices on real rock. The 
systematic data collection and interviews for this project began when I received IRB approval in 
late 2012.42 I interviewed a number of friends and acquaintances (and then their acquaintances) 
in a small snowball sample—in total there were three formal and about ten informal interviews. 
In many ways, I was immersed in Boulder’s biocitizenly subculture even at home, as my partner 
                              
42 This study has received exemption from CU’s Institutional Review Board, Protocol #12-0574. 
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at the time was a rock climber, ice climber, and ultrarunner regularly in training. Because both of 
these facilities are reputed to exemplify the subculture of fitness and athleticism that defines 
Boulder, Colorado, I will start with a description of Boulder itself. 
 
Biocitizenship in Boulder, Colorado 
 
Last summer, when my partner and I hosted a barbecue at a public park in Boulder, and 
we realized that everyone gathered around the grill was currently or had one point been a 
sponsored athlete in cyclocross, orienteering, or ultrarunning. A patch of triathletes chatted 
nearby. I have never lived in a place so inclined towards athletic endeavors, nor have I ever been 
invited to so many social gatherings that revolve around exercise in some way. Yet as if by 
inertia, I now regularly meet friends at cycling classes at the local gym in the evenings (for a few 
of them, it is their second workout of the day) and I completed my first sprint-distance triathlon 
in August of 2013. I trained in the climbing gym in the winter in order to “session my projects” 
in the summer, and I made regular use of the hiking trails, bike paths, and open green space for 
which Boulder is famous. Scores of professional cyclists, climbers, runners, and other athletes 
live in Boulder for access to these luxuries and to reap the hypoxic benefits of training at altitude.  
Boulder is consistently ranked among the top cities for outdoor sports access, and is 
reputed to be the most physically fit and least obese city in the least obese state in the nation. 
One GQ poll honored Boulder as the “worst dressed city that looks best naked.” 43 Of course, not 
                              
43 The GQ rankings of worst dressed cities can be found here,	  Nurit Zunger, “The 40 Worst-Dressed Cities 
in America,” GQ, http://www.gq.com/style/fashion/201107/worst-dressed-cities-america#slide=1. As the GQ poll 
notes, the city is obsessed with its high performance in fitness and lifestyle rankings. Boulder’s city council website 
lists hundreds of Boulder’s general lifestyle accolades here: “Best of Boulder - Community Honors,” City of 
Boulder Colorado. https://bouldercolorado.gov/newsroom/best-of-boulder-community-honors. 
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everyone in town is a well-conditioned athlete, nor does Boulder have the monopoly on status-
oriented fitness practices. There is certainly a popular pushback against the “cult of the body” 
that feels compulsory here. It is telling that people will “out” themselves as “not Boulder 
enough” if they do not pursue, at least somewhat competitively, a gamut of outdoor sports. Not 
surprisingly, as property values have inflated around Boulder, what was formerly celebrated as a 
progressive hippie town has became a place where persons performing consumption-oriented 
whiteness gather and gentrify. What Jessie Stewart and Greg Dickinson called the “Colorado 
lifestyle” is inextricably linked to consumption, as many of the nation’s boutique fitness apparel 
stores, such as Mont Bell, Prana, Go Lite, or Skirt Sports locate their flagship stores on Boulder’s 
Pearl Street mall.44 For these reasons, the city of Boulder furnishes an excellent geographical 
location at which build a theory around the embodied accumulation of privilege through 
practices of vitality.45 
Boulder’s self-identity as a fit city appears at the gyms, too, in personal interactions as 
well as promotional material. “Just don’t start dieting and running three hours a day without 
telling me…believe me, it happens in Boulder,” advised my personal fitness instructor, as she 
pinched a handful of fat from my abdomen to measure with calipers. Amid zero communication 
from me that I was unhappy with my current body weight, her insensitive advice was a subtle 
admonishment of my performance of vitality. Her subtext, as interpreted through my necessarily 
partial experience, was, “If you want to fit in here, you’re going to have to change your current 
                              
44 Jessie Stewart and Greg Dickinson, “Enunciating Locality in the Postmodern Suburb: FlatIron Crossing 
and the Colorado Lifestyle,” Western Journal of Communication 72, no. 3 (2008): 280-307. 
 
45 In focusing on upscale gyms, I do not mean to suggest that working class communities of Boulder (and 
the nature of their fitness practices) are unimportant. I focus on the privileged groups precisely because I am 
interested in bodily accumulations of this privilege—especially the kind of accumulations that have consequential 
zoerhetorical effects. 
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nutrition and exercise routine for a more demanding one.” In a similar Boulder-worshipping 
vein, the gym’s website practically gushes: 
 
Even if you don’t live or work in Boulder, you’ve likely heard how health and fitness is a 
major part of our lifestyle. Boulder consistently ranks among studies’ and publications’ 
fittest cities in America; walk into a grocery store and it seems like most of the shoppers 
just finished a trail run, a bike ride or a yoga class; internationally competitive athletes 
train in Boulder. Surrounded by so many positive influences, many of our Members don’t 
need motivation to stay in shape; their focus is to simply work with a talented, 
knowledgeable professionals.  
 
Members do not need motivation to stay in shape, because they have fully and appropriately 
internalized regimes of vital self-care. The upscale local athletic club uses an affiliation with 
Boulder’s vital identity (while tapping the vague expertise of “studies and publications”) to 
promote itself as a competent venue. In this paragraph we can also see the link between 
responsible fitness practices and responsible consumption (“walk into any grocery store”). In 
fact, the undertone of Boulder pride is best exemplified at a grocery store. The regional flagship 
Whole Foods market, just a few blocks from either gym, has signs in its parking lot that say, 
“Smile, you’re in Boulder!” After a morning group fitness class, clubgoers descend on the juice 
bar and hot bar at the Whole Foods, perhaps consuming quality protein calories within twenty 
minutes of strength training, as we are repeatedly advised by fitness instructors-cum-
biopedagogues. This awareness of Boulder’s physically fit and athletic reputation permeated 
both of my fieldsites. 
 
 
 
 
  
173 
Working Out at the Athletic Clubs 
 
 The glass triple-door entrance to the athletic club greets you with succulents and ferns. In 
order to advance into the main interior, you must show your membership card with photo ID to a 
person behind the counter, who welcomes you to the club and then says, “Have a good work 
out!” The large indoor space opens as you pass a large stone fountain, wide-screen television, 
comfortable couches, and a glorified snack bar called “Energy.” Although I have been to the 
gym at about every time of the day, I like it in the late morning—past the pre-work rush. I call 
this the stay-at-home-mom time of the day to work out. Many middle-aged women use the 
facility at that time of the day, dropping their kids off at the childcare center called “Blast,” a 
kid’s “active play” space before their workout. One thing that makes Boulder different from 
other cities of its size is that a lot of people are freelance consultants, work from home, or have 
the flexible hours granted by some white collar professions. As a result, there are people in the 
gyms at all times of the day, but both gyms experience a post-5:00 p.m. rush. 
 The locker room at the athletic club is not one that you rush through. You want to linger. 
Sometimes after showering, even though I knew I should have started the labor of my day, it was 
hard to resist the saline hot tub, aromatherapized steam room, or sauna in the locker room. The 
“well-appointed” locker rooms include shampoo, conditioner, body wash, hair dryers, body 
lotion, styling gel, Q-tips, tampons, shaving cream, razors, cotton balls, an iron and ironing 
board, and cheap plastic combs in Barbicide. When I am dressing or undressing in the locker 
room, I like to listen to the backstage conversations that are invited in this kind of gendered 
space. The combination of the intimacy of nakedness, the proximity between lockers, and the 
luxurious surroundings invites complete strangers to start chatting with one another. (This is a 
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phenomenon that I have only experienced in this particular athletic club’s locker room, but I 
have limited social experience with locker rooms in other gym cultures).  
Mostly we chat about what is in front of us: the content on one of the flat screen 
televisions (“Are they always playing the Kardashians in here?”); the performance quality of 
different types of activewear (“Yeah, Gaiam’s clothes are definitely for people who move;” 
“UnderArmour’s sports bras are the best because you can shop by cup size.”); the aesthetic 
quality of different types of activewear; (“That top is so cute—where did you get it?”); or the 
group fitness, cycling, or yoga class from which we recognize each other (“Oh my God, my butt 
is always so sore from Tracy’s TRX class. Nothing makes you feel skinny when your put your 
jeans on more than a sore butt!”). The best line, in terms of class performance, I ever overheard 
in the locker room was one very buff, tan middle-aged woman asking another, “How do you 
work out when you’re at your Aspen cabin?” The saddest line I ever overheard was one very thin 
middle-aged woman telling another, “I don’t feel like myself until I exercise. That’s when you 
know you have a problem, I guess.” 
 The athletic club features an appealing interior “green” design. According to their 
website, their spacious square footage is “canvassed by earth-tone finishings, natural stone and 
energy efficient lighting.” I am skeptical about this appeal to greenness being anything more than 
a marketing ploy. When you walk through the main fitness floor, tens of treadmills, elliptical 
machines, and Stairmasters each have a television in front of them that is usually on whether or 
not the machine is in use—what a waste of energy! When Greg Dickinson described a Starbucks, 
he linked the curved plant form, green colors, and wood paneling of the interior design to wide 
open spaces, a minimal environmental footprint, the greenness of nature, and the greenness of 
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money.46 The climbing gym’s attempt at a green image is more believable, but also certainly part 
of a careful marketing scheme. They feature solar panels and a real-time read-out display of the 
club’s energy use in the lobby. 
 The climbing gym is not as beautiful or inviting as the athletic club, but it is vertically 
dazzling. The main foyer opens into wide carpeted stadium-style benches. Climbers are invited 
to watch people on the “gray wall,” or the wall with the steepest terrain and most challenging set 
climbs. On any given evening, there are a handful of world class climbers “sessioning” or 
“seshing” their projects on the gray wall. The gray wall arcs out over the seating area like a wave 
about the crash, forming a kind of amphitheater shape. Because climbers use chalk on their 
palms and fingers for traction, the air in the climbing gym is often cloudy with fine white dust—
a state that the building’s designers tried to combat with an advanced ventilation system. Climbs 
are “set,” (an art unto itself), marked with colored tape, and then rated for difficulty (on a scale 
from 5.5 to 5.15). It is not uncommon to see a plastic climbing hold with blood on it. No one 
seems to care. I have ripped open fingers and knees plenty of times on fake rock, and you don’t 
always get the opportunity to clean off the hold. 
 Both gyms entertain a relationship with visibility, spectatorship, and display. Mirrors line 
the walls of the group fitness room, the cycling studio, the functional fitness floor, and the yoga 
studio of the athletic club. In classes, we are entreated by fitness instructors to use the side or 
front mirrors to check our alignment and to self-adjust if necessary. A handful of eager group 
fitness devotees arrive earlier to snag spots directly in front of the mirror (I have, at various 
times, been one of these people). At the athletic club, the more of a following that a particular 
fitness instructor has, the earlier you have to arrive. By positioning the steepest wall in front of 
                              
46 Greg Dickinson, “Joe’s Rhetoric: Finding Authenticity at Starbucks,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 32, no. 
4 (2002): 5-27. 
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the stadium seating, the most skilled climbers are clustered together for the viewer’s pleasure. 
The treadmills and stationary bikes that ring the upper level of the gym are also all pointed 
towards the gray wall. The level of climbing is so advanced at the gym that it almost serves as an 
advertisement for the gym itself. Next to these talented climbers, my climbing looks more like 
flailing—it was difficult to not be self-conscious in the arena-like viewing center. 
A busy night at the climbing gym can turn into a who’s who of the national or local 
climbing circuit. Friends in-the-know would whisper to me, “That’s Jim Erickson, he had a ton 
of bad ass first ascents in Eldo!” or “That’s Brooke Raboutou, she’s twelve, she’s a prodigy. Her 
whole family climbs fourteens.” The opportunity to climb right next to these “celebrities,” and 
even cheer them on, can be inspiring but also enervating. For months I avoided climbing on the 
gray wall because it felt like I was not allowed in “their” space. The most elite crop of climbers 
at the gym were often sponsored by a popular brand of climbing shoes (such as 5.11 or Sportiva) 
or outdoor apparel. Spotting Lynn Hill at the gym was not unusual but was always a treat. She 
was the first person—not just the first woman—to free climb The Nose on El Capitan in 
Yosemite National Park. She is now a “Patagonia Ambassador,” a fact that underscores the 
relationship between wearing the “right” clothes in the performance of vital biocitizenship.  
 Another feature of both gyms is the presence of skilled trainers roaming the facility. At 
the athletic club, these workers are available to spot you while you lift weights or answer 
questions about the use of a particular machine. At the climbing gym, these workers were more 
likely to be doing safety checks, to make sure people are belaying properly. One man I 
interviewed who worked at the climbing gym—a climber himself—had lots of stories to share 
about people taking life-threatening falls at the gym because of faulty equipment and 
incompetent belaying. For a few months, the climbing gym had a foot-shaped hole in the padded 
  
177 
carpet beneath the highest point on the gray wall. (Climbing is dangerous. I had too many close 
calls, and I do not do it anymore). Both facilities feature display walls with photographs and brief 
biographies of their certified trainers, and both facilities advertise and encourage paying for 
additional one-on-one sessions with a personal trainer.  
As Dickinson noted of coffeeshop baristas, these trainers can be understood as “cultural 
workers,” insofar as they interpret and “sell” the variety of goods available for the biocitizen’s 
consumption.47 These cultural workers are partially responsible for representing, and even 
branding, their respective gyms. During one revealing moment in a cycling class at the athletic 
club, I heard a particularly saucy fitness instructor say to a latecomer, “Oh, be careful, that bike it 
broken. Oh wait, I’m not supposed to say anything is broken. I am supposed to say that it 
‘requires maintenance.’ Oops, I forgot!” She rolled her eyes, as if to suggest that kind of policing 
was ridiculous. In that moment, her break from the top-down imposed script revealed the highly 
structured nature of interaction between cultural worker and clubgoers. It reminded me that even 
after I had already purchased the membership, the “experience” of the club was still actively 
being sold to me. The employee at the climbing gym echoed this observation, by noting that he 
was provided a huge, top-secret manual that prescribed what exactly to say to climbers at the 
club in various situations. 
 Typically, bodies across both sites present as muscular, fit, and white. This is not to 
suggest that overweight bodies never frequent these places, but rather to emphasize the 
homogeneity of Boulder bodies, especially as they cluster and move at these athletic centers. 
This is embarrassing to relay, but one time while climbing with my former partner, we saw an 
obese person at the gym. “Wow, he must be really brave,” we said. “It must be really hard for 
                              
47 Ibid., 18.  
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him to be here.” I recognize that kind of talk to be superior and patronizing, but I share it as an 
important ethnographic datum. Bodies at both clubs tend to be hegemonically gendered. 
Typically, there are a few more men than women at the climbing gym. At the athletic club, there 
are more women than men (reflective of national rates of health care membership). However, 
male and female bodies cluster differently in the gym. What Shari Dworkin observed in her 
ethnography of a fitness club in 2003 is generally true of the fitness club in Boulder: more 
women tend to participate in group fitness classes and use cardiovascular equipment, whereas 
more men tend to occupy the area with weight-lifting equipment.48 
The assumed level of fitness and mobility in group fitness classes at both sites serve as a 
good example of the homogeneity of bodies. Certified fitness instructors are typically trained to 
offer novice, intermediate, and advanced modifications for any one single exercise. For example, 
in Hot Yoga classes at the athletic club, I will often hear various modifications for a single asana 
(the Sanskrit word for pose). Yet often, through a series of visual cues, instructors “read” the 
fitness and mobility levels of the bodies present in order determine the modifications they need 
to offer. As a result, especially at the climbing gym, the group fitness instruction assumes that 
fitness levels and mobility range are remarkably high. Instructors often assume, for example, that 
participants are willing and able to partake in a range of fairly advanced activities, such as 
jumping rope, unassisted pull-ups, or rapidly switching from supine to standing to inverted 
positions.  
In addition to homogeneity of body type, there are a number of social and capital 
privileges that vital biocitizens have. Here is a partial list of the economic, social, and other 
                              
48 Shari Dworkin, “A Woman’s Place is in the…Cardiovascular Room? Gender Relations, the Body, and 
the Gym,” in Athletic Intruders: Ethnographic Research on Women, Culture, and Exercise, eds. Anne Bolin and 
Jane Granskig (Albany: SUNY Press, 2003).  
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privileges enjoyed by many of the biocitizens I have observed at these sites: a career that allows 
for extra physical energy before, during, or after work to exercise; the financial stability required 
to pay in excess of hundreds of dollars a month for sometimes multiple gym memberships, 
equipment, apparel, and race registration fees; access to the additional quality calories required 
to support a training regimen; social/familial networks who support or encourage time spent on 
“training;” an able-bodiedness that approaches hyper-ability; access to medical care in support of 
a training regimen; geo-spatial access to athletic training facilities; and a self-conception that one 
is capable of improvement or even superior performance across a range of fitness indicators. 
Clearly the vitality-performing biocitizen reaps the benefits of his or her economic and social 
capital. 
 
Making Vital Biocitizens: Training and Whiteness 
 
Health today is not so much a biological imperative linked to survival as a social 
imperative linked to status. 
— Jean Baudrillard, The Consumer Society49 
 
When Baudrillard wrote The Consumer Society in 1970, he had no idea of the 
proliferative ways in which performances of vitality would index social status in 2014. As they 
are performed across these two athletic clubs in Boulder, the biocitizen’s self-inflationary 
practices draw from rhetorics of training and whiteness. In the contemporary regime of living, 
these two rhetorics allow vitality-performing biocitizens to do what Burke would call 
                              
49 Jean Baudrillard, The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures (Thousands Oaks, CA: Sage, 1998), 139. 
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“mount[ing] the hierarchy” in publicly sanctioned, socially approved ways.50 Each of these 
overlapping rhetorics of training and whiteness illuminate characteristics of the slow, life-
building, accretive practices of the vitality-performing biocitizen. Further, each of these 
zoerhetorics hews biocitizens to a range of positive qualities and from a range of negative 
qualities. In the ongoing and dynamic zoerhetorical movements in the contemporary United 
States, the set of positive qualities associated with properly internalized regimes of self-care 
include goodness, virtue, discipline, self-control, responsibility, and autonomy. While adhering 
to zoerhetorically ascendant practices of health and fitness, the biocitizen, who cannot help but 
be materially and psychologically invested in the zoerhetorical hierarchy, reinscribes the 
hierarchy while reaping its rewards. 
One of the key logics buttressing vitality-performing biocitizenship is an affective 
attachment to almost infinite body malleability. A plenum of rhetorics across both clubs forward 
the idea that the only thing standing between clubgoers and the body of their dreams is hard 
work. Shaping one’s body is rendered as the equivalent of shaping one’s life.51 The extension of 
this logic to its most brutal conclusion means that an imperfect body indicates an imperfect self.52 
The infinite malleability of bodies suggests that the extent to which a body conforms to the 
“ideal” fit athletic body acts is a reliable dipstick or indicator as to a person’s social status. 
Again, persons whose bodies conform to the fit, able, athletic ideal are attributed a range of 
                              
50 The sexual pun of “mounting” is not lost on Kenneth Burke, of course. See William Rueckert, Encounters 
With Kenneth Burke (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 75. 
 
51 Susan Bordo, in her incredible book Unbearable Weight, excerpts an ad that says exactly this. See 
Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). 
 
52 The promise of cosmetic plastic surgeries serves this myth of infinite body malleability. For a further 
discussion of the rhetorical limits of body changeability, see: John Jordan, “The Rhetorical Limits of the “Plastic 
Body,”” Quarterly Journal of Speech 90, no. 3 (2004): 327-358. 
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positive qualities in zoerhetorical ascendance; persons whose bodies fail to conform are 
attributed a range of negative qualities in zoerhetorical descendance.  
The problem here is that bodies are not infinitely malleable, nor are they consistently 
reliable indicators of privilege. They are recalcitrant and stubborn things. Some bodies will 
accumulate biocitizenly privileges quickly, displaying fitness and athleticism with little to no 
prompting, whereas some bodies will paunch and pull idealized slender lines despite ascetic self-
management regimes. Bodies have a vital agency all their own, separate from the top-down 
executive functions of willpower. They are mutable, but only to an extent. Like the fungibility of 
fetal entities at memorials to the unborn discussed in the previous chapter, the fungibility of 
bodies is both an opportunity and threat for the gyms. That some bodies can change sometimes 
fuels a (perhaps Berlantian cruel) affective attachment to the myth of body malleability, but that 
some bodies remain stubbornly immune to training threatens membership numbers at the gyms. 
In the contemporary regime of living, aspirational body malleability may keep athletic clubs in 
business. At the same time, the myth of body malleability also results in rhetorically descendant 
attributions to persons with imperfect bodies, because we assume that they have “earned” them 
through unhealthy, indulgent practices. The discourse of training anchors mythic body 
malleability to biolegitimacy. 
 
Vital Biocitizens Train for Life 
 
Various textual messages intended to inspire clubgoers decorate the interior of the 
athletic club as well as its website. One poster reads, “Athletes eat and train—they don’t diet and 
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exercise.”53 Similarly, a personal trainer’s tagline on the club website intones, “Train smart. Rest. 
Repeat.” As I write these words, the club is running a “spring training” sale. A preference for 
discourses and practices of training over those of exercising mark an important movement across 
both fieldsites. The scoffing of an attractive white male ultrarunner with whom I am friendly first 
drew my attention to the bio/legitimating narrative of training. He groused, “I don’t understand 
fitness. It’s pointless. You’re not doing anything. Fitness for what?” In this particular case, he 
was mocking middle-aged women doing step aerobics, but the barb stung me, too. Chris went on 
to clarify, “When I work out, it’s because I want to accomplish or achieve something. I don’t just 
work out to work out. I don’t want to just spin my wheels.” Besides asserting his masculinity, 
Chris wanted to make a distinction between “mere” exercise versus a carefully planned and 
meticulously executed training regimen in pursuit of some goal. Although he might be an 
extreme case, even for Boulder, Chris’s preference for training over mere exercising aligns with 
many of the persons at the athletic clubs. In this subculture, palpable social approval is available 
for persons who train for a particular event. Although I am no serious athletic contender, I 
announced I would compete in my first sprint triathlon to much high-fiving and pats-on-the-
back. 
Clubgoers I encountered were in various stages of training for (or recovering from) a 
dazzling range of athletic events: Nationally famous or local foot races of varying length across 
the country (including the Leadville 100-mile, the Boston marathon, or the 10K Bolder Boulder); 
the gamut of triathlon distances at race events across the country (from the Coeur d’Alene 
Ironman in Idaho to the women-only Outdoor Divas sprint triathlon in nearby Longmont); geo-
                              
53 Similarly, another quotable “fitspo” fragment that inspires identification with training is this one: 
“Joggers bounce up and down at red lights. Runners just stand there looking pissed.”  
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specific climbing projects scattered around the world (whether traditional multi-pitch, sport 
climbing, or bouldering routes); Muddy Buddy-type races; hiking each of Colorado’s 14,000-
foot peaks; upcoming local aerial yoga, aerial dance, or partner yoga performances or 
demonstrations; and local cyclocross and orienteering events. This impressive list is just from a 
sampling of people within the relatively small social community of amateur athletes with whom I 
am acquainted. 
The range of events, across dispersed geographic locales, demonstrate a few things about 
vitality-performing biocitizens. Perhaps most obviously, biocitizens who train have access to the 
financial resources required not only to complete the training itself, but also to purchase a round-
trip commercial airline flight, a hotel stay, and race registration fees. (For longer races like the 
IronMan, these fees can reach one thousand dollars). Second, competing at these events often 
entails the consumption of tourist experience, especially as many of the events take place in 
desirable locations. According to ironman.com, the Coeur d’Alene Ironman vies for the “most 
breathtaking scenery” on the Ironman circuit, because it takes place “in the pristine heart of one 
of Idaho’s prettiest areas.”54 Here we see the conflation of life itself with lifestyle, as the 
burgeoning race event management industry tailors to vitality-performing biocitizens. 
More importantly, training for any of these events infuses the biocitizen’s performances 
of vitality with purpose and direction. Like the good neoliberal citizen, the vital biocitizen is 
goal-directed and future-oriented. The biocitizen on a treadmill is not a hamster on a wheel; she 
does not exercise for the sake of exercise. She does not nonchalantly determine the timing, 
duration, or vigor of her exercise as it suits her mood. Rather, she is engaged in an organized, 
charted, and planned self-disciplinary regime, which often includes multiple workouts per day 
                              
54 “IRONMAN Coeur d'Alene,” Ironman. 
http://www.ironman.com/triathlon/events/americas/ironman/coeur-dalene.aspx#axzz32Cw3SVH1. 
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and planned meals. Even activities that seem relaxing, such as “gentle” or “restorative” yoga 
classes (offered at both gyms) or massages, are justified through discourses of training. 
Biocitizens are encouraged to partake in these activities because they offer muscle recovery 
processes crucial to athletic training and performance. (The sign next to the chair massage area at 
the athletic club says, “You have a training plan. But do you have a recovery plan?”) In this 
community, the proactive management of “life itself” requires diligence and forethought. 
Rhetorics of training further serve the vital biocitizen in terms of bio/legitimizing the 
demanding and time-consuming practices of vitality. Many of the biocitizens with whom I 
interact at the gym expend large amounts of time, financial resources, and physical effort in these 
practices. At times, these resource expenditures run counter to commonsensical notions of what 
counts as wise or healthy. For example, there are people who have not (yet) achieved financial 
stability spend their limited monetary resources on multiple gym memberships, fancy road bikes 
and other equipment, or Whole Foods fare they cannot afford. I include myself among these 
vitality-aspirant fiscal fools.  
On a surface level, the embodied demands of high-achieving amateur athletic 
performance contradict a commit to “life itself.” Many vitality-performing community members 
sustain chronic, debilitating injuries. Climbers wrap injured hand and fingers in white medical 
tape in order to keep training, and stuff their feet into tiny, downturned, excruciating rubber-
soled rock shoes. Because climbing performance is so integrally tied to bodyweight, even 
amateur athletes will drop weight to tackle a project. Stress fractures, blisters, dehydration, 
fatigue, and sprained or torn muscles are just a few of the common maladies suffered as a result 
of intense training regimes. One man I interviewed successfully completed a 100-mile run at 
altitude (the famous Leadville 100), an accomplishment for which he was proud despite a 
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resulting debilitating ankle injury. When I asked him if his training and competition resulted in a 
net gain for his overall health, he admitted that it probably did not. He agreed that there was 
probably more harm than good done to his body as a result of his exertions. (This man’s 
certification as a physical therapist lent his assessment of his overall health some credibility). At 
the same time, he insisted that the glory of the completed achievement was absolutely worth it. 
From these sustained bodily injuries, we can see that sometimes the pressures of competition and 
achievement exceed the logics of biolegitimacy. 
If this man or others like him were “merely” exercising, their multi-hour-per-day workout 
habits might raise eyebrows or fuel suspicions of pathological relationships with exercise. But 
the rhetorically (bio)legitimate rhetoric of training sanctions all sorts of behaviors that would 
otherwise be deemed compulsive, shallow, appearance-obsessed, or disordered. The statement, 
“I’ve got to keep up with my training schedule,” will continue to carry more rhetorical punch 
than “I’ve got to keep up with my exercise routine.” When the vital biocitizen is in training, we 
are invited to admire her vital fortitude and drive. 
A commitment to “life itself” appears in other rhetorics of training. For two years, I 
regularly attended a group fitness class at the club called Bosu® Explosion.55 The class 
combined agility drills, weightlifting, and balance training on the unstable inflated surface of a 
Bosu® Ball. During one class last year, I was moved by the instructor’s energetic oratory during 
a “max effort” agility drill. I paraphrase here: 
 
Why are you doing this? Why are you here today? I can bring the energy, but you have to 
bring the effort. If you want what you’ve never had before, be willing to work like you 
                              
55 When I first started working out at the gym, the class was called Bosu® Blast. The name change 
reflected a club-wide decision to engage more male-identified persons in group fitness classes, which also included 
expanding the number of group fitness classes led by men.   
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never have before. This is your work out. What do you want from you life? Do you want 
to be around for the people you love? Do you want to be around a few more years for 
your kids? Then you have to work for it. You have to earn it, right here, right now. 
 
 In this exhortation, the instructor introduces a causal link between prolonged life (as mere 
existence, “be[ing] around”) and the effort exercised in the agility drill. In order to motivate 
participants, he invoked biolegitimate rhetoric of life itself as the ultimate goal towards which we 
work. In his role as group fitness instructor, Walter operates as a biopedagogue, guiding 
participants towards performances of proper biocitizenship. In this example, biocitizenship 
requires vigorous physical effort in order to attain life itself. In response to Walter’s invitation, a 
little voice in me cried, “I want to be around for my children!” I knifed my knees up to my chest 
to the loud beats of the music with vociferous effort. That I don’t have children was beside the 
point. For a brief moment I was affectively suspended in the endorphin-supplemented joy of 
working towards my future life.   
 The rhetorics of training orient in different ways to a concept of earning. The first is way 
is by a banking metaphor—nothing ventured; nothing gained. Training is the vehicle by which 
aspiring athletes earn the speed, strength, endurance, or agility required to perform in their goal 
event, or required to earn “life.” The second is a metaphor of earning calories from food. After a 
long run, ride, or hike, biocitizens like to discuss how they have earned the food or drink they 
consume afterwards. I have frequently heard vitality-performing biocitizens say something like, 
“The best part of training is earning calories. I work this hard so I can eat whatever I want.” 
Similarly, members of this community often express that food tastes better when it has been 
“earned” through physical effort. I heard a female IronMan say once, “I am in training, so all 
calories taste amazing right now.” It is not just clubgoers who espouse these rhetorics of earning 
calories—the instructors at both gyms do as well. One woman instructing a cycling class at the 
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climbing gym announced, “I am going to visit family in South Carolina next week—I better train 
hard today to earn my biscuits and gravy tomorrow!” Marathon runners often talk about how 
incredible beer tastes after running twenty-six miles.  
I empathize with this rhetoric of “earning” calories, but I find it painfully arrogant as 
well. When I feel as if I have “earned” calories through vigorous physical labor, indulgent food 
is delightful. But there is a dark side to the idea of earning calories. Earning calories implies that 
persons who fail to train have not properly earned, and therefore do not rightly deserve, 
indulgent foods. It assumes that persons not engaged in regular, vigorous exercise have not 
earned the energy from food that they need to survive. In this way it indirectly accusatory to 
obese persons, who (we can only infer) must be consuming unearned calories. Perhaps even 
more problematically, a rhetoric of earned calories encourages vital biocitizens to avail 
themselves of the gentrified, high-end, organic specialty-item food industry in Boulder. The 
ironic problem here is that vital biocitizens training tens of hours per week will consume more 
calories in order to build muscle mass or maintain performance body weight. In this way, it 
seems that the rhetorics of training, especially those regarding earning food, allow for vitality-
performing biocitizens to identify as superior to persons who fail to perform these performances 
of vitality. Ironically, in the very moment when vital biocitizens feel superior for having 
“earned” eggs benedict or foie gras, their bodies are demanding more calories (and therefore 
more of the world’s resources like coal, fresh water, and topsoil intimately tied to global food 
production) than they otherwise would consume. 
As a rhetorical resource, training allows vitality-performing biocitizens to do a number of 
things. First, rhetorics of training infuse performances of vitality with purpose and direction, 
aligning biocitizens with the positive qualities of disciplined neoliberal citizens. Second, training 
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provides a justification for biocitizens to exercise more often, at high intensities, and with more 
negative consequences (such as chronic injury) than would otherwise be socially sanctioned. 
Third, rhetorics of training insist on the earned privilege of biocitizens, averting or subverting a 
narrative around unearned privileges. As a result, it is all too easy for biocitizens to overlook the 
myriad set of privileges required to even begin a training regimen, such as access to the time, 
financial resources, energy, nutritious food, and the sports-specific knowledge required to start a 
training regimen.  
Thus, any accumulated privilege that results in a higher status on the zoerhetorical 
hierarchy—such a leaner, more muscular physique or more adept and able-bodied physical 
movements in a public place—are couched as the result of something that the biocitizen has 
earned through hard work at the gym. In practice, this may or may not be true, but the emphasis 
on training, work, and effort forecloses the possibility for an accessible, popular, public narrative 
where we can identify vitality-performing biocitizens as likely members of a privileged 
populations. Even as Jacqui Alexander maintains that there is no innocence in the empire, it is 
almost easier to come to the biocitizen’s defense than it is to indict her. After all, it required a lot 
of work for her body to accumulate that much privilege in the form of a strong, flexible, mobile, 
hyper-able athleticism. 
 
Vital Biocitizens Perform Whiteness  
  
 A joke in circulation around the gyms hints at the vital biocitizen’s complicated 
relationship with whiteness. Question: why are triathlons so popular in Boulder? Answer: 
because Kenyans can’t afford $15,000 road bikes. This joke tells us a lot about Boulder’s vital 
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biocitizens. Like the audience of this joke, for example, vital biocitizens are implicitly white. 
Whiteness operates as both a mode of social belonging and an unmarked universal norm across 
vital biocitizenly spaces. Further, the social and financial capital of vital biocitizens labels them 
as appropriate neoliberal consumers that being “Kenyan” (that is, being racially and 
economically othered) precludes. I first heard this joke in the climbing gym at Boulder, where it 
takes on additional meaning among the very white, masculine, muscular, slender bodies that 
assemble there. In this section, I explore the intersection of whiteness and vital biocitizenship as 
enacted across my fieldsites.  
 What Joseph Pugliese called “infrastructural whiteness” identifies the ways in which 
whiteness both structures everyday life while paradoxically remaining invisible.56 While there is 
no true “essence” to race, phenotypically or otherwise, race is constantly restaged as an 
ontological truth written on the body, usually in the form of skin color.57 As Megan Foley 
showed in an analysis of media coverage regarding O.J. Simpson, the durable dominion of 
whiteness persists in popular media representations both chronically (in sequential time) and 
kairically (in episodic moments).58 Performances of whiteness as a strategy of social belonging 
are not limited to persons with white skin. Whiteness deeply structures the practices and 
experiences of vital biocitizens at the gym. For example, as scholars have shown, the curve-free, 
slender female idealized body (toward which we may imagine the female vital biocitizen labors) 
                              
56 Joseph Pugliese, “Biometrics, Infrastructural Whiteness, and the Racialized Zero Degree of 
Nonrepresentation,” boundary 2 34, no. 2 (2007): 105-133. 
 
57 Nadine Ehlers, “Hidden in Plain Sight: Defying Juridical Racialization in Rhinelander v. 
Rhinelander,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 1, no. 4 (2004): 313-334. 
 
58 Megan Foley, “Serializing Racial Subjects: The Stagnation and Suspense of the OJ Simpson 
Saga,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 96, no. 1 (2010): 69-88. 
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is an implicitly white body.59 Furthermore, white bodies are already culturally linked to the 
temperance, restraint and good judgment that athletic performances of biolegitimacy require.60 It 
is no accident that the now defunct blog “Stuff White People Like” included entries related to 
performances of vital biocitizenship, such as “Yoga,” “Marathons,” and “Outdoor Performance 
Clothes.”61 
 In June of 2014, the implicit whiteness of the Boulder vital biocitizen was recently 
underscored and made momentarily visible. In a letter to the editor of the local Daily Camera, 
citizen Shannon Burgert aired her concerns regarding a large, fence-high banner that rings the 
pool of one of the upscale athletic clubs in town. (This club is owned by the same company that 
owns the one at which I participant-observed). Her complaint? All fifty of the “larger than 
life…fun in the sun” people on the banner were white.62 Burgert argued that the banner was not 
representative of the diverse community in which we live. Activating her identity as a 
schoolteacher, Burgert challenged the athletic club to help “establish environments that make 
diversity natural for our kids.” We can read this letter as a moment of critical, vernacular 
pushback against the implicit whiteness of the vital biocitizen. However, the implicit whiteness 
of Boulder’s vital biocitizens is not always so visible or so publicly critiqued. 
                              
59 Margaret Duncan and T. Tavita Robinson, “Obesity and Body Ideals in the Media: Health and Fitness 
Practices of Young African-American Women,” Quest 56, no. 1 (2004): 77-104. 
 
60 Helene Shugart, “Ruling Class: Disciplining Class, Race, and Ethnicity in Television Reality Court 
Shows,” The Howard Journal of Communications 17, no. 2 (2006): 79-100. 
 
61 See http://stuffwhitepeoplelike.com. Of white people and marathons, the (white) author wrote: “If you 
find yourself in a situation where a white person is talking about a marathon, you must be impressed or you will lose 
favor with them immediately. Running for a certain length of time on a specific day is a very important thing to a 
white person and should not be demeaned.” “#27 Marathons,” Stuff White People Like, January 26, 2008. 
http://stuffwhitepeoplelike.com/2008/01/26/27-marathons/. 
 
62 Shannon Bugert, “Banner is Not Representative of Our Diversity,” letter to the editor, The Daily Camera, 
June 14, 2014. http://www.dailycamera.com/Opinion/ci_25956842/Shannon-Burgert:-Banner-is-not-representative. 
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 There is a choreographed dance exercise class offered at the athletic club called Zumba®. 
Usually whiteness as an unmarked norm is something that stays right below the surface, but in 
one particular moment of rupture, it made itself present in a crowded Zumba class. Through its 
format, Zumba provides a tourist experience without having to leave Boulder. Each song hails 
from a different country, and the choreographed dance that accompanies it mimics the native 
style of dancing (or the stereotype of the native style of dancing) for that particular country or 
ethnic group. Randy Martin described a similar racial appropriation in this ethnographic work 
taking hip-hop aerobic classes in California.63 While Zumba, as a brand, has more of a focus on 
weight loss (its tagline on the website is “Shake, Shake, Shrink”) than is usually the norm for the 
athletic club, it is still a popular class, especially for middle-aged women.  
In a very uncomfortable moment in Zumba class, the instructor once shouted, “Let’s see 
those African arms, ladies!” In a song coded as “tribal,” we were invited to perform a dance also 
coded as tribal and racially other. In a homologous moment, during a song coded as “Latin,” we 
were invited to shimmy, or move our shoulders back and forth quickly. The fitness instructor, 
whose shimmy is admittedly remarkable, said, “Some people ask me if I am Latina because I can 
shimmy and shake so well! Nope, not a single drop!” In this group fitness class, the instructor 
promotes a commitment to race as an ontological essence while also providing (mostly) white 
women an opportunity to consume racial otherness as exotic and fun. The group fitness 
instructor’s shimmy is operating in analogous way to Helene Shugart’s description of Jennifer 
                              
63 Randy Martin, “The Composite Body: Hip-hop Aerobics and the Multicultural Nation,” Journal of Sport 
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Lopez’s bottom. The “Latina butt,” like the Latina shimmy, authorizes seemingly authentic proof 
of cultural diversity while, again, shoring up a white norm.64 
In a similar way, the “Total Body Bootcamp” group fitness classes also offer a touristic 
glimpse into the working-class lifestyle of military preparedness. Clubgoers are invited to 
consume this experience of class otherness—without, of course, any of the high stakes or danger 
of actually going through military bootcamp. What practices of Zumba in white, upper middle-
class spaces do across race, Total Body Bootcamp does across class. Fitness instructors blow 
whistles, yell at us, and explain the merit of side straddle hops. Depending on the proclivities of 
the instructor, participants may be asked to “military crawl” under imaginary barbed wire and 
swing heavy ropes. As we are invited to identify with soldiers, Diane Keeling would argue that 
we are also invited to identify with masculinist ideals of strength and bodily invulnerability.65 
Total Body Bootcamp offers another lifestyle experience at the athletic club available for 
consumption by the implicitly white vital biocitizen. There is an interesting irony operating when 
upper middle-class clubgoers mimic the exercises of soldiers.66 Recall Foucault’s docile bodies, 
ready to accept control and submission from the state. Vitality-performing biocitizens, at their 
most warrior-like, strengthened, stretched, cardiovascularly efficient, hydrated, and protein-
fueled, are simultaneously at their most submissive and useful to the state.  
                              
64 Helene Shugart, “Crossing Over: Hybridity and Hegemony in the Popular Media,” Communication and 
Critical/Cultural Studies 4, no. 2 (2007): 115-141. 
 
65 Diane Keeling, “His/tory of (Future) Progress: Hyper-Masculine Transhumanist Virtuality,” Critical 
Studies in Media Communication 29, no. 2 (2012): 132-148. 
 
66 Like the racial appropriations mimicked in the Zumba class, mimicking soldiers involves stereotyping 
embodied soldierly habitus. That our idealized image of a transhumanist soldier crawls under the tripwire and is 
resilient in the face of fatigue is symptomatic of the same national anxiety and disapproval that circulates around 
soldierly bodies who act as sedentary “video-game warrior” drone pilots. 
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Whiteness also operates as a mode through which vital biocitizens can align themselves 
with American-identified social belonging. In any instantiation of the concept, biocitizenship is 
always about citizenship—about relating the materiality of the body, broadly construed, to 
projects of social belonging and recognition. In a landmark essay, Thomas Nakayama and Robert 
Krizek identified whiteness as an everyday rhetoric of belonging. In one of the strategic rhetorics 
of whiteness they described, whiteness was conflated with nationality—a move that they suggest 
territorializes the assemblage of the nation by sharpening the national borders.67 The body-
improvement projects of implicitly white vital biocitizens often inflect national identification. As 
Kathleen Lebesco has observed, questioning the scheme of vitality-building in the U.S. is 
“downright unpatriotic, which explains our former Surgeon General Richard Carmona’s equation 
of obesity with the September 11 terror attacks.”68 Vitality-performing biocitizens are enfolded 
into American-identified social belonging through the prism of whiteness. Importantly, Kathryn 
Henne linked citizenship, whiteness, and social belonging to distributions of privilege: 
 
While citizenship can take on a myriad of configurations including imagined, global, 
sexual, biological and even genetic dimensions, there is a common tenet: citizenship 
entails a form of boundary work that delineates insiders—those who enjoy a particular 
status and benefits—and outsiders—those who may desire such privileges but are 
denied.69  
 
                              
67 Thomas Nakayama and Robert Krizek, “Whiteness: A Strategic Rhetoric,” Quarterly Journal of 
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68 Lebesco, “Fat Panic,” 77. There are further links between fitness and combat training. President 
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The biocitizenly boundary work that Henne referenced here is necessarily zoerhetorical as it 
partakes in status re/distributions.  
In sum, whiteness as an infrastructural, strategic, yet invisible mode of social belonging 
operates across performances of vital biocitizenship. While biocitizenly clubgoers rarely (except 
in moments of bawdy humor like the joke that opened this section) reference their race, 
whiteness structures the experiences of the vital biocitizen in a way that reflects the dominance 
of whiteness in the zoerhetorical hierarchy. The slender, fit ideal for which biocitizens labor is 
essentially white. Furthermore, an implicitly white vital biocitizen consumes racial (and class) 
otherness in a variety of experiences offered at the athletic club, such as Zumba and Total Body 
Bootcamp. Finally, whiteness is a mode of social and national belonging. In the strategic rhetoric 
of whiteness, the citizen part of biocitizen becomes important. Levy-Navarro asserted, “the fat 
body…obstruct[s] what should be our manifest destiny—to progress as a nation or 
civilization.”70 We can also assume the opposite: the slender, athletic, white body manifests our 
exceptional destiny as a (white) nation.  
 
Conclusion: Towards a Critique of Life-Building Practices 
 
I opened this chapter with this question from feminist studies scholar Jacqui Alexander: 
“[w]hat do lives of privilege look like in the midst of war and the inevitable violence that 
accompanies the building of an empire?”71 I have generated a critique of vitality-aspiring 
performances of health and physical fitness as they circulate at two athletic facilities in Boulder, 
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Colorado. The zoerhetorics of training and whiteness combine to encourage and legitimate these 
unequal distributions of social status.  
What does this add to zoerhetorical theory? Populations can be nourished toward vitality, 
neglected toward attenuation, or targeted for death. A particular subset of populations nourished 
toward vitality—the fit, vital biocitizens on whom I have focused—engage a range of 
biolegitimate rhetorics to justify their accumulation of privilege. Returning to Didier Fassin’s 
claim that biolegitimacy produces inequalities, Fassin identified the ways in which “technologies 
of government produce inequalities of life but simultaneously erase their traces.”72 Although in 
that moment Fassin was referring to the inability of population statistics practices in South Africa 
under apartheid to identify wide gaps of inequality, his insight is useful for broader zoerhetorical 
theory concerns. We can read the practices of the vital biocitizen as a means by which these 
inequalities are produced just as the traces of these inequalities are erased in rhetorics of training 
and whiteness. In the oscillation between the blurred modes of accruing and enjoying privilege 
that occur at these athletic clubs, vital biocitizens are consistently invited to understand their 
privileges as earned (rather than an accident of geospatial location, birth family, race, etc.). 
Through training and through proper consumption, these bodies congeal the performances of 
both biocitizenship and whiteness.  
The working poor, the chronically ill, the illegally detained, the moderately to severely 
disabled, and the obese constitute populations whose performances of vitality cannot possible 
aspire to match those of the inimitable vital biocitizen, who “exercises” his or her hegemonic 
capacity for a full range of “functional” physical movement and labor. As aspirant vital-
biocitizens, we (I use the inclusive pronoun shamefully now) do not tell each other that we are 
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going to raise our social status, or that we are going to accumulate embodied privilege, or that we 
are on the lucky side of capitalism’s mean flows. Rather, we tell ourselves that we are working 
towards our health, our future, our life. But even as we work towards life, we still require 
an/other to bound or delineate this social belonging. (Inflations required deflations). Practices of 
vitality might accrue attributions of virtue, but as these practices are obsessively internalized in 
the gyms at which I made observations, these attributions of virtue have nothing to do with 
practices of social justice. 
The rhetoric of training funnels focus towards biocitizenly privilege as earned rather than 
unearned. In doing so, it strengthens a system that attributes rhetorical agency to entities higher 
on the zoerhetorical hierarchy and rob agency to entities lower on the hierarchy. In other words, 
as vitality-performing biocitizens are attributed agentic qualities of self-control, discipline, 
autonomy, and strength, their high position on the hierarchy is legitimated and sedimented. They 
are granted more rhetorical agency, in the traditional sense. That is, people are more likely to 
listen when they speak; establishing ethos is less difficult for persons whose privilege-
accumulating bodies conform to a normative ideal.73 The rhetoric of whiteness acts as a strategy 
of social belonging—and therefore exclusion—for biocitizens. Through performances of 
whiteness, clubgoers shore up zoerhetorically ascendant attributions of national belonging. 
I opened this chapter with a vignette about Blaine and his friends watching The Biggest 
Loser while racing each other on their stationary bike trainers. Their story allows me to remark 
on another feature of the zoerhetorical hierarchy as it operates across my field sites. Entities not 
only aspire towards “mounting” the hierarchy, but they also fear sliding down the hierarchy. In 
                              
73 We concede this truth when we instruct our public speaking students to attain credibility by dressing and 
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racial terms, scholars have identified not just an aspiration towards whiteness but also repulsion 
by “anti-blackness.”74 Within the world of the vignette, Blaine and his buddies were both 
aspiring towards vitality but also literally racing away from something (or some Other) low on 
the zoerhetorical hierarchy. In this case, the “blackness” metonymically slid into fatness. Yet 
note that the socially sanctioned, publicly visible zoerhetorical trajectory was the upward one: 
the pure becoming. Privileged persons near the top of the hierarchy have material and discursive 
investments in maintaining the hierarchy. From this tenet we can infer that attempts at 
zoerhetorical ascendance are as much about rhetorically grafting to higher entities/qualities on 
the hierarchy as they are about rhetorically separating from lower entities/qualities. The word 
hew is useful here, with its two contradictory meanings of both “to split from” and “to adhere 
to.” Zoerhetorical movements hew, in both senses of the word, as all splittings are graftings 
somewhere else. 
Finally, one take-home message of this chapter is a caution against the bland valorization 
of health that we see across a range of social sciences, including my home discipline of 
communication. In these studies, health automatically equals good. We should especially be 
skeptical of the social approval we attribute to privileged bodies accumulating more privilege in 
the form of vitality and well-being. A host of zoerhetorics work to distribute social status to this 
particular entity of the vital biocitizen in ways that structurally exclude and other large groups of 
persons. 
                              
74 Jared Sexton and Elizabeth Lee, “Figuring the Prison: Prerequisites of Torture at Abu Ghraib,”  
Antipode 38, no. 5 (2006): 1005-1022. 	  
  
198 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion: 
 
What Can Zoerhetorical Theory Do? 
 
 
Zoerhetorical theory offers pathways for understanding how some lives come to matter 
and some lives fail to matter. If biopolitical and necropolitical regimes function as machines for 
producing bodies nourished towards life, neglected for deterioration, and targeted for death, then 
zoerhetorics are the means by which these inequalities are publicly justified and legitimated. In 
this conclusion, I make brief observations across my case studies, in the effort of sketching some 
propositions for a zoerhetorical theory of the contemporary United States. Specifically, I offer a 
series of topoi, horoi, patterns, and qualities of zoerhetorics. Following this, I identify limitations 
of this project and outline areas for potentially fruitful future research. 
Each case study offered a zoerhetorical reading of an emplaced entity with special or 
unique status vis-à-vis humanity, belonging, and citizenship: the fetus, the terrorist, and the 
biocitizen. Taken together, the zoerhetorical patterns and trajectories in these three field-
assemblages provided a broad-ranging overview of zoerhetorics in the contemporary United 
States. They traversed realms of privilege, markers of humanity, and attributions of vice and 
virtue. Across case studies, we saw the durability of privileges like whiteness, citizenship, social 
belonging, and innocence. Zoerhetorics produce, legitimate, and maintain radical cleavages in 
livability. 
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Zoerhetorical Topoi 
 
We can think of zoerhetorics as a branch of rhetoric analogous to Aristotle’s epideictic, 
deliberative, or forensic rhetorics. For each of these branches, Aristotle offered accompanying 
special topoi for invention, or templates for discovering new arguments. For deliberative oratory, 
by way of example, Aristotle offered four topoi: the good and the unworthy, and the 
advantageous or disadvantageous. Like classical deliberative rhetoric, zoerhetorics also draw on 
the good and the unworthy as topics by which to invent arguments. In the War on Terror, the 
worthy/unworthy topical dichotomy gets rehearsed as the civilian/militant dichotomy. In the 
world of Boulder’s vital biocitizens, the worthy/unworthy topoi take the permutation of 
fitness/fatness. Other topoi of zoerhetorical invention would include binaries like the citizen and 
the foreigner.  
Perhaps the topics of invention that supply the most arguments for contemporary 
zoerhetorics in the contemporary United States would be the biolegitimate and the 
bioillegitimate. Although this strains Didier Fassin’s original definition of the term, we can think 
of biolegitimacy as the rhetorical performance of a commitment to sacred “life itself” or capital-
L Life.1 The opposite, bioillegitimacy, would be a failure to rhetorically perform this 
commitment. Nation-states like the U.S. plumb the topos of biolegitimacy when we call ours a 
“culture of life” and theirs a “culture of death,” like George W. Bush has done. I am not arguing 
that zoerhetors use the word biolegitimacy itself—they clearly do not—but rather that they use 
the words like Life and Death, and these appeals to Life bring powerful results.  
                              
1 Didier Fassin, “Another Politics of Life is Possible,” Theory, Culture & Society 26, no. 5 (2009): 44-60, 
50. 
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Rhetorics of biolegitimacy appeared repeatedly across the case studies. At the National 
Memorial for the Unborn, life is king. The pro-life movement, as their name suggests, performs a 
commitment to life itself. In this case, “Life” manifests as the innocent unborn baby full of 
human potential. The rhetoric of CIA drone strikes in the New York Times also draws on 
biolegitimacy. Drones are mis/understood as weapons that save lives (of servicepersons, 
civilians, and all Americans). In the official Obama administration rhetorics of “precision,” 
“sterile” drones, drones sound more like a brain surgeon’s tools than deadly weapons. If drones 
became the biolegitimate weapon par excellence, then we can think of suicide bombers as their 
bioillegitimate antipodes. Suicide bomb attacks are disavowed in dominant U.S. public rhetorics 
as terrorizing and portrayed as the result of a backwards, Islamic “culture of death.” In Boulder’s 
nonpareil athletic clubs, vital biocitizens perform biolegitimacy when they couch their training in 
terms of life itself. Shaping the body is rendered as the equivalent of shaping life itself. Working 
towards vital Life is clustered with a host of positive associations—goodness, virtue, self-
discipline, etc. Across the case studies, entities like women who practice abortion, the “death-
dealing insects” drone targets, and obese people are discredited along lines of bio(il)legitimacy.  
From here we can draw some preliminary observations regarding biolegitimacy as a 
topical resource for zoerhetorics. First, as I have been insisting, it is best understood as topos 
animated through rhetorical performance. Second, biolegitimacy can be rhetorically performed 
by organs of nation-states, organizations, and individuals, an expansion of Fassin’s original use 
of the term. Third, we can get the same theoretical and political traction out of the corollary 
opposite term of bioillegitimacy. The biolegitimate needs the bioillegitimate against which to 
define itself; self-identified “cultures of life” require “cultures of death.” If a successful 
performance of biolegitimacy accrues credibility, a failed rhetorical performance of 
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biolegitimacy accrues discredit. Finally, and most importantly, hegemonically successful and 
convincing rhetorical performances of biolegitimacy bear no relation to the lethality of a 
particular nation-state, organization, or entity. The United States cautiously guards its monopoly 
on biolegitimacy in order to forward a security agenda that “kills to make life live.”2 
 
The Horoi of the Zoerhetorical Hierarchy 
 
In Ancient Greece, stone markers called horoi delimited the boundaries of Athens and the 
agora. In similar ways, the zoerhetorical hierarchy is sectioned off with boundary markers or 
thresholds. To be inflated or deflated across one of these boundary markers produces 
consequential results for livability. Humanity is perhaps the most salient of these horoi—and as a 
result, one of the most zoerhetorically contested of these boundary markers. In addition to 
species, the other biopolitically entrenched markers of difference that operate as zoerhetorical 
horoi include citizenship, race, gender, sexuality, and ability. So structurally integral are these 
boundary markers that we can even say zoerhetorics are only consequential when they traverse a 
horos. In other words, zoerhetorics influence livability in the very moment that an entity’s status 
changes across one of these horoi. 
We can think of these horoi as the bottlenecks of the zoerhetorical hierarchy. It generally 
takes more rhetorical force to jump over (trope) or slide (metonymically shift) an entity across 
one of these bottlenecked boundaries, just as it takes more force to push matter through an actual 
bottleneck. Across the field-assemblages under consideration, different horoi became important. 
Humanhood (articulated as personhood or “life”) was the threshold that obsessed the NMU. 
                              
2 Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live (New York: 
Routledge, 2009). 
  
202 
Through memorialization, naming, en/voicing, and en/facing, NMU rhetorics energetically 
troped the unborn upwards through the bottlenecked horoi of humanity. Of course, they did not 
stop at humanity. As I showed, the NMU understood the unborn not only as people, but also as 
hegemonically gendered people with American-identified embodied habits.  
A different set of horoi became the focus for CIA drone rhetorics as they appeared in the 
New York Times. American-identified drone rhetorics revolved around the horoi of social 
belonging (as indexed by citizenship) and innocence (as indexed by civilian/militant status). 
Excluded from the territory of citizenship and innocence, CIA drone targets inched down the 
bottleneck of social belonging. For Boulder’s vital biocitizens, whiteness became an important 
horos in the slow accumulation of embodied privilege. There is a simple test to determine the 
important horoi for a given hierarchy. If an entity’s inflation above or deflation below a certain 
watermark results in differences in livability, we can think of this threshold as a horos of the 
zoerhetorical hierarchy. Another way to locate horoi is in the moment of defining “us” against an 
“other.” Judith Butler may as well have been referencing horoi when she remarked that “the 
inhuman, the beyond the human, the less than human, is the border that secures the human in its 
ostensible reality.”3  
 
Zoerhetorical Forms: How Zoerhetorics Meet Language 
 
 Through this dissertation, I have identified a number of means by which zoerhetorics 
“meet language” or get uttered, practiced, or performed into being. There are a handful of 
zoerhetorical forms or patterns that I have explored in the case studies: metonymic sticking 
                              
3 Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (New York: Routledge, 2004), 30. 
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(sliding), naming, en/voicing (apostrophe) and en/facing (prosopopeia). Following an intellectual 
lineage from Friedrich Nietzsche, Paul de Man, Megan Foley, Diane Davis, and Johanna 
Hartelius, tropes are moments when language does things. If tropes (tropos in Greek means 
“turn”) are moments when discourse “turns” from its “straight” usage, zoetropes are instances 
where such “turns” inflate or deflate the status of a life or lives. As Paul Ricoeur observed of 
them, in the moment of their turning, tropes deviate from their prescribed meanings.4 According 
to Christian Lundberg, reading Jacques Lacan, “the economy of tropes and investments 
constitute the subject and its discourses.”5 We are all rhetorically made in these movements of 
deviation from “straight” discourse. We all have a queer birth. 
 Following Sara Ahmed’s work in The Cultural Politics of Emotion, which suggests that 
Others get stuck together on a kind of metonymic slide, I identified a lumping/splitting of living 
entities along a hierarchy indexed by god and devil terms.6 The associational and dissociational 
movements of entities were made possible by the fungible, gradient nature of the zoerhetorical 
hierarchy—qualities that it inherited from Ancient Greek hierarchies and the early Christian 
Great Chain of Being, along with modern regimes of patriarchy, racism, heterosexism, and 
ableism. Mel Chen’s notion of animacy hierarchies, what she called their transsubstantiations 
and transmatterings, was also key in bringing forward this idea.7 By employing metonymy, drone 
                              
4 Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: The Creation of Meaning in Language (Routledge, New York, 
2003). 
 
5 Christian Lundberg, Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric (Tuscaloosa: University 
of Alabama Press, 2012), 73. 
 
6 Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion (New York: Routledge, 2013). 
 
7 Mel Y. Chen, Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2012), Kindle Edition. 
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rhetorics in the New York Times were able to mobilize the eroded militant/civilian dichotomy in 
order to manufacture racialized targets for drone strikes.  
 At the National Memorial for the Unborn, we saw a series of zoetropings in full effect. In 
order to territorialize their particular construction of the fetal entity as a sacred human, the NMU 
relied on a series of strategic zoetropes. In the second chapter, I analyzed three zoetropes as they 
occurred at the NMU: naming, apostrophe (en/voicement) and prosopopeia (en/facement). These 
rhetorical devices were the means by which the slow, iterable accumulation of humanhood was 
achieved for the unborn. At the same time, I acknowledge that not all human-identified entities 
share the feature of the fetus that makes it so malleably “available” for zoetroping; namely, 
silence.   
My hope has been that the series of zoetropological enfacements I have identified at 
across the case studies can be used to understand the en-facing, or rhetorical “making,” of 
humans more broadly. All human-identified entities are embedded within accumulations of the 
effects of zoetropological gestures. In the third chapter, I argued that drone rhetorics in the New 
New York Times feature a metonymic reduction that “creates” terrorists. Across the case studies, 
I have been thinking of the zoetropological effects of metonymy, naming (arguably a subdivision 
of metonymy), apostrophe, and prosopopeia with the following metaphor. Metonymic sliding or 
shifting—the gesture of calling something by a different name—is like the simple, light pressure 
of a foot against the pedal of a bicycle. You aren’t going to make much progress in one stroke, 
but repeating the movement over and over might get you somewhere. The other tropes, 
apostrophe and prosopopeia, are a little bit more powerful than metonymy’s light pressure. They 
can be compared to the changing of the bicycle’s gears. Like riding up a hill, a more 
mechanically efficient movement is required to “shift” an entity over a contested horoi like 
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humanity. The ways in which other human-identified entities are zoetroped as subjects would be 
a great direction for future research. 
 
Qualities of Zoerhetorics: Four Propositions 
 
1. Zoerhetorics are interdependent and dynamic. 
One of the interesting things to note about the zoetropological enfacements at the NMU is 
that naming, apostrophe, and prosopopeia inflate explicitly. The metonymic lumping/splitting 
downshifting trope is more likely to do the work of deflation. If there is a pattern here of certain 
zoetropes inflating and other zoetropes deflating, it is not yet identifiable. What is identifiable, 
however, is this: all inflations probably involve deflations elsewhere. When tropes “turn” to 
inflate one entity they likely “turn” away from another group of entities. From this observation 
we can infer that attempts at zoerhetorical ascendance are as much about rhetorically grafting to 
higher entities/qualities on the hierarchy as they are about rhetorically separating from lower 
entities/qualities. As I have identified earlier, the word hew is useful here, with its two 
contradictory meanings of both “to split from” and “to adhere to.” All zoerhetorical modulations 
hew, in both senses of the word, splittings entities off from some group and grafting them on to 
another. Lumpings necessarily split and splittings necessarily lump. Again, I will reiterate that 
these movements are not zero-sum games, but rather conform to general patterns of 
consequential status modulation. 
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 Kenneth Burke ends a likely original snippet of poetry in Rhetoric of Religion with  
“What God or Devil makes men climb/ no end?”8 The God or Devil part is important here, 
because it is not just ascendance that moves us, not just the aspiration towards Go(o)d or 
perfection or goodness or other things on top of the hierarchy (as he implied at the end of 
Rhetoric of Motives).9 Rather, we are also moved by the Devil, which, logologically speaking, 
stands in for a host of repulsions. We can think about this another way. Entities are not interested 
solely in pure, ascendant, upward movement. They are also motivated by repulsion from what is 
at the bottom of the hierarchy. Some scholars have called this repulsion anti-blackness—we 
don’t just aspire to whiteness; we run from what we might call “blackness.”10  
I opened the fourth chapter with a story where Blaine and his friends were racing each 
other for mileage on stationary bikes while watching The Biggest Loser. This vignette is helpful 
for understanding the double affective movement of repulsion/aspiration. Within the world of the 
anecdote, Blaine and his buddies were both aspiring towards vitality but also literally racing 
away from something (or some Other) low on the zoerhetorical hierarchy. In this case, the 
“blackness” metonymically slid into “fatness.” Yet note that the socially sanctioned, publicly 
visible zoerhetorical trajectory was the upward one: the pure becoming. In fact, the Blaine 
vignette is reproachable exactly to the extent we identify the bikers as recognizing themselves as 
superior to the Biggest Loser contestants. 
                              
8 Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1970), 42. 
 
9 In his much-quoted line on hierarchy in Rhetoric of Motives, Burke implies a desire for ascendant 
aspiration but not repulsion from below: “…each kind striving towards the perfection of its kind, and so towards the 
kind next above it, while the strivings of the entire series head in God as the beloved cynosure and sinecure, the end 
of all desire.” Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (New York: New York Press, 1950), 333. 
 
10 Jared Sexton and Elizabeth Lee, “Figuring the Prison: Prerequisites of Torture at Abu Ghraib,” 
Antipode 38, no. 5 (2006): 1005-1022. 
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 Each field-assemblage exhibited trajectories of both inflation and deflation. At the 
National Memorial for the Unborn, women whose reproductive practices do not conform to those 
sanctioned by the NMU—that is, women who abort—were deflated. Official government drones 
rhetorics and drone rhetorics in the New York Times consistently invited American-identified 
persons into an in-group deserving of protection (a “hewing” to), and disinvited military-aged 
male Islamic Others (a “hewing” from). In the world of Boulder’s vital biocitizen, persons with 
absent or unsuccessful performances of vital biocitizenship were deflated. Inflations tend to be 
more biolegitimate; deflations tend to be bioillegitimate. The biolegitimate rhetorics, in turn, are 
more likely to be visible and publicly sanctioned, which presumes my next point on zoerhetorical 
in/visibility. 
   
2. Zoerhetorics are visible and invisible. 
One of the patterns emerging from these case studies and zoerhetorics writ broadly is that 
ascendant zoerhetorics are typically socially sanctioned and hypervisible, whereas their corollary 
descendent zoerhetorics are often concealed, denied, invisible, or euphemistic. We see this at the 
NMU, where the descendent zoerhetorical vector (that excludes women with different 
reproductive practices) is absent or silent. We also see this with drone rhetorics, as the 
descendent trajectory targets persons marked with euphemisms like “combatant” or Devil terms 
like “terrorist.” At the gym, the practices around the “cult of the body” are just about the most 
socially sanctioned, generally approved, unequivocal “good” operating in the contemporary 
United States. It should be no surprise that one of the most hypervisible and socially sanctioned 
ascendant zoerhetorical narratives—the will to health—would drag the largest shadow. The 
descendent vector excluded persons who did not perform vital biocitizenship.  
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Similarly, zoerhetorics are both present and absent. Sometimes silence serves a 
zoerhetorical function—as when, for example, the New York Times spends minimal above-the-
fold inches on the deaths of civilians in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, but 
the deaths of American citizens get pages and pages. We can think of this as a kind of ironic 
paraleipsis—a moment where, in the very gesture of saying little, what is omitted is emphasized. 
The take-home message here is that zoerhetorics need not always speak loudly to have an effect. 
 
3. Zoerhetorics are directed at both self and other. 
Consequential status modulations may be the result of a zoerhetoric addressing a self (or 
a group that includes the self) or addressing another (or a group of others). In the case of drone 
warfare as mediated in the New York Times, journalists and online comment forum participants 
spoke for drone targets, with identifiable deflationary zoerhetorical effects. In the case of fetal 
memorialization at the National Memorial for the Unborn, volunteers and visitors spoke for 
unborn babies, with identifiable inflationary zoerhetorical effects. In this project I have chiefly 
explored how the status of a group of entities can be mediated through other-directed 
zoerhetorics, while spending less time exploring how entities can and do zoerhetorically 
modulate their own statuses (drone targets and the unborn, conceivably, among these entities).  
Vital biocitizens were the exception to this pattern. In the case of rhetorics of fitness 
practices at the athletic club, participants speak for themselves—with, again, identifiable 
zoerhetorical effects for both selves and others. In their zoerhetorical exertions, vital biocitizens 
attempted to inflate their own status. Perhaps because of this “auto-zoerhetorical” movement 
(that is, zoerhetorics acted on the self), vitality-aspirant biocitizens at the gym had to do some 
interesting maneuvering in order to justify their intensely self-obsessed gazes. The rhetorics of 
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training, “earning” accumulated body privilege, “earning” calories, the mythology of infinite 
body malleability, the virtue of health practices—all of these things served to rationalize and 
justify an “economy of attention” where “self” is the chief agent, substrate, and workstation.11 
Further, I will propose that there is a more general manifestation of privilege here. Self-directed, 
upward-troping zoerhetorics are more likely to “stick” to high-status entities, who then 
potentially gain another dimension of rhetorical agency in their self- and life-affirming 
performances. 
 
4. Zoerhetorics are extra/ordinary. 
The zoerhetorical hierarchy is built and rebuilt in both spectacular, headline-making 
moments as well as in everyday habits and practices such as going to the gym. Drone strikes are 
marked, striking, spectacular events. When I planned the case studies for this dissertation, I 
intended the everyday mundanity of working out at the gym as a counter the spectacularity of 
drone strikes and fetal memorials. Lauren Berlant offered a theoretical foothold for making sense 
of this with her theory of “slow death.” This dissertation project has been largely inspired by 
Achille Mbembe’s vision of necropolitical deathworlds, where populations targeted for death are 
crucial to (and not merely a sad accident of) biopolitical regimes of living. Pivotal to Berlant’s 
slow death is an everyday ordinariness for which Mbembe’s extraordinary crises failed to 
account. Arguably, consequential shifting of an entity’s status occurs in small, everyday, iterable 
movements. The daily minutiae of activities constitutes the zoerhetorical makings and 
unmakings of self and other.  
                              
11 Richard A. Lanham, The Economics of Attention: Style and Substance in the Age of Information 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).  
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Berlant was interested in tracking the livability of life for people who were not 
spectacularly murdered in the War on Terror, but rather just neglected for a slow deterioration. 
The working class obese represented this population for her. In my chapter on the vital 
biocitizen, I extended Berlant’s concept of “slow death” with a concept of “slow life.” Vital 
biocitizens were engaged in daily, repeated, zoerhetorically consequential habits of life-building. 
Drone strike rhetorics cover both poles of the ordinary and extraordinary. The actual missile 
strike itself can be read as a spectacular zoerhetorical event. At the same time, the zoerhetorical 
symbolic practices around drone strikes (as collected, for example, in the New York Times), 
accumulate force in slow, daily iterations. Memorials to the unborn are also extra/ordinary. Most 
people are shocked to hear that they exist—they are out of the ordinary, in that sense. At the 
same time, they are also ordinary in that visitors and volunteers participate in slow, daily 
practices of fetal life-building. Interesting questions for future research include: do ordinary 
zoerhetorics take different forms, or perform different operations, than extraordinary ones? What 
are some examples of consequential one-off zoerhetorical events? 
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 
Mapping a zoerhetorical theory has been an ambitious project—a project in whose value 
I firmly believe. Given the time and genre constraints of a dissertation, I have only begun to 
complete such a project. My radical hope is that zoerhetorical theory will someday be a sustained 
research topic in rhetorical theory whose polyvocal reverberations respond to, and terrifically 
exceed, my own voice here. To that optimistic end, I offer a series of limitations of this 
dissertation, each of which open out to promising future directions. Zoerhetorical theory could be 
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refined and expanded with the following premises in mind. First, the commitment that I have 
made here to a liberal pluralist (and especially pro-life) politics is in tension with the 
posthumanism I also push. Second, my study of zoerhetorics has been limited geographically and 
culturally to fairly hegemonic rhetorics in the United States. Third, I fall short of articulating an 
affirmative zoerhetorical practice—a zoetechnics, if you will. Fourth, an entity-assemblage, 
rather than a field-assemblage, might be a more productive unit of zoerhetorical analysis. Fifth 
and finally, zoerhetorics need to be understood longitudinally—especially if, as I claim 
repeatedly, zoerhetorical effects often slowly accumulate over a series of rhetors, publics, 
venues, and time frames. Let me elaborate briefly on each of these opportunities. 
 One inconsistency in this project would be glaringly obvious to anyone who believes that 
abortion is murder. While I rail at length on behalf of populations targeted for death, living in 
deathworlds, I do not identify fetal entities as populations targeted for death. By employing the 
same theoretical lens of necropolitical deathworlds, a pro-lifer could identify fetuses as 
populations targeted for death—indeed, this has already happened—the so-called “war on the 
unborn” has been repeatedly compared to the Holocaust. It is well documented that the pro-life 
movement, as well as its generational offshoots who argue for the sanctity of life for stem cells 
and brain dead persons, have harnessed the language of the progressive left for their own 
purposes.12 That there have been arguments for the rights, voices, and freedoms of the unborn are 
but a few examples of this. I can even imagine the pro-life movement identifying the 
zoerhetorically deflationary subtleties in rhetorics of reproductive freedom.  
                              
12 For example, this essay find analogues in fetal rights rhetorics with animal rights rhetorics: Jason Edward 
Black, “Extending the Rights of Personhood, Voice, and Life to Sensate Others: A Homology of Right to Life and 
Animal Rights Rhetoric,” Communication Quarterly 51, no. 3 (2003): 312-331. 
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I will not pretend, in this moment, to solve the abortion debate, nor will I even make a 
pitch for the pro-choice side. However, I want to be clear that I have chosen my political 
orientation, and I will adhere to the zoerhetorical demands of this orientation (i.e. avoiding 
inflations of the fetal entity). As I disclosed in the chapter on the NMU, I am a pro-choice 
feminist. This has been both a strength and weakness of the study. Insofar as it has led me to 
identify ways that the NMU’s zoerhetorical actions foreclose certain reproductive practices, a 
feminist orientation has been a boon. But the fact remains that the chapter on the NMU would be 
enraging, even incomprehensible, to a person for whom the fetus is a full human deserving of 
citizenship. Therefore, I approached the fetus with my own zoerhetorical lens, even as I worked 
to expose the zoerhetorical lens of the NMU. Further, I recognize my stance here for a woman’s 
right to choose as squarely humanist, as it calls on familiar liberal narratives of freedom, choice, 
and autonomy. I am aware that this leaves me open to the criticism that I shift from a humanism 
to a posthumanism as it suits my needs, but I would call this more of an unapologetic collage 
than a devastating contradiction. Humanism leaves me with an impoverished ontology, as well as 
a history of collusion with colonialism. At the same time, the shifting posthumanist grounds for 
ethical commitments keeps demanding that I refer back to the solid ethical grounding of 
humanism. 
Commitments to Western liberal pluralism have squirreled their way into this dissertation 
in other areas as well. For example, I have only looked at fairly hegemonic zoerhetorics, as they 
appear in standard English, in the United States. Would zoerhetorics meet language in other 
ways in other languages and across other cultures? Certainly people in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, against the incessant background noise of flying Predator 
drones, inflate and deflate differently than hegemonic zoerhetorics in the United States. What 
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topoi and horoi would territorialize zoerhetorical inflations and deflations in other cultural 
milieus? What does hierarchy-building look like for groups that do not occupy its upper 
echelons? What do zoerhetorics of resistance look like? Biolegitimacy, for example, as a 
ubiquitous topos of zoerhetorical invention in the contemporary United States, would clearly 
have more or less traction in different sociohistorical contingencies. Cross-cultural mappings of 
zoerhetorics would enrich zoerhetorical theory. If I don my posthumanist hat, I wonder if cross-
species mappings of zoerhetorics would be even more interesting. Do great apes manufacture 
Otherness amongst themselves the same ways that we manufacture Otherness? Do cetaceans 
zoetrope? 
Speaking of great apes—what is their “proper” place in the hierarchy? Where do humans 
go in the hierarchy? Who/what should count as human? These are all questions that zoerhetorical 
theory cannot directly answer. I have tried to resist any reification of the current arrangement of 
the zoerhetorical hierarchy. I have also tried to resist making any claims for an entity’s “proper” 
place in the hierarchy, even the proper place of the human. Because of the shifting ground of 
exclusionary inclusions, I would not even claim that all zoerhetorics that inflate humans are 
good. (All the while, I have smuggled in my own zoerhetorical lenses, which host ethical 
commitments to, for example, fecund women, War on Terror targets, and the obese poor). 
Zoerhetorical theory, as I have outlined it here, falls short of dictating any guidelines for 
zoerhetorical practice—a zoetechnics, if you will. It is not my project here, but it would be 
worthwhile to imagine a deliberative craft of zoetechnics operating in the service of a justice 
beyond human justice. At the outset of this dissertation, when I was discussing methodology, I 
wrote that one of the challenges of using frameworks like assemblage theory or posthumanist 
theory is that it becomes difficult to make normative claims about what humans should do—
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about how we should live together. Zoerhetorical theory employed in the service of a human 
rights project, for example, would be counter-intuitive to the way I have outlined it here. From a 
posthumanist frame, universal human rights movements exhibit what Damien Pfister would call 
“speciesist hubris.”13 At the same time, I am jazzed by the openings between posthumanism, 
bioegalitarianism, and deep ecology. The editors of the journal Humanimalia wrote in their 
“Humanimalifesto” that “for deep ecologists, Gaians, and other naturalists, post-humanism 
means dissolving humanity back into a super-organic natural world-system, where it will be one 
kind of animal on a level with others.”14  
Another strength-cum-limitation of the current study is its unit of analysis. I delved into 
specific field-assemblages in order to gather the rich, status-modulating data that occurred at 
particular sites. This was not a mistake, as these sites proved to be replete with consequential 
zoerhetorics. However, it would also be germane to zoerhetorical theory to take a certain group 
of entities—fetal entities, aspirant biocitizens, drone targets, what have you—and track the 
matrix of intersectional and conflicting zoerhetorics for one particular group of entities. We 
could call this potentially productive unit of analysis an entity-assemblage, and it could 
potentially replace the field-assemblages with which I have worked here. Along these lines, in 
this project, I chose to focus on entities with complex, contested relationships to the horos of 
humanity: the fetus, the drone target, the vital biocitizen. What about the zoerhetorical 
modulations of regular, everyday, average folks? Sarah Palin’s mythical Joe six-pack would 
make a provocative entity-assemblage for zoerhetorical analysis. 
                              
13 Damien Pfister, ““A Short Burst of Inconsequential Information:” Networked Rhetorics, Avian 
Consciousness, and Bioegalitarianism,” Environmental Communication 8, no. 4 (2014): 1-19, 2. 
 
14 The “Humanimalifesto” lists no authors other than the editors of the journal Humanimalia, which 
published its first issue in 2009. http://www.depauw.edu/humanimalia/humanimalifesto.html. 
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Along the lines of expanding the scope of a potential zoerhetorical theory, it would also 
be productive to track zoerhetorics longitudinally for a given group of entities. I have repeatedly 
stated that zoerhetorics are slow accumulations or slow depletions. One zoerhetoric does not a 
human make. While zoerhetorical modulations can occur in a quick, one-off event, they are more 
likely to occur over a long sweeping period of time. In her work on companion species, Donna 
Haraway made a gesture in this direction.15 The (often humanized) status of companion animals 
like dogs is remarkably different today than it was hundreds of years ago. Similarly, Nathan 
Stormer’s corpus of work identifies various modes and discourses of fetal inflation over a range 
of historical periods in the United States.16 
One possible objection to this study would be that it borrows from the interpretive frames 
of Burke’s hierarchy and Mbembian biopolitics/necropolitics to coin a set of terms that fail to 
actually assert an original theory. The Jamesian “cash value” of zoerhetorical theory goes beyond 
a biopolitically-sensitive Burkean analysis and a rhetorically-sensitive necropolitical analysis. 
While this dissertation is transparently deeply indebted to those frameworks, the way in which I 
have stitched them together here has produced an emergent product—a useful configuration for 
understanding the world, a set of tools—that neither Burkean hierarchies or necropolitics could 
supply on their own, without the lens (or terministic screen) of zoerhetorical theory. 
“Zoerhetorics” identify the rhetorical processes by which the status of entities are modulated 
along sociopolitical hierarchies—a “naming” of a concept through which both Burke and 
biopolitical/necropolitical scholars traffic but never dwell. The identification of this category (it 
                              
15 Donna Haraway, The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness (Chicago: 
Prickly Paradigm Press, 2003); Donna Haraway, When Species Meet. No. 224. University of Minnesota Press, 2008. 
 
16 Nathan Stormer, “Why Not? Memory and Counter-Memory in 19th-century Abortion Rhetoric,”   
Women’s Studies in Communication 24, no. 1 (2001): 1-29; Nathan Stormer, Articulating Life’s Memory: U.S. 
Medical Rhetoric about Abortion in the Nineteenth Century (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002). 
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is too diverse to be a genre) of contemporary public rhetorics provided the opportunity to map a 
series of general topics from which it draws, boundaries it traverses, and patterns to which it 
typically conforms—the topoi, horoi, forms, and propositions I elaborated above. 
Despite these limitations to the current study, I can firmly conclude that zoerhetorics 
matter. Across the case studies I have enumerated the way in which zoerhetorics produce 
consequential distributions of livability for fetal entities, drone strike targets, and vital 
biocitizens. I have also tried to discuss the ways in which the zoerhetorics around fetuses, drone 
targets, and biocitizens affect the group against which they push for boundedness: women who 
abort, American citizens in need of protection from terrorists, and slowly deteriorating working 
class obese Americans. Zoerhetorics matter not just for these folks, but also for all living entities, 
from amoeba to celebrities, from puppies to Barack Obama, from heirloom vegetables to persons 
in persistent vegetative states. At the risk of sounding dramatic, zoerhetorics are a matter of life 
and death, of lives livable and unlivable. (Of course, even as I make that very humanist claim, I 
draw on the very topos of biolegitimacy that zoerhetors turn to again and again). The entities for 
whom zoerhetorics matter traverse the horos of humanity. 
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